Page:Washington Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc..pdf/39

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WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v. COUGAR DEN, INC.

Roberts, C. J., dissenting

tax is on fuel and not travel, it is preempted because it has “the practical effect of burdening” the Yakamas’ right to travel on the highways. The plurality’s rule–that States may not enforce general legislation that has an effect on the Yakamas while they are traveling–has no basis in our precedents, which invalidated laws that punished or charged the Yakamas simply for exercising their reserved rights. The plurality is, of course, correct that the trespass law in Winans did not target fishing, but it effectively made illegal the very act of fishing at a traditional location. Here, it is the possession of commercial quantities of fuel that exposes the Yakamas to liability, not travel itself or any integral feature of travel.

The concurrence reaches the same result as the plurality, but on different grounds. Rather than holding that the treaty preempts any law that burdens the Yakamas while traveling on the highways, the concurrence reasons that the fuel tax is preempted because it regulates the possession of goods, and the Yakamas’ right to travel includes the right to travel with goods. Ante, at 7–8. But the right to travel with goods is just an application of the right to travel. It means the Yakamas enjoy the same privileges whether they travel with goods or without. It does not provide the Yakamas with an additional right to carry any and all goods on the highways, tax free, in any manner they wish.[1] The concurrence purports to find this additional right in the record of the treaty negotiations, but
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  1. The plurality simply assumes that the right to travel with goods is an additional, substantive right when it reasons that the fuel tax is preempted because it taxes an “integral feature” of travel with goods. Ante, at 16. The concurrence makes the same assumption when it compares the fuel tax to a tax on “ ‘possession’ of fish” Ante, at 8. That tax would be preempted because “taking possession of fish” is just another way of describing the act of fishing. But possession of a tanker full of fuel is not an integral feature of travel, which is the relevant activity protected by the treaty.