Russia & The Struggle for Peace/Chapter 17

by Michael S. Farbman

Part V: The Struggle for Peace

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE REVOLUTIONARY
DEMOCRACY

IN recalling the first steps of the revolutionary democracy in their struggle for peace, we are carried away by two currents of feeling. One is a deep feeling of pride and joy at their almost prophetic clearness and foresight in realising the tasks that confronted the democracy of Russia and of the world. The other is a feeling of anger and sorrow at the united international reaction which destroyed all the hopes and efforts of new Russia.

Whatever may be the fate of Russia, however deplorable may be the situation of the revolutionary democracy in Russia to-day, however offensive and triumphant the slanderers of the Revolution, the noble utterances and acts of that young democracy of Russia will remain as a brilliant page in history. Openly and joyfully revolutionary Russia expressed the aspirations and hopes of the democracy of the world. Confident in the triumph of democracy, it addressed few and simple words about peace to the peoples at war. The Manifesto "To the Peoples of the World" which the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers issued on the 14th^[1] of March, exactly a fortnight after the Revolution, is an historical event. It was the first step in the great struggle for peace and democracy which is now being worked out slowly and painfully, and this step may proudly be recorded by history.

"TO THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD.

"Comrades! Proletarians and Workers of all lands!

"We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, greet you heartily and send you the news of a great achievement. The Russian democracy has shattered in the dust the age-long despotism of the Tsar, and enters in your circle as an equal member, as a mighty power in the struggle for our common liberation. Our victory is a great victory for the freedom and democracy of the world. The chief pillars of reaction in the world, the 'gendarmes of Europe,' are no more. May the earth turn to heavy granite on their graves. Long live freedom! Long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and its struggle for final victory!

"Our deed is not yet completed: the shades of the old order have not yet dispersed, and not a few enemies are gathering their forces against the Russian Revolution. Yet our conquests are mighty. The peoples of Russia will express their will in the Constitutent Assembly, which is to be called together as soon as possible, on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And already now we can predict with certainty that the democratic republic will triumph in Russia. The Russian people enjoys full political freedom. To-day it can say its sovereign word in the internal self-determination of the country and in its foreign policy. And, turning to all the peoples, desolated and massacred as they are in this inhuman war, we announce that the time has come to begin the decisive struggle with the grasping ambitions of the governments of all countries; the time has come for the peoples to take into their own hands the decision of the question of war and peace.

"Conscious of its revolutionary power, the Russian democracy announces that it will use all means to oppose the annexationist policy of its ruling classes, and invites the peoples of Europe to united and vigorous action on behalf of peace.

"And we turn to our brother-proletarians of the Austro-German alliance, and, above all, to the German proletariat. From the first days of the war you have been assured that in taking up arms against autocratic Russia you were defending European civilisation against Asiatic despotism. Many of you saw in this a justification of your support of the war. To-day this justification also is no more; democratic Russia cannot be a menace to freedom and civilisation.

"We shall unflinchingly defend our own freedom against all reactionary threats—whether from within or from without. The Russian Revolution will not retreat before the bayonets of invaders and will not let itself be crushed by external military force. But we appeal to you: shake off the yoke of your half-autocratic régime, as the Russian people shook off the Tsarist autocracy; refuse to serve as instruments of gain and annexation and violence in the hands of kings, landowners, and bankers then in friendly alliance of our forces we will put a stop to the awful slaughter which is degrading mankind and darkening the great days of the birth of Russian freedom.

"Workers of all lands! We hold out to you the hand of brotherhood across mountains of our brothers' corpses, across rivers of innocent blood and tears, across smoking ruins of towns and villages, across the broken treasures of civilisation: we call you to the rebirth and strengthening of international unity. In it is the pledge of our future victories and of the complete liberation of mankind.

"Proletarians of all lands, unite!

"Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Delegates."

It is difficult to name another public utterance with such transparent honesty of purpose; yet, on the other hand, it is difficult to name one which led to greater misrepresentations and more shameless calumnies. The authors of this manifesto were branded as "traitors," "German hirelings," and agents of German peace. Their more benevolent opponents, with a patronising wave of the hand, and almost with compassion, called them "revolutionary fanatics and hopeless idealists." The name "idealist," when applied to a statesman, is nowadays considered as the worst criticism possible. But as a matter of fact there probably never was a better synthesis of true idealism and genuine statesmanship than in the conduct of the Russian democracy in its struggle for peace. The element of idealism was strong indeed. It was the great dream of bringing peace to the tortured world. It was the ideal of reviving the Proletarian International. It was the desire to see the war over; to be able to start the great task of social reconstruction in building the new Russia.

