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[08-22-08 15:44:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN
EVANS v. CHAVIS Opinion of the Court
propositions that set the boundaries within which the Ninth Circuit must answer this question. First, we pointed out that if “the California Supreme Court had clearly ruled that Saffold’s 41⁄2-month delay was ‘unreasonable,’ that would be the end of the matter.” Ibid. Second, we noted that the California Supreme Court order denying Saffold’s petition had stated that the denial was “ ‘on the merits and for lack of diligence.’ ” Id., at 225. But, we added, these words alone did not decide the question. Id., at 225–226. Third, we stated that the words “lack of diligence” did not prove that the California Supreme Court thought the peti tion was untimely. That is because those words might have referred to a totally different, earlier delay that was “irrele vant” to the timeliness of Saffold’s California Supreme Court petition. Id., at 226. Fourth, we stated that the words “on the merits” did not prove that the California Supreme Court thought the peti tion was timely. That is because the California Supreme Court might have decided to address the merits of the peti tion even if the petition had been untimely. A “court,” we said, “will sometimes address the merits of a claim that it believes was presented in an untimely way: for instance, where the merits present no difficult issue; where the court wants to give a reviewing court alternative grounds for decision; or where the court wishes to show a prisoner (who may not have a lawyer) that it was not merely a procedural technicality that precluded him from obtaining relief.” Id., at 225–226. We ultimately concluded that the Ninth Circuit must not take “such words” (i. e., the words “on the merits”) as “an absolute bellwether” on the timeliness question. Id., at 226 (emphasis added). We pointed out that the Circuit’s con trary approach (i. e., an approach that presumed that an
