Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/251

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546US1

40

Unit: $$U5

[08-22-08 13:38:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

IBP, INC. v. ALVAREZ Opinion of the Court

coverage by the Portal-to-Portal Act. 360 F. 3d, at 282. Our analysis in Part II, supra, demonstrates that the Court of Appeals was incorrect with regard to the predoffing wait­ ing time. Because doffing gear that is “integral and indis­ pensable” to employees’ work is a “principal activity” under the statute, the continuous workday rule mandates that time spent waiting to doff is not affected by the Portal-to-Portal Act and is instead covered by the FLSA. The time spent waiting to don—time that elapses before the principal activity of donning integral and indispensa­ ble gear—presents the quite different question whether it should have the effect of advancing the time when the work­ day begins. Barber argues that such predonning waiting time is explicitly covered by § 4(a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, which, as noted above, excludes “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to [a] principal activity or ac­ tivities” from the scope of the FLSA. 29 U. S. C. § 254(a)(2). By contrast, petitioners, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, maintain that the predonning waiting time is “integral and indispensable” to the “principal activity” of donning, and is therefore itself a principal activity. How­ ever, unlike the donning of certain types of protective gear, which is always essential if the worker is to do his job, the waiting may or may not be necessary in particular situations or for every employee. It is certainly not “integral and in­ dispensable” in the same sense that the donning is. It does, however, always comfortably qualify as a “preliminary” activity. We thus do not agree with petitioners that the predonning waiting time at issue in this case is a “principal activity” under § 4(a).8 As Barber points out, the fact that certain preshift activities are necessary for employees to engage in their principal activities does not mean that those preshift activities are “integral and indispensable” to a “principal ac­ 8

As explained below, our analysis would be different if Barber required its employees to arrive at a particular time in order to begin waiting.