Page:Whole works of joseph butler.djvu/328

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297
THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST LETTER.

and in every point of duration. Whatever can at any time be conceived possible to be absent from any one part of space, may for the same reason, [viz., the implying no contradiction in the nature of things,] be conceived possible to be absent from every other part of space at the same time; either by ceasing to be, or by supposing it never to have begun to be. Your instance about demonstrating a man to live 1000 years, is what (I think) led you into the mistake; and is a good instance to lead you out of it again. You may suppose a man shall live 1000 years, or God may reveal and promise he shall live 1000 years; and upon that supposition, it shall not be possible for the man to be absent from all places in any part of that time. Very true: but why shall it not be possible? Only because it is contrary to the supposition, or to the promise of God; but not contrary to the absolute nature of things; which would be the case, if the man existed necessarily, as every part of space does. In supposing you could demonstrate, a man should live 1000 years, or one year; you make an impossible and contradictory supposition. For though you may know certainly, (by revelation suppose,) that he will live so long; yet this is only the certainty of a thing true in fact, not in itself necessary: and demonstration is applicable to nothing but what is necessary in itself, necessary in all places and at all times equally.

To your second difficulty, I answer: what exists necessarily, not only must so exist alone, as to be independent of anything else; but (being self-sufficient,) may also so exist alone, as that everything else may possibly (or without any contradiction in the nature of things) be supposed not to exist at all: and consequently, (since that which may possibly be supposed not to exist at all, is not necessarily existent,) no other thing can be necessarily existent. Whatever is necessarily existing, there is need of its existence in order to the supposal of the existence of any other thing; so that nothing can possibly be supposed to exist), without presupposing and including antecedently the existence of