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VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. Syllabus
stores able to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller buyers could demand. Robinson-Patman does not ban all price differences charged to different purchasers of similar commodities, but proscribes only “price discrimination [that] threatens to injure competition,” Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U. S. 209, 220. Of the three categories of competitive injury that may give rise to a Robinson-Patman claim, secondary-line cases, like this one, involve price discrimination that injures competition among the discriminating sell er’s customers (here, Volvo’s dealerships). Reeder has satisfied the Act’s first two requirements for establishing secondary-line injury: (1) The relevant Volvo truck sales were made in interstate commerce, and (2) the trucks were of “like grade and quality,” 15 U. S. C. § 13(a). Because Reeder has not identified any differentially priced transaction in which it was both a “purchaser” under the Act and “in actual competi tion” with a favored purchaser for the same customer, see, e. g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S. 505, 518–519, Volvo and amicus United States maintain that Reeder cannot satisfy the Act’s third and fourth require ments—that (3) Volvo “discriminate[d] in price between” Reeder and another purchaser of Volvo trucks, and (4) “the effect of such discrimina tion may be . . . to injure, destroy, or prevent competition” to the advan tage of a favored purchaser, i. e., one who “receive[d] the benefit of such discrimination,” 15 U. S. C. § 13(a). Absent actual competition with a favored Volvo dealer, Reeder cannot establish the competitive injury the Act requires. Pp. 175–177. 2. The injury to competition targeted by the Robinson-Patman Act is not established by the selective comparisons Reeder presented at trial: (1) comparisons of concessions Reeder received for four successful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with larger concessions other successful Volvo dealers received for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (purchase-to-purchase comparisons); (2) comparisons of concessions of fered to Reeder in connection with several unsuccessful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with greater concessions accorded other Volvo deal ers who competed successfully for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (offer-to-purchase comparisons); and (3) comparisons of two occa sions on which Reeder bid against another Volvo dealer (head-to-head comparisons). Pp. 177–180. (a) Because the purchase-to-purchase and offer-to-purchase com parisons fail to show that Volvo sold at a lower price to Reeder’s “com petitors,” those comparisons do not support an inference of competitive injury. See Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U. S. 428, 435. Both types of comparisons fall short because in none of the discrete instances on which Reeder relied did it compete with beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer. Nor
