Page:United States Army Field Manual 3-13 Information Operations.djvu/14

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distorted information by indirect means (through the information environment) or direct means (such as deceiving friendly intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR] systems). • Simulative electromagnetic deception comprises actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces (JP 3-51). For example, a military deception operation may place surveillance radars in a typical defensive array when, in fact, the commander’s intention is to attack. • Imitative electromagnetic deception is the introduction of electromagnetic energy into enemy systems that imitates enemy emissions (JP 3-51).

1-24. Electronic Attack. Electronic attack is that division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Electronic attack includes (1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an adversary’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and (2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams) (JP 3-51). Electronic attack (EA) against friendly C2 systems and their associated networks can occur at any time.during peace, crisis, or war. Army C2 systems are always subject to attack, regardless of the level of international tensions or hostilities. 1-25. Adversaries may try to inhibit operations by shutting down networks through electronic means. Some adversaries can conduct computer network attacks (CNAs) as well. Computer networks are particularly vulnerable to denial of service attacks. Networks do not have to be compromised or destroyed to disable them. Hackers can deny use of a network or other INFOSYS without gaining access to it. This capability makes denial of service attacks hard to defend against. 1-26. Physical Destruction. Weapons that can destroy, disrupt, or degrade C2 systems by physically destroying parts of them range from terrorist bombs to artillery, missiles, and aircraft. The ability of adversaries to strike will only grow as more capable systems, such as cruise missiles and precision- guided munitions, proliferate. The spread of such technologies as global positioning systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and near real-time-imagery satellites, will enhance precision-strike capabilities. 1-27. Perception Management. Perception management consists of actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover, deception, and psychological operations (JP 3-13). Some adversaries will target friendly forces and interests with perception management activities, such as propaganda and deception, to