that which is neeessary. For instance; the supposal of the existence of anything whatever, includes necessarily a presupposition of the existence of space and time; and if anything could exist without space or time, it would follow that space and time were not necessarily existing. Therefore, the supposing anything possibly to exist alone, so as not necessarily to include the presupposal of some other thing, proves demonstrably, that that other thing is not necessarily existing; because, whatever has necessity of existence, cannot possibly in any conception whatsoever, be supposed away. There cannot possibly be any notion of the existence of anything, there cannot possibly be any notion of existence at all, but what shall necessarily preinclude the notion of that which has necessary existence. And, consequently, the two propositions which you judged independent, are really necessarily connected. These sorts of things are indeed very difficult to express, and not easy to be conceived but by very attentive minds: but to such as can and will attend, nothing (I think) is more demonstrably convictive.
If anything still sticks with you in this, or any other part of my books, I shall be very willing to be informed of it: who am,
{{c|Sir, Your assured Friend and Servant,
{{smaller|November 10, 1713.
P.S.—Many readers, I observe, have misunderstood my second general proposition; as if the words [some one unchangeable and independent Being,] meant [one only—Being.] Whereas the true meaning, and all that the argument there requires, is, [some one at least.] That there can be but one, is the thing proved afterwards in the seventh proposition.
THE SECOND LETTER.
Reverend Sir,—I have often thought that the chief occasions of men’s differeng so much in their opinions, were
