Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 108 Part 4.djvu/269

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PUBLIC LAW 103-337 —OCT. 5, 1994 108 STAT. 2903 of the Israeli Defense Force over any combination of adversaries. (2) Congress continues to recognize the many benefits to the United States from its strategic relationship with Israel, including enhancing regional stability and technical cooperation. (3) Despite the momentous peace process in which Israel and its neighbors are productively engaged, Israel continues to face difficult threats to its national security that are compounded by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. (4) Congress is supportive of the objective of the President to enhance United States-Israel military and technical cooperation, particularly in the areas of missile defense and counterproliferation. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS. —It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the President should ensure that any conventional defense system or technology offered for release to any NATO or other major non-NATO ally should concurrently be available for purchase by Israel unless such action would contravene United States national interests; and (2) the President should make available to Israel, within existing technology transfer laws, regulations, and policies, advanced United States technology necessary for continued progress in cooperative United States-Israel research and development of theater missile defenses. SEC. 1322. READINESS OF MILITARY FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. (a) FINDINGS.— Congress makes the following findings: (1) Under existing security arrangements between the United States and the Republic of Korea, responsibility for the defense of the territory of the Republic of Korea is allocated so that the Republic of Korea has primary responsibility for the ground defense of its territory and the United States has primary responsibility for air and sea defense of the Korean peninsula and for reinforcement. (2) The Force Improvement Program of the Republic of Korea.-has not fiiliy addressed critical shortfalls in its ground force capability which continue to exist even though the Republic of Korea spends approximately $12,000,000,000 annually on defense while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea spends approximately $4,000,000,000 annually on defense. The Republic of Korea has directed substantial defense resources to procuring submarines, destroyers, advanced aircraft, and other military systems that are marginal to its primary ground defense responsibility. (3) The defense acquisition decisions of the Republic of Korea have had the effect of not allowing the Republic of Korea to attain self-sufficiency in its ground defense responsibility. As a result, there exists an undue burden on the United States for the ground defense of the Korean peninsula. (4) The lack of intelligence capability to forecast the military intentions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea presents major problems for the combined United States-Republic of Korea defense of South Korea.