Secret Diplomacy/Chapter 10
X.
THE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
OUR historical survey of diplomatic policy and practice does not hold much assurance that the evils of secret diplomacy have very appreciably waned since the eighteenth century. The cruder methods of deception and corruption which were at that time employed would indeed now be con- sidered beneath the dignity of diplomats; al- though it is unhappily true that some of the most despicable tricks, such as stealing correspondence and placing informers in houses to be watched, are still practised occasionally. However, it may be said that while in general the trade-secrets of diplomacy have lost greatly in prestige, the spirit of diplomatic action itself has not yet been brought into accord with democratic ideals.
A secret service attached to the diplomatic es- tablishment is still considered useful by some gov- ernments. It is, however, certainly very doubt- ful whether the results thus obtained in the nature of accurate information, are at all commensurate to the expense and to the constant danger of being
misinformed through secret agents who think that they must earn their pay. My own observation leads me to believe that people who use secret service information are frequently confused and worried by an abundance of unauthenticated re- ports brought to them; they would have been far better off without backstairs information, relying on the fundamental facts and on knowledge which can be obtained only by seeking the confidence of the men who control public action. Secret serv- ice gossip may often give the key to the aims and desires of an individual person, and if one is willing to appeal to motives through corrupt and deceitful means, the information may be actually useful. However, he whose policy rests upon an essential reasonableness and mutual benefit, can, afford to disregard such gossip.
We might distinguish between a secrecy which is vicious in itself, and one that pursues beneficent objects. The former seeks to conceal the pres- ence of harmful motives and projects, to confuse and mislead people to their disadvantage, and in general, to play on weakness and ignorance. The other keeps secret its plans and negotiations which in themselves have honest motives, from a desire to prevent interference with their prompt and complete realization. Opinions as to the char ac- ter of a policy may differ widely and those who secretly advance a policy generally condemned by many, may perhaps claim credit for honest pur- poses. This type of secrecy is common. Unfor- tunately, though it may advance a good object, it incidentally has an evil influence upon public con- fidence. It must be confessed that the distinction here pointed out is difficult to apply in practice in a thoroughly objective manner, because there are probably among diplomats very few indeed who do not persuade themselves at least that the means applied by them are designed to achieve useful purposes.
A good example of how stratagem may be used for a laudable purpose is found in the action of William J. Buchanan, American Minister to Ar- gentina, in adjusting the Chili- Argentinian bound- ary dispute. Buchanan, one of the most original of American diplomats, had nothing whatever of the suave manipulator of the old school of diplo- macy. He was direct to the verge of bruskness, yet his ability to go straight to the essential point, and his mastery and bigness, made him highly successful as a negotiator. In this particular case, Buchanan had been designated, together with a Chilian and an Argentinian representative, on a commission to settle boundary questions and re
quested to make a preliminary report. He agreed to act only on the following conditions : That be- cause of the complexity and difficulty of the ques- tions involved, it would be necessary to report on the suggested boundary by sections, that each sec- tion should be voted upon as reported by him, and that a majority vote on each section should be decisive. This proposal was accepted. After a careful investigation, Buchanan made his report, and it was found that on each section the sug- gested boundary was carried by two votes against one; the American always voted in the affirma- tive; the Chilian and Argentinian, as in the par- ticular section the allotments seemed favorable or unfavorable to their respective country. In ac- cordance with the terms agreed upon, the entire report had thus to be accepted, and all the thorny problems of long-standing boundary controversies were settled. Had Buchanan not used this strata- gem it is very unlikely that the report as a whole would have been accepted, as each of his associ- ates would have felt that he could not vote for a report containing arrangements for giving up spe- cific tracts of territory which his country had hitherto always insisted upon retaining. By this clever arrangement Buchanan made it possible for them to vote against such relinquishment in
each case without defeating the project as a whole; but if he had revealed to them his plan at the beginning, the object could not have been achieved.
