6. That, in a deed, if there be two clauſes ſo totally repugnant to each other, that they cannot ſtand together, the firſt ſhall be received and the latter rejected[1]: wherein it differs from a will; for there, of two ſuch repugnant clauſes the latter ſhall ſtand[2]. Which is owing to the different natures of the two inſtruments; for the firſt deed, and the laſt will are always moſt available in law. Yet in both caſes we ſhould rather attempt to reconcile them[3].
7. That a deviſe be moſt favourably expounded, to purſue if poſſible the will of the deviſor, who for want of advice or learning may have omitted the legal and proper phraſes. And therefore many times the law diſpenſes with the want of words in deviſes, that are abſolutely requiſite in all other inſtruments. Thus a fee may be conveyed without words of inheritance[4]; and an eſtate-tail without words of procreation[5]. By a will alſo an eſtate may paſs by mere implication, without any expreſs words to direct it's courſe. As, where A deviſes lands to his heir at law, after the death of his wife; here, though no eſtate is given to the wife in expreſs terms, yet ſhe ſhall have an eſtate for life by implication[6]; for the intent of the teſtator is clearly to poſtpone the heir till after her death; and, if ſhe does not take it, nobody elſe can. So alſo, where a deviſe is of black-acre to A and of white-acre to B in tail, and if they both die without iſſue, then to C in fee: here A and B have croſs remainders by implication, and on the failure of either's iſſue, the other or his iſſue ſhall take the whole; and C's remainder over ſhall be poſtponed till the iſſue of both ſhall fail[7]. But, to avoid confuſion, no croſs remainders are allowed between more than two deviſees[8]: and, in general, where any implications are allowed, they muſt be ſuch as are neceſſary (or at leaſt highly probable) and not merely
