Page:Vol 4 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/368

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.
352
SIEGE OF CUAUTLA.

sprung up between them; and though an apparent reconciliation occurred in the face of a danger common to all, mutual confidence was never restored.

On the 1st of January, 1812, Calleja appeared before Zitácuaro, the doomed city. He had left Guanajuato on the 11th of November, and the slowness of his movements marks at once the repugnance with which he undertook the enterprise and his care to secure a successful issue.[1] Proceeding to Acámbaro, he there conferred with Trujillo, who met him for that purpose, and was joined by Castillo y Bustamante, García Conde, Meneso and other chiefs with their divisions, according to previous instructions. From Acámbaro he leisurely continued his march,[2] and arrived at Ixtlahuaca toward the middle of December, in order to open communication with Toluca and combine his operations with these of Porlier.[3] Here he received some reënforcements, and his army now amounted to 4,900 combatants,[4] with twenty-three pieces of artillery of different calibre.

On the 22d of December Calleja marched from San Felipe del Obraje, where he had concentrated his troops, and on the following day entered the rugged defile of San Mateo. The difficulties which he en-

    y desconocidas en la mayor parte de las divisiones insurjentes. . .y se acusa Rayon de haber intentado apoderarse de la autoridad suprema a la sombra de personas insignificantes y nombres desconocidos.' Mej. y sus Rev., iv. 190-1.

  1. After his departure from Guanajuato he received Venegas' instructions of October 31st, couched in such peremptory terms as to cause him much annoyance. He replied to the viceroy that 'no necesitaba usar de términos tan estrechantes, pues bastaban las anteriormente recibidas para obedecer.' Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 133.
  2. Calleja was 10 days passing from Acámbaro to Maravatío, expecting to receive instructions from the viceroy, which failed to arrive. Gaz de Mex., 1812, iii. 136.
  3. Calleja, considering that the previous failures to take Zitácuaro were caused by the attacks being directed through the difficult cañon of San Mateo, had intended to make his approach by that of Tuxpan, while Porlier secured the San Mateo road against the retreat of the insurgents. He was, however, compelled to alter his plan and march through the San Mateo cañon, while Porlier directed his attention against Tenango. Ib.
  4. Consisting of 2,761 infantry and 2,134 cavalry. His original force had, however, been reduced by 1,543 men from sickness and desertion. Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 451-2.