Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning/Chapter 2
CHAP. II.
Of the Moral and Political Knowledge
of the Ancients and Moderns.
I Have often thought that there could not be a pleasanter Entertainment to an inquisitive Man, than to run over the first Thoughts which he had in his Infancy, whilst he was gathering his Collection of Idea's, and labouring to express those Sounds, by which he perceived that his Mother and Nurse made themselves be understood. We should then see the true Gradations by which Knowledge is acquired: We should judge, perhaps, what is in it self hard, and what easie, and also what it is that makes them so; and thereby make a better Estimate of the Force of Men's Understandings, than can now be made. But this it is in vain to lament for, since it can never be had. Yet it may in general be observed, that the first Thoughts of Infants are of Things immediately necessary for Life. That being in some measure satisfied, they spend their Childhood in Pleasure, if left to their own Liberty, till they are grown up. Then they begin to reflect upon the Things that relate to Prudence and Discretion, and that more or less, according as their Circumstances oblige them to carry themselves more or less warily towards those with whom they converse. This is, and ever was, general to all Mankind; whereas they would not take so much pains to cultivate the Arts of Luxury and Magnificence, if they were not spurred on by Pride, and a Desire of not being behind other Men. So that it is reasonable to suppose, that, all those Things which relate to Moral Knowledge, taken in its largest Extent, were understood by the ancient Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, in as great Perfection as the Things themselves were capable of. The Arts of Governing of Kingdoms and Families; of Managing the Affections and Fears of the unconstant Multitude; of Ruling their Passions, and Discoursing concerning their several Ways of Working; of Making prudent Laws, and Laying down wise Methods by which they might be the more easily and effectually obeyed; of Conversing each with other; of Giving and Paying all that Respect which is due to Men's several Qualities: In short, all that is commonly meant by knowing the World, and understanding Mankind; all Things necessary to make Men wise in Counsel, dexterous in Business, and agreeable in Conversation, seem to have been in former Ages thoroughly understood, and successfully practised.
There seems, indeed, to be some Reason to fear, that in the Arts of Knavery and Deceit, the present Age may have refined upon the foregoing; but that is so little for its Honour, that common Decency does almost as much oblige me to throw a Veil over this Reproach, as common Interest does all Mankind to put an effectual Stop to its Increase. But since we are enquiring into Excellencies, not Blemishes and Imperfections, there seems to be great Reason to affirm, that After-Ages had no need to invent Rules, which already were laid down to their Hands; but that their Business was chiefly to reexamine them, and to see which were proper for their Circumstances, considering what Alterations Time sensibly introduces into the Customs of every Age; and then to make a wise Choice of what they borrowed, that so their Judgment might not be questioned by those who should have the Curiosity to compare the Wisdom of several Ages together.
If we descend into Particulars, these Observations will, I believe, be found to be very true: The minutest Differences between Vertue and Vice of all sorts, are judiciously stated by Aristotle, in his Ethicks to Nicomachus. Xenophon's Cyrus shews that he had a right Notion of all those Things which will make a Prince truly great and wise. The Characters of all those Vices which are immediately taken notice of in Civil Life, are admirably drawn by Theophrastus. Nothing can give a clearer Idea of one that has lived under Tyrants, than the Writings of Tacitus; in whose Histories, almost every Thing is told in such a Way, as we see that Ill Usage and Disappointments lead Men to censure and report the Actions of former Governors. Great Skill in all the Arts and Secrets of Persuasion appear every where in Demosthenes and Tully's Orations, in Quinctilian's Institutions, and the Orations in Thucydides, Sallust and Livy. The Duties of Mankind in Civil Life, are excellently set forth in Tully's Offices. Not one Passion of the Soul of Man has been untouched, and that with Life too, by some or other of the Ancient Poets. It would require a Volume to state these Things in their full Light; and it has been done very often by those who have given Characters and Censures of Ancient Authors. So that one may justly conclude, that there is no one Part of Moral Knowledge, strictly so called, which was not known by the Ancients, equally well as by the Moderns.
