Roberts, C. J., dissenting
the record shows only that the Yakamas wanted to ensure they could continue to travel to the places where they traded. They did not, and did not intend to, insulate the goods they carried from all regulation and taxation.
Nothing in the text of the treaty, the historical record, or our precedents supports the conclusion that the right “to travel upon all public highways” transforms the Yakamas’ vehicles into mobile reservations, immunizing their contents from any state interference. Before it reaches the reservation, the fuel in Cougar Den’s tanker trucks is always susceptible to state regulation–it does not pass in and out of state authority with every exit off or entry onto the road.
Recognizing the potentially broad sweep of its new rule, the plurality cautions that it does not intend to deprive the State of the power to regulate when necessary “to prevent danger to health or safety occasioned by a tribe member’s exercise of treaty rights.” Ante, at 17. This escape hatch ensures, the plurality suggests, that the treaty will not preempt essential regulations that burden highway travel. Ante, at 9–10. I am not so confident.
First, by its own terms, the plurality’s health and safety exception is limited to laws that regulate dangers “occasioned by” a Yakama’s travel. That would seem to allow speed limits and other rules of the road. But a law against possession of drugs or illegal firearms–the dangers of which have nothing to do with travel–does not address a health or safety risk “occasioned by” highway driving. I do not see how, under the plurality’s rule or the concurrence’s, a Washington police officer could burden a Yakama’s travel by pulling him over on suspicion of carrying such contraband on the highway.
But the more fundamental problem is that this Court has never recognized a health and safety exception to reserved treaty rights, and the plurality today mentions the exception only in passing. Importantly, our prece-
