Secret Diplomacy/Chapter 11
XI. PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS[edit]
IN considering the relation of legislative bodies, and of the public opinion therein represented, to the conduct of foreign affairs, it will be useful to glance briefly at the relevant historical facts. When the United Colonies of America formed a separate political organization from the mother country, the conduct of foreign affairs was en- trusted to a committee of Congress, a successor to the Committee of Secret Correspondence. In 1781 a Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, with a permanent department, was created and in 1782 the conduct of foreign affairs was regulated in the following terms:
"All letters to sovereign powers, letters of credence, plans of treaties, conventions, manifestoes, instructions, passports, safe conducts, and other acts of Congress relative to the department of foreign affairs, when the substance thereof shall have been previously agreed to in Congress, shall be reduced to form in the office of foreign affairs, and submitted to the opinion of Con- gress, and when passed, signed and attested, sent to the office of foreign affairs to be countersigned and for- warded. ' '
Congress therefore retained a very close control over this matter; a control which under the Con- stitution passed to the Senate, though in a re- stricted form. In no other country did a legisla- tive committee participate in the conduct of for- eign affairs with similar power and influence. The policy of the arrangements under the Con- stitution is explained by John Jay in the Feder- alist as follows :
"It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immedi- ate despatch are sometime requisite. There are cases where the most useful intelligency may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from appre- hensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will oper- ate on those persons whether they are actuated by mer- cenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the se- crecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large ponu- lar assembly. ' '
Jay's explanation is dominated by the conception which the eighteenth century had of the functions of diplomacy and the conditions of its work. The constitutional system as conceiv ed at that time implied (1) Full power of negotiation in the President, (2) Taking counsel with the Senate, (3) Formal ratification of treaties by the Senate, and publication thereof as parts of the law of the land. The system has been highly praised by European publicists as reconciling the mainte- nance of confidential relations with publicity of the results, in that treaties are given the charac- ter of laws.
In the course of the nineteenth century there occurred many instances resulting in a growing practice of making special agreements by the Sec- retary of State alone, without the advice and con- sent of the Senate. When President Roosevelt in 1905 attempted to deal with the Dominican sit- uation in this manner, the Senate objected and in- sisted that all international agreements of any kind must be submitted to its action. The sys- tem of the United States, however, actually per- mits of the current conduct of foreign affairs without information to the people or even without constant and complete information to the Senate which is, moreover, usually preoccupied with mat- ters of internal legislation.
In England, the mother of Parliaments, we might expect that there should have been a con- stant effort at parliamentary control of foreign
affairs, with strong remonstrance when effective control was denied; yet on account of the spe- cific nature of the system of Cabinet government, such has not been the case. Under the two-party system as it exists in England the conduct of for- eign affairs is always in the hands of a minister trusted and supported by the majority in the Lower House. Even if the minority should at- tempt to censor the conduct of foreign affairs as being carried on apart from the knowledge and active consent of the House, the majority whose leaders form the Cabinet which is managing things, will always prevent such a vote from suc- ceeding. Only in case of a cabinet going abso- lutely and openly counter to the policy of its own party in Parliament could a real conflict of this nature arise; and such a contingency is itself im- possible, because of the party control exercised by the cabinet.
According to the theory of the Stuarts, the man- agement of foreign affairs belonged entirely to the Crown which had not at that time been put in commission. In 1677 the House of Commons ob- jected to granting money for alliances and for wars, unless the matter in question had been pre- viously communicated to it. Charles II, however, declared the conduct of foreign affairs to be the
Crown's fundamental prerogative in which it must remain free from direct control of Parliament. William III was in fact to a very large extent his own Minister for Foreign Affairs. With the in- troduction of responsible Government under the Hanoverians, however, the situation changed. The dominant party being represented by the ministers was quite ready to submit to their guidance in matters of foreign affairs. It was the opposition who occasionally attacked the gov- ernment on its foreign policy, and particularly the opposition in the House of Lords. In a Lords ' protest of March 26, 1734, it was urged that ' ' the interposition of the British Parliament would be more effectual than the occasional expedients of fluctuating and variable negotiations." In 1740 it was moved that a select committee consisting of peers should be appointed to inquire into the conduct of the Spanish War. The motion was re- jected. Another Lords' protest in the same year opposes the argument that absolute secrecy is es- sential because this claim is often used in bar of all inquiries. Such secrecy is "much oftener the refuge of guilt than the resort of innocence."