This incident illustrates that a complete solu- tion will often be accepted as satisfactory al- though it may contain details which, by them- selves, would have been resisted to the last. It may be said that the disadvantage of public dis- cussion lies in the emphasizing of such points of opposition, and the obscuring of the general rea- sonableness of a solution.
Mr. Balfour in his defense of the secrecy of diplomatic intercourse, says that the work of diplomacy is exactly similar to the work which is done every day between two great business firms. He then argues that, in all such relationships, it is unwise to air difficulties in public. Bismarck used the more homely illustration of a horse trade, the participants in which should not be expected to tell each other all they know about the prospec- tive bargain. That view is putting diplomacy on a rather lowly footing. One might expect a somewhat different temper among men dealing with momentous public affairs than the bluff-and- haggle of a petty private transaction. Yet such tactics have actually been found usefu l in diplo- macy. Mr. Balfour is on sounder ground when lie says, "In private, in conversations which need not go beyond the walls of the room in which you are, both parties may put their case as strongly as they like and no soreness remains," but "di- rectly a controversy becomes public, all that fair give-and-take becomes difficult or impossible. " This, of course, implies a somewhat low estimate of public intelligence and self-control, of which more later.
The greatest vice of a secret diplomatic policy, working in the dark and concealing international undertakings, lies in the inevitable generating of mutual suspicion and the total destruction of pub- lic confidence among the different countries which compose the family of nations. No nation is so bad as imagination, confused and poisoned by secrecy and by the suggestion of dire plottings, would paint it. Agreements and understandings which do not exist at all are imagined, the nature of those which actually have been made is mis- judged, and animosities are exaggerated; thus the public is quite naturally put in that mood of sus- picion and excitement which renders it incapable of judging calmly when apparently startling facts suddenly emerge.
Secret diplomacy destroys public confidence.
however, in a still more insidious manner : by the practice of using a language of ideal aims and humanitarian professions in order to conceal and veil the most narrowly selfish, unjust and uncon- scionable actions. The conventional language of diplomacy still carries in it many of the phrases and concepts instilled by the false idealism of the eighteenth century, to which at that time diplo- macy gave lip worship. The most disconcerting performances of this kind are the profuse and reiterated declarations promising the mainte- nance of the sovereignty, independence and in- tegrity of certain countries, when in fact the ac- tion really taken was quite to the contrary effect. The diplomacy of Japan has manifested pe- culiar expertship in the use of phrases that are associated with some wise public dispensation or arrangement and which have a calming effect to cover action not remotely in fact contributing to such beneficent providences. The sovereignty, integrity and independence of a neighboring coun- try are guaranteed in solemn terms at the very moment when force, intrigue and every tricky arti- fice are secretly employed to destroy them. "Strong popular demand" is alleged as a reason for harsh action abroad, in a country where the expressions of public opinions as well as policy itself are controlled by a narrow group, with absolutist authority. There is so much talk of "frank discussion" that every one is put on his guard as soon as the word "frank" is uttered.
The "peace of Asia," a "Monroe Doctrine for Asia," the "Open Door," "greatest frankness," "hearty coöperation with other powers," are heralded at times when the context of facts makes a strange commentary. But while such a discrepancy is very strident in a country where military absolutism wields control over diplomacy, with a grudging obeisance to representative forms, yet other countries are by no means free from this hypocrisy. What blasted promise of equity in all that succession of declarations concerning Korea, China, Persia, parts of Turkey, and Morocco. What confusion of political ideals in supporting Denikin, Wrangel, and Horthy as defenders of "representative government."
When Russia and Japan, in response to Secretary Knox' Manchurian proposal had made their secret arrangements to defeat his policy, Great Britain, though it had made many reassuring protestations at Washington, nevertheless had secretly acquiesced (to cite a Russian diplomatic paper) in the "recognition of our (Russian) sphere of influence in Northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Western China, with the exception of Kashgar, as well as the undertaking not to hinder us in the execution of our plans in these territories, and herself to pursue no aims which we should have to regard as incompatible with our interest." And it was also stated that Great Britain, in return, was to receive "recognition of her freedom of action and her privileged position in Tibet." This was in 1912.
