Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/258

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546US1

Unit: $$U6

[09-04-08 12:09:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 43 (2005)

47

Opinion of the Court

make the tort liability of the United States “the same as that of a private person under like circumstance, in accordance with the local law”). The Court there considered a claim that the Coast Guard, responsible for operating a lighthouse, had failed “to check” the light’s “battery and sun relay sys­ tem,” had failed “to make a proper examination” of outside “connections,” had “fail[ed] to check the light” on a regular basis, and had failed to “repair the light or give warning that the light was not operating.” Indian Towing, 350 U. S., at 62. These allegations, the Court held, were analogous to allegations of negligence by a private person “who under­ takes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reli­ ance.” Id., at 64–65. It is “hornbook tort law,” the Court added, that such a person “must perform his ‘good Samari­ tan’ task in a careful manner.” Ibid. The Government in effect concedes that similar “good Samaritan” analogies exist for the conduct at issue here. It says that “there are private persons in ‘like circum­ stances’ ” to federal mine inspectors, namely, “private per­ sons who conduct safety inspections.” Reply Brief for United States 3. And other Courts of Appeals have found ready private person analogies for Government tasks of this kind in FTCA cases. E. g., Dorking Genetics v. United States, 76 F. 3d 1261 (CA2 1996) (inspection of cattle); Flor­ ida Auto Auction of Orlando, Inc. v. United States, 74 F. 3d 498 (CA4 1996) (inspection of automobile titles); Ayala v. United States, 49 F. 3d 607 (CA10 1995) (mine inspections); Myers v. United States, 17 F. 3d 890 (CA6 1994) (same); How­ ell v. United States, 932 F. 2d 915 (CA11 1991) (inspection of airplanes). These cases all properly apply the logic of In­ dian Towing. Private individuals, who do not operate light­ houses, nonetheless may create a relationship with third par­ ties that is similar to the relationship between a lighthouse operator and a ship dependent on the lighthouse’s beacon. Indian Towing, supra, at 64–65, 69. The Ninth Circuit should have looked for a similar analogy in this case.