But it would be a wrong Inference to conclude from thence, that the Ancients were greater Genius's than the Men of the present Age. (b) Essay 3. upon Heroick Vertue, Sect. 2,3.For, by Sir William Temple's Confession, (b), the Chineses and Peruans were governed by excellent Laws: and Confucius and Mango Capac may well be reckoned amongst the Law-givers and Philosophers of those which are commonly called learned Nations; though neither of them, especially the Latter, can justly be suspected of learning what they knew by Communication from other Nations. From whence Sir William Temple rightly concludes, that Common Sence is of the Growth of every Country; and that all People who unite into Societies, and form Governments, will in time make prudent Laws of all kinds; since it is not Strength of Imagination, nor Subtilty of Reasoning, but Constancy in making Observations upon the several Ways of Working of Humane Nature, that first stored the World with Moral Truths, and put Mankind upon forming such Rules of Practice as best suited with these Observations. There is no Wonder therefore, that in a long Series of ẓAges, which preceded Socrates and Plato, these Matters were carried to a great Perfection; for as the Necessity of any Thing is greater, so it will be more and more generally studied: And as the Subject of our Enquiries is nearer to us, or easier to be comprehended in it self; so it will be more throughly examined, and what is to be known will be more perfectly understood. Both these concurr here: Necessity of conversing with each other put Men upon making numerous Observations upon the Tempers of Mankind: And their own Nature being the Thing enquired after, all Men could make their Experiments at home; which, in Consort with those made with and by other People, enabled them to make certain Conclusions of Eternal Truth, since Mankind varies little, if any thing, any farther than as Customs alter it, from one Age to another. Since therefore this Necessity always lasts, and that all the Observations requisite to compleat this noble Science, as it takes in the Art of Governing Kingdoms, Families, and Men's private Persons, cannot be made by one or two Generations, there is a plain Reason why some Nations, which wanted Opportunities of diffused Conversation, were more barbarous than the rest; and also, why others, who for many Ages met with no Foreign Enemies that could overturn their Constitutions, should be capable of improving this part of Knowledge as far as unassisted Reason was able to carry it.
For, after all, how weak the Knowledge of the ancient Heathens was, even here, will appear by comparing the Writings of the old Philosophers, with those Moral Rules which Solomon left us in the Old Testament, and which our Blessed Saviour and his Apostles laid down in the New. Rules so well suited to the Reason of Man, so well adapted to civilize the World, and to introduce that true Happiness which the old Philosophers so vainly strove to find, that the more they are considered, the more they will be valued: and accordingly, they have extorted even from those who did not believe the Christian Religion, just Applauses, which were certainly unbiassed, because, not being led by the Rewards which it proposes, nor deterred by the Punishments which it threatens, they could have no Motive to commend them but their own native Excellency. So that one may justly wonder why Sir W. T. should give us an Account of Mahomet's Life, and that so minutely, as not to omit the Sergian Monk, (c) Essay 3. pag. 248. He means Sergius, a Monk; turning the Name of a Man into the Denomination of an Order. Sergius is said to have been a Nestorian.his Master (c), in his Essay of Heroick Vertue; where he mentions Law-givers, as well as Generals, and yet take no notice of Moses and Jesus Christ.
It is evident therefore, that though in some Sence the Moderns may be said to have learned their Politicks and Ethicks from the Ancients, yet there is no convincing Argument that can be brought from those Sciences, singly considered, that the Ancients had a greater Force of Genius than the wise and prudent Men of these later Generations. If, indeed, in all other Sciences, Mankind has for 1500 Years been at a full Stop, the Perfection of the Ancient Politicks and Ethicks may be justly urged, amongst other Arguments, for the comparative Strength of their Parts; otherwise not.
But there are other Parts of Learning, that may seem capable of farther Improvement; of which, the Advocates for the Ancients do not only pretend that they were the Inventors, but that their Performances have never since been equalled, much less out-done; though within these last 200 Years all imaginable Pains have been taken to do it; and great Rewards have been given to those who have, licèt non passibus æquis, laboured to come near the Copies which were already set them. From whence these Men think it probable that all Modern Learning is but Imitation, and that faint and flat, like the Paintings of those who draw after Copies at a Third or Fourth Hand from the Life. Now, as this can only be known by an Induction of Particulars, so of these Particulars there are two sorts: One, of those wherein the greatest part of those Learned Men who have compared Ancient and Modern Performances, either give up the Cause to the Ancients quite, or think, at least, that the Moderns have not gone beyond them. The other of those, where the Advocates for the Moderns think the Case so clear on their Side, that they wonder how any Man can dispute it with them. Poesie, Oratory, Architecture, Painting, and Statuary, are of the First Sort: Natural History, Physiology, and Mathematicks, with all their Dependencies, are of the Second.