Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/252

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546US1

Unit: $$U5

[08-22-08 13:38:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 21 (2005)

41

Opinion of the Court

tivity” under Steiner. For example, walking from a time­ clock near the factory gate to a workstation is certainly necessary for employees to begin their work, but it is indisputable that the Portal-to-Portal Act evinces Congress’ intent to repudiate Anderson’s holding that such walking time was compensable under the FLSA. We discern no lim­ iting principle that would allow us to conclude that the wait­ ing time in dispute here is a “principal activity” under § 4(a), without also leading to the logical (but untenable) conclusion that the walking time at issue in Anderson would be a “prin­ cipal activity” under § 4(a) and would thus be unaffected by the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Government also relies on a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Labor as supporting petitioners’ view. That regulation, 29 CFR § 790.7(h) (2005), states that when an employee “is required by his employer to report at a par­ ticular hour at his workbench or other place where he performs his principal activity, if the employee is there at that hour ready and willing to work but for some reason beyond his control there is no work for him to perform until some time has elapsed, waiting for work would be an integral part of the employee’s principal activities.” That regulation would be applicable if Barber required its workers to report to the changing area at a specific time only to find that no protective gear was available until after some time had elapsed, but there is no such evidence in the record in this case. More pertinent, we believe, is the portion of § 790.7 that characterizes the time that employees must spend waiting to check in or waiting to receive their paychecks as generally a “preliminary” activity covered by the Portal-to-Portal Act. See § 790.7(g). That regulation is fully consistent with the statutory provisions that allow the compensability of such collateral activities to depend on either the agreement of the parties or the custom and practice in the particular industry.