Thus were the solemn declarations relating to the Open Door and the integrity of China applied in action.
Subsequent departure from the letter and spirit of such declarations may indeed sometimes be excused on account of changed circumstances; but frequently it is quite apparent to those who know what is going on, that such well-sounding declarations are made for public consumption, at the very time when the contrary action is taken secretly.
This is indeed nothing less than a crime against the public opinion and conscience of the world, which cannot be condemned in terms too strong. It shows a thorough contempt of the people, who are supposed to be either of so little intelligence or of so short a memory that such vain professions may succeed in veiling the true inwardness of political intrigue. This practice tends to engender thorough confusion in the public mind as to standards of right and justice in international affairs; it shakes the basis on which alone sound international relations can grow up; as, indeed, all social relations must rest upon confidence in an underlying justice and equity.
Closely allied to the practice of making public declarations in international affairs which do not correspond with the specific action taken, is the control of the press and the censure of news. This is indeed a matter which transcends the subject of diplomacy, because a system of press control and censure is often applied by other departments of the government than the diplomatic branch. As far as foreign affairs are concerned, it is used in an effort to support foreign policy, and it therefore shares the same defects which inhere in the old diplomacy. Like secret diplomatic control, it is accounted for on the assumption that the people cannot be trusted with the entire truth, and that carefully selected portions of the truth have to be put forth in order to make them ready to support the policy considered necessary by the leaders. This involves the assumption of an enormous responsibility by a few leaders in determining by themselves what the public interest requires and instead of relying on the strength naturally to be gained from a spontaneous public opinion, to attempt to fashion that opinion for specific purposes. Press control and censure, with the incomplete and warped information which it implies, is one of the evil accompaniments considered necessary in the conduct of a war, for the safety of the combatant nation. The principle that strategic information must be kept secret is extended, at such times, out of all reason. After hostilities have actually been concluded, this practice tends to subsist and to continue the evils of misinformation and confusion in the public judgment. The manner in which all news emanating from the Balkan and Near Eastern countries has been censured since the war, has made it impossible for the public of the world to form a just conception as to what is there going on. Control of the press and censorship likewise resulted in such confusion in the public mind concerning the problems of Russia, that there remained no reliable basis for a policy which would facilitate the restoration of more normal conditions there, in a sympathetic spirit with the struggles and difficulties of the Russian people.
On account of the natural fact that men are apt to be influenced in their action unconsciously through persons with whom they have constant associations, it is a matter of no mean importance that the armament interests should have been so strongly represented in many capitals by men of high professional and social standing, always on the ground, eager to advance the business in military supplies. In many capitals, very close relationships have grown up between the diplomatic officers and the representatives of the great armament firms. As a mutual apprehenhension of excessive preparation for war greatly stimulates these industries, it is not surprising that their representatives do not exert themselves to prevent occasional war scares. In fact, highly misleading information on war plans has often been given out, as in the case of a representative of the Coventry Ordnance Works, who in 1909 informed the British Government of excessive shipbuilding by Germany. The news was later found to be erroneous; but new orders had been given in Great Britain, and through action and reaction armaments were stimulated elsewhere. The close connection of the Krupp Iron Works with the German Government and with associations favoring aggressive foreign action is well known.
It has often happened that what represents itself to be a national interest and enlists diplomatic and political support in that way, is really only the enterprise of individuals to make profits. The men who support it with their best energies and talents are not villains, but their method of assuming a great national interest where only a tradition, a prejudice or a private plan of profit are involved, renders their doings far from beneficial to the commonweal. Similarly, those who operate on the principle that the public mind must be nourished with certain carefully selected facts and kept from the knowledge of others, may have honest motives, but their ideas of public action are obsolete or deserve to be so, as they are left over from the absolutist régime in politics.