Undoubtedly these great and high ideals determined the first peace move of the democracy. But these ideals were not the only, not even the main, motives of the policy of the democracy in their struggle for peace. The main motives which impelled them were the actual realities of Russia. They worked for peace, not because they wanted peace, but because Russia needed peace. The bitter legacy they inherited from the old régime made the continuation of the war all but impossible. The disorganisation of Russia's economic system and the disintegration of the army made the prolongation of the war a sheer impossibility. At all events, the army, as the Revolution found it was unable to carry on the war. The greatest concern for the Russian democracy was the army. It was in an altogether unstable and insecure condition. It was in imminent danger of collapse ; the disruptive forces tended to be greater than the forces holding it together. Something had to be done to inspire it with new confidence. I have already mentioned above that the whole foundations of the army had to be reformed to restore it to a condition of fighting fitness. But the democratisation of the army meant more than the mere democratisation of its disciplinary system; it involved no less the democratisation of the aims for which the army was to fight. The first task confronting the Russian democracy was to give the army the confidence that it was fighting a purely defensive war. Had the democracy not instinctively understood the dangerous condition of the army, had they not solemnly repudiated all aims of conquest and begun the struggle for peace, the army would have disintegrated much more rapidly and would have relapsed into a still more unhealthy condition. The democracy of Russia had only two alternatives: either to begin an active and systematic struggle for peace, or to wait and see how peace would come by the inevitable collapse. Peace had to be achieved. Either it had to be brought about by a strong and definite policy, or it would be forced on the country as a result of complete disorganisation. The repudiation of annexationist policy and the struggle for peace were expressions of the idealism of the Russian democracy. The Russian revolutionaries certainly could not have acted otherwise. They had been opponents of war all their lives; they saw and confessed the imperialistic basis of this war; they were bound to protest with all their might against its prolongation, all the more, so after the Revolution. The Revolution had created such a mighty spiritual exaltation that they believed more than ever in the triumph of the ideals of humanity, democracy, and internationalism. But these idealistic motives are insufficient to explain the energy and impetus with which the Russian democracy carried on their great struggle for peace. The point of view and the ideas which inspired them in their struggle for peace are fully explained by their idealistic motives. On the other hand, the force, the energy, the intensity with which they carried on that struggle are to be attributed solely to the actual conditions of the national economy and of the army.

The appalling condition of the army was one factor determining the struggle for peace. The other idea that obsessed the Russian democracy was the prevailing and traditional fear that Germany would come to crush the Revolution and try to reinstate the Monarchy. At this stage it is exceedingly difficult to describe how deeply and how hopefully democratic Russia wanted a revolution in Germany. The thought of a revolution in Germany was like a passion which obsessed the workers and soldiers of Russia. At the front and in the rear they passionately awaited and hoped for the German revolution, and believed in its possibility. Their own Revolution seemed to them only a prelude to the regeneration of the world. The Russian Revolution would never achieve its objects unless there was a revolution in Germany: such was the prevailing idea.

The supporters of a fight to a finish tried to exploit this idea for their own ends. They began an agitation for the continuation of the war. They said: "You want a revolution in Germany! We all want it! Then get on with the war: beat Germany, destroy German militarism, and carry the banner of Revolution into Germany." Such contentions in the Press and on the platform were, however, too obviously inconsistent with the whole policy and mentality of their authors. The democracy knew that those who gave them this good advice were the last to think of revolution in Germany, or to desire it. The whole purpose of this warlike agitation was simply the satisfaction of grabbing, imperialistic ambitions: the annexation of Galicia, the dismemberment of Austria, the destruction of the Turkish Empire, the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits, annexation of Armenia, etc., etc. The Russian democracy understood only too well that such a continuation of the war not only could not lead to revolution in Germany, but could only hinder that process of internal disruption in the Central Empires which began with the Russian Revolution and took place under its influence. The preceding years of war had proved with absolute clearness that there could be no hope of destroying German unity by fighting the German armies. The more aggressively, the more successfully the Russian armies fought, the greater became the unity of Germany. Germany began to show signs of disintegration only after the Russian Revolution. Only from the moment when Russia ceased to be a menace to Germany and Austria, from the moment when Russia repudiated the ambitious aims of Tsardom, did the Burgfrieden in Germany begin to waver. All attempts to break down Germany by external force have led and are bound to lead to a strengthening of Germany's internal unity. The same would be true of England, America, or any other nation. Had the Russian democracy had a fresh and well-equipped army at their disposal, they would none the less first have tried the political method of destroying German unity. As it was, they had no other alternative.

