poſſible implications[1]. And herein there is no diſtinction between the rules of law and of equity; for the will, being conſidered in both courts in the light of a limitation to uſes[2], is conſtrued in each with equal favour and benignity, and expounded rather on it's own particular circumſtances, than by any general rules of poſitive law.
And thus we have taken a tranſient view, in this and the three preceding chapters, of a very large and diffuſive ſubject, the doctrine of common aſſurances: which concludes our obſervations on the title to things real, or the means by which they may be reciprocally loſt and acquired. We have before conſidered the eſtates which may be had in them, with regard to their duration or quantity of intereſt, the time of their enjoyment, and the number and connexions of the perſons entitled to hold them; we have examined the tenures, both antient and modern, whereby thoſe eſtates have been, and are now, holden: and have diſtinguiſhed the object of all theſe enquiries, namely, things real, into the corporeal or ſubſtantial, and incorporeal or ideal kind; and have thus conſidered the rights of real property in every light, wherein they are contemplated by the laws of England. A ſyſtem of laws, that differs much from every other ſyſtem, except thoſe of the ſame feodal origin, in it's notions and regulations of landed eſtates; and which therefore could in this particular be very ſeldom compared with any other.
The ſubject, which has thus employed our attention, is of very extenſive uſe, and of as extenſive variety. And yet, I am afraid, it has afforded the ſtudent leſs amuſement and pleaſure in the purſuit, than the matters diſcuſſed in the preceding volume. To ſay the truth, the vaſt alterations which the doctrine of real property has undergone from the conqueſt to the preſent time; the infinite determinations upon points that continually ariſe, and which have been heaped one upon another for a courſe
