546US1
Unit: $U15
[08-22-08 15:43:12] PAGES PGT: OPIN
Cite as: 546 U. S. 164 (2006)
167
Syllabus did Reeder even attempt to show that the compared dealers were con sistently favored over it. Reeder simply paired occasions on which it competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer A with in stances in which other Volvo dealers competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer B. The compared incidents were tied to no sys tematic study and were separated in time by as many as seven months. This Court declines to permit an inference of competitive injury from evidence of such a mix-and-match, manipulable quality. No similar risk of manipulation occurs in cases kin to the chainstore paradigm. Here, there is no discrete “favored” dealer comparable to a chainstore or a large independent department store—at least, Reeder’s evidence is in sufficient to support an inference that such a dealer exists. For all that appears, Reeder, on occasion, might have gotten a better deal vis-a`-vis one or more of the dealers in its comparisons. While Reeder may have competed with other Volvo dealers for the opportunity to bid on poten tial sales in a broad geographic area, competition at that initial stage is based on a variety of factors, including the existence vel non of a rela tionship between the potential bidder and the customer, geography, and reputation. Once the customer has chosen the particular dealers from which it will solicit bids, the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of the particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the sale. Volvo dealers’ bidding for sales in the same geographic area does not import that they in fact competed for the same customer-tailored sales. Pp. 178–179. (b) Nor is a Robinson-Patman violation established by Reeder’s ev idence of two instances in which it competed head to head with another Volvo dealer. When multiple dealers bid for the business of the same customer, only one dealer will win the business and thereafter purchase the supplier’s product to fulfill its contractual commitment. Even as suming the Act applies to head-to-head transactions, Reeder did not establish that it was disfavored vis-a`-vis other Volvo dealers in the rare instances in which they competed for the same sale—let alone that the alleged discrimination was substantial. Reeder’s evidence showed loss of only one sale to another Volvo dealer, a sale of 12 trucks that would have generated $30,000 in gross profits for Reeder. Per its policy, Volvo initially offered Reeder and the other dealer the same concession, but ultimately granted a larger concession to the other dealer after it had won the bid. In the only other instance of head-to-head competition, Volvo increased Reeder’s initial discount to match the discount offered the other competing Volvo dealer, but neither dealer won the bid. If price discrimination between two purchasers existed at all, it was not of such magnitude as to affect substantially competition between Reeder and the “favored” Volvo dealer. Pp. 179–180.