But there was yet another element which determined the peace move of the Russian democracy. I refer to their desire to frustrate the threatened German offensive. While the first two motives of Russia's peace policy—the necessity to counteract the growing dissolution of the army and the hope of undermining the political unity of Germany—have been perverted and misrepresented, this third element has been completely ignored in Allied countries. To grasp the full reality of this motive, it is necessary to remember the state of affairs in Russia immediately after the Revolution. No sooner were the first few days of the Revolution over than Russia was seized by the fear that the Germans were preparing an offensive. Persistent rumours stated that Petrograd was in immediate danger, that the Germans were about to land troops on the Riga front, and so forth. Who disseminated such rumours, and with what purpose, it is not necessary to consider here. Maybe there was some foundation for them, and some of their authors were acting in good faith. But there is no doubt that to a great extent these rumours emanated from the new War Office, which was stupid enough to imagine that anxiety was a salutary state of mind for the Russian people at that time. Such tactics were a very crude mistake, but that is not the question here. The important thing is that immediately after the Revolution the Russian army and democracy were faced with the question of a possible German offensive. That the Russian army was at that time absolutely unable to repel a great offensive was too obvious. Thus the manifesto to the peoples of the world, and "above all, to the German proletariat," was a tactical move. I do not mean merely to say that it turned out to be a tactical move; I want to emphasise that it was purposely intended as such. I base my statement on conversations with the members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet who drafted this manifesto. In relating the circumstances which led to the elaboration of this step, they emphasised that they were influenced by anxiety and expectation that Hindenburg was preparing a crushing blow against Russia. My view is based on these conversations, but I can support it with a very important document which confirms it absolutely. On the 14th of March, the very day when the Soviet addressed its manifesto to the world, the Izvestia published a leading article about the war which explains all the motives that impelled the leaders of the democracy. The article concludes: "Evidently Hindenburg intends to attempt an attack against Russia so as to weaken, by means of victories, the effect of the Russian Revolution, and to check the advance of revolution in Germany and Austria. … And the danger from this side is not yet over. The German offensive must be arrested by a double blow on the front and in the rear. … On the front it must be repelled by military efforts; into the rear of Germany we must direct our appeal for an immediate conclusion of the war."

Thus the manifesto to the peoples of the world was, so to say, a peace offensive, or even a "peace-trap. " It was intended to break up and disorganise the military and social unity of Germany and of Austria. And it achieved considerable results. It would have been decisive if the Russian bourgeoisie and the short-sighted diplomacy of the Allies had not hastened to the assistance of German militarism.

There is a widespread belief in the Allied countries that the Russian Revolution was saved by the Allies, who, by their offensive on the West, paralysed Germany's striking power on the Russian front. This idea must emphatically be contradicted. There was no German offensive, not because Germany had to transfer her Eastern army to the Western front, but because of the political situation in Germany and Austria. The attempt to crush the Russian Revolution by force was at that time a very risky undertaking from the point of view of Germany's rulers. And as far as a mass transference of troops from the Eastern to the Western front is concerned, it has never been proved to have taken place. It is a great misfortune that figures relating to the movements of armies are used very arbitrarily. For instance, since the Revolution the Allied Press have proclaimed that, thanks to revolutionary disintegration, fraternisation, and so forth, the Germans have been able to transfer the greater part of their troops from the Eastern front to the West, and that the Allies have therefore had to bear the full brunt of Germany's forces. Yet even six months after the Revolution, Russia kept on the Eastern front 92 German divisions, i.e., considerably more than at any other period of the war, in addition to several Turkish divisions and the overwhelming majority of the Austro-Hungarian army.^[2]

We now see that the Soviet's attitude to war and peace was based on two foundations: the struggle for peace and the revolutionary defence of the country. The two factors are intimately connected with each other, and were of equal value in determining the Russian attitude. Here was a clear-sighted and harmonious policy; it proposed peace to the enemy if they would repudiate conquests; it promised help to the Allies if they would repudiate imperialism. "We are ready to hold out the hand of brotherhood to the peoples of Germany and Austria, if they will compel their rulers to renounce all conquests. But we will fight with our weapons in our hands against the attack of German and Austrian invaders. Thus we shall compel the people of the Austro-German alliance to choose between war and peace.

"We are ready to support by force of arms the peoples of England, France, and Italy, if they compel their Governments to renounce all conquests and are none the less forced to defend themselves against Germany. But we shall energetically protest against the continuation of the war for capitalist interests, whatever the national flag whose protection they enjoy." (Izvestia, No. 29, March 31, 1917.)

The Russian democracy did not merely demand a declaration of Allied War-Aims. They aimed at a formal definite proposal of peace on the basis of no annexations or indemnities and the right of peoples to determine their own destinies. They wanted to force Germany into a position where she had to choose between a just peace and a continuation of the war. The events following the Russian Revolution and the appeal to the peoples of the world were such as to awaken hope. But the scheme of the Soviet was frustrated, and the first hindrance was the opposition of the Russian Imperialists and of the Provisional Government itself.

1. I use the Russian or the "old" calendar.
2. (p. 10). In a letter to the Press, published on October 11th, 1917, Lieut. -General C. N. Bessino, the Russian Plenipotentiary accredited to the British Armies, writes: "It is over six months since our Revolution began, and our armies continue to hold the enemy's forces on the front, besides which, during this time, his forces, far from diminishing, have up to the present been augmented."

   Mr. H. Warner Allen, the well-known British correspondent with the French armies, writes on September 24, 1917: "It is to be observed that the number of German divisions on the Russian front at the present moment is higher than it has ever been before, viz., 92, compared with 79 a year ago, when Brussilov had just been brought to a halt in Galicia and Mackensen was overrunning Roumania, and 67 in September, 1915, at the close of the great thrust in Poland. … Thus the number of German troops on the Eastern front was higher than ever, and it is noteworthy that the Russian Revolution did not tempt the enemy to reduce his forces in the East."