Page:United States Reports 546.pdf/406

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546US1

Unit: $U16

[08-22-08 15:44:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 546 U. S. 189 (2006)

195

Opinion of the Court

order denying a petition “on the merits” meant that the peti­ tion was timely) would lead to the tolling of AEDPA’s limita­ tions period in circumstances where the law does not permit tolling. Ibid. And we gave as an example of the incorrect approach a case in which the Ninth Circuit had found timely a petition for review filed four years after the lower court reached its decision. Ibid. (citing Welch v. Newland, 267 F. 3d 1013 (CA9 2001)). II We turn now to the present case. Respondent Reginald Chavis, a California state prisoner, filed a state habeas cor­ pus petition on May 14, 1993. The trial court denied the petition. He sought review in the California Court of Ap­ peal, which also held against him. The Court of Appeal re­ leased its decision on September 29, 1994. Chavis then waited more than three years, until November 5, 1997, before filing a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. On April 29, 1998, the California Supreme Court denied the petition in an order stating simply, “Petition for writ of ha­ beas corpus [i. e., review in the California Supreme Court] is DENIED.” App. G to Pet. for Cert. 1. Subsequently, on August 30, 2000 (after bringing a second round of state habeas petitions), Chavis filed a federal habeas petition. The State asked the federal court to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was untimely. After all, AEDPA gives prisoners only one year to file their federal petitions, and Chavis had filed his federal petition more than four years after AEDPA became effective. Still, AEDPA also provides for tolling, adding to the one year those days during which an application for state collateral review is “pending.” And the federal courts consequently had to cal­ culate how many days Chavis’ state collateral review appli­ cations had been “pending” in the state courts and add those days to the 1-year limitations period. Ultimately, after the case reached the Ninth Circuit, that court concluded that the timeliness of the federal petition