Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/250

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

546US1

Unit: $$U5

[08-22-08 13:38:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 21 (2005)

39

Opinion of the Court

ment, the questions submitted to the jury after trial asked jurors to consider only whether Barber was required to com­ pensate petitioners for the time they spent actually donning and doffing various gear. Before the case was submitted to the jury, the parties stip­ ulated that four categories of workers—rotating, setup, meatroom, and shipping and receiving associates—were re­ quired to don protective gear at the beginning of their shifts and were required to doff this gear at the end of their shifts. The jury then made factual findings with regard to the amount of time reasonably required for each category of em­ ployees to don and doff such items; the jury concluded that such time was de minimis and therefore not compensable. The jury further concluded that two other categories of em­ ployees—maintenance and sanitation associates—were not required to don protective gear before starting their shifts.7 Accordingly, the jury ruled for Barber on all counts. On appeal, petitioners argued, among other things, that the District Court had improperly excluded as noncompensa­ ble the time employees spend walking to the production floor after donning required safety gear and the time they spend walking from the production floor to the area where they doff such gear. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ argument, concluding that such walking time was a spe­ cies of preliminary and postliminary activity excluded from FLSA coverage by §§ 4(a)(1) and (2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. 360 F. 3d, at 281. As we have explained in our discus­ sion of IBP’s submission, see Part II, supra, that categorical conclusion was incorrect. Petitioners also argued in the Court of Appeals that the waiting time associated with the donning and doffing of clothes was compensable. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the waiting time qualified as a “preliminary or postliminary activity” and thus was excluded from FLSA 7

The claims brought by these workers are no longer part of this case.