546US1
Unit: $U15
[08-22-08 15:43:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 546 U. S. 164 (2006)
165
Syllabus dealers received in bidding processes in which Reeder did not partici pate. Reeder also compared concessions Volvo offered it on several oc casions when it bid unsuccessfully against non-Volvo dealers (and there fore did not purchase Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions accorded other Volvo dealers who gained contracts on which Reeder did not bid. Reeder did not look for instances in which it received a larger concession than another Volvo dealer, but acknowledged it was “quite possible” that such instances occurred. Nor did Reeder offer any sta tistical analysis revealing whether it was disfavored on average as com pared to other dealers. The jury found a reasonable possibility that discriminatory pricing may have harmed competition between Reeder and other Volvo dealers, that Volvo’s discriminatory pricing injured Reeder, and that Reeder’s damages from Volvo’s Robinson-Patman vio lation exceeded $1.3 million. The District Court awarded treble dam ages on the Robinson-Patman Act claim, and entered judgment. Affirming, the Eighth Circuit, among other things, noted the thresh old requirement that Reeder show it was a “purchaser” within the Act’s meaning; rejected Volvo’s contention that competitive bidding situations do not give rise to Robinson-Patman claims; held that the four instances in which Reeder purchased trucks following successful bids rendered it a purchaser under the Act; determined that a jury could reasonably decide Reeder was in actual competition with favored dealers at the time price differentials were imposed; and held that the jury could prop erly find Reeder had proved competitive injury based on evidence that (1) Volvo intended to reduce the number of its dealers, (2) Reeder lost one contract for which it competed with another Volvo dealer, (3) Reeder would have earned more profits, had it received the conces sions given other dealers, and (4) Reeder’s sales declined over time. Held: A manufacturer may not be held liable for secondary-line price dis crimination under the Robinson-Patman Act in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to re sell its product to the same retail customer. The Act does not reach the case Reeder presents. It centrally addresses price discrimination in cases involving competition between different purchasers for resale of the purchased product. Competition of that character ordinarily is not involved when a product subject to special order is sold through a customer-specific competitive bidding process. Pp. 175–182. 1. Section 2 was enacted to curb financially powerful corporations’ use of localized price-cutting tactics that gravely impaired other sellers’ competitive position. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 543, and n. 6. Augmenting § 2, the Robinson-Patman Act targeted the per ceived harm to competition occasioned by the advent of large chain
