100 STAT. 3958
President of U.S.
PUBLIC LAW 99-661—NOV. 14, 1986
seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. (2) A comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United StatesSoviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (3) The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty was signed in 1976, and both have yet to be considered by the full Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. (4) The entry into force of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will ensure full implementation of significant new verification procedures and so make completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty more probable. (5) A comprehensive test ban treaty must be adequately verifiable, and significant progress has been made in methods for detection of underground nuclear explosions by seismological and other means. (6) At present, negotiations are not being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union toward completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. (7) The past five administrations have supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible date, the President should— (1) request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification (with a report containing any plans the President may have to negotiate supplemental verification procedures, or if the President believes it necessary, any understanding or reservation on the subject of verification which should be attached to the treaty) of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, signed in 1974 and 1976, respectively; and (2) propose to the Soviet Union the immediate resumption of negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. In accordance with international law, the United States shall have no obligation to comply with any bilateral arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union is violating. SEC. 1003. REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON UNITED STATES NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREEMENTS
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to Congress a report containing a detailed assessment of— (1) the military consequences to the United States of a policy decision by the United States to discontinue compliance with the major provisions of existing strategic offensive arms limitations agreements (including central numerical sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the SALT II accord) would have on the security of the United States; and (2) the likely military responses of the Soviet Union to such a policy decision. (b) MATTERS TO B E CONSIDERED.—The assessment required by subsection (a) shall focus on what the likely Soviet military responses would be during the period between 1987 and 1996. In
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