Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/95

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In late December 2002, following a meeting at CIA Headquarters to discuss resuming the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri,  , the chief of RDG[1]—the entity that managed the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program—objected to sending   [CIA OFFICER 2] to the detention site because he "had not been through the interrogation training" and because   "had heard from some colleagues that [  [CIA OFFICER 2]] was too confident, had a temper, and had some security issues."   later learned from other CIA officials that "[CTC chief of operations  ] wanted [  [CIA OFFICER 2]] at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] over the holidays."   told the Office of Inspector General that "his assessment is that the Agency management felt that the [RDG] interrogators were being too lenient with al-Nashiri and that [  [CIA OFFICER 2]] was sent to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] to 'fix' the situation."[2]

(TS// //NF)   [CIA OFFICER 2] arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December  , 2002, and the CIA resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despite the fact that   [CIA OFFICER 2] had not been trained, certified, or approved to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.   [CIA OFFICER 2] wrote in a cable to CIA Headquarters that "[al]-Nashiri responds well to harsh treatment" and suggested that the interrogators continue to administer "various degrees of mild punishment," but still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introducing some 'minute rewards.'"[3]

(TS// //NF) It was later learned that during these interrogation sessions,   [CIA OFFICER 2], with the permission and participation of the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base, who also had not been trained and qualified as an interrogator, used a series of unauthorized interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri. For example,   [CIA OFFICER 2] placed al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed over his head" for approximately two and a half days.[4] Later, during the course of al-Nashiri's debriefings, while he was blindfolded,   [CIA OFFICER 2] placed a pistol near al-Nashiri's head and operated a cordless drill near al-Nashiri's body.[5] Al-Nashiri did not provide any additional threat information during, or after, these interrogations.[6]


  1. As described, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records.
  2. Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,  , February 23, 2003.
  3.   10140 (031727Z JAN 03)
  4. See email from:  ; to  ; subject: EYES ONLY – [ ] ONLY – MEMORANDUM FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003. In an April 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, Senator Carl Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[p]rolonged stress standing position, naked, arm[s] chained above the head...." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator." See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
  5. See, for example, CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003; email from [DETENTION SITE BLUE] COB  ; to:  ; subject: EYES ONLY - [ ] ONLY -- MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.
  6. For additional details, see Volume III.

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