Wyndham, in 1733, on a motion calling for cer- tain letters of instructions, argued for the neces- sity of giving such information to Parliament.
He asked how could members of the House of
Commons judge of the estimates to be laid before
them as a provision for national safety if they
did not know by what danger the nation was con-
fronted. The motion, however, was rejected.
When Pelham was criticized in the House for not having informed Parliament of the prelimina- ries of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle he argued: "If Parliament should encroach upon the pre- rogative of the Crown, by assuming a right to make peace or war, and to inquire into foreign transactions under negotiation, our affairs will be reduced to a dangerous predicament; for no for- eign State will negotiate with our ministers, or conclude any treaty with them, either political or commercial. " This is an argument often made in the eighteenth century to show the unwisdom of Parliamentary control. The change of min- isters following party changes in the House, and the fact that the Foreign Minister would not by his own word be able to give complete assurances to foreign governments, were considered to put the British Government under a disadvantage in negotiations. It was therefore considered unde- sirable that negotiations should be submitted to the^ control and sanction of Parliament. Walpole had stated the matter in the following words : " Therefore while our happy constitution remains en- tire, while the Parliament meets but once a year, and does not continue assembled above three or four months in the twelve, it is impossible for either House of Parlia- ment to intermeddle, much less to prescribe to the Crown, in any affairs relating to peace or war, without exposing the nation to imminent danger."
Throughout the nineteenth century Parliament interfered very little with the conduct of foreign affairs. The minister for foreign affairs or the premier would from time to time give information or make a systematic discourse on foreign affairs and it was understood that the House would be kept informed concerning the aims and tendencies of the Government's foreign policy. Specific questions were asked by members but not fre- quently. The nature of the British system would have rendered unmeaning any struggle for control between the House and the Cabinet.
The manner of keeping Parliament and the pub- lic informed on foreign affairs was discussed. The Earl of Clarendon spoke of the practice of laying before Parliament official information in the Blue Books. He stated :
"I am perfectly certain there is always laid before Parliament a very fair and complete view of the trans- actions between this country and any otner to which those papers may relate. I know that foreign Govern
ments rather complain of our Blue Books, and to a cer- tain extent they may curtail some of the communications that are made to our foreign Ministers, but I should be extremely sorry to see our system of publication of diplo- matic papers in any way curtailed, or different from what it is; of course, there must always be care taken not to compromise individuals for the information they have given, but I believe it is an immense advantage to this country that our despatches and diplomatic transac- tions should be known, because if they have the appro- bation of Parliament and of the country, the Government then has the whole weight of public opinion in its favor, and it is that which gives such strength to our policy and to our opinions in foreign countries."
That is a very statesmanlike presentation of the advantages of constant public knowledge of for- eign policy in giving the government a secure base of intelligent support.
When dissatisfaction or doubt was felt by large numbers concerning the foreign policy of the gov- ernment, as in 1857 and again in 1878 after the concealment of the Schuvalof agreement, com- plaint was frequently made in Parliament and in the press to the effect that Parliament on the one hand was not given a chance to acquire a com- plete knowledge of foreign policy, and on the other it was not sufficiently alert and active in using its opportunities for control. In 1886 the follow- ing resolution was moved:
"That in the opinion of this House it is not just or expedient to embark in war, contract engagements in- volving grave responsibilities for the nation, and add territories to the Empire, without the knowledge and consent of Parliament."
Like other similar resolutions, it did not pass. Mr. Gladstone opposed it on the ground that the House of Commons under existing arrangements actually possessed all necessary power of control and that the passage of this resolution would mean simply that the House of Lords would share this power with it.
In 1885 when Earl Granville had objected to public criticism of negotiations which were still in progress between Russia and Great Britain re- garding Afghanistan, Lord Salisbury made the following interesting and important statement with respect to the relations of foreign policies to public opinion, which in temper resembles that of Lord Clarendon cited above:
"The noble Earl seemed to me to lay down a doctrine which we cannot pass unnoticed, when he says it is the duty of an Opposition not to canvas or condemn the conduct of the Government, if by so doing it should have the effect of discouraging friends and allies in other parts of the world. That seems to be a very far-reaching doctrine, and one which it is impossible to assent to. ... If we are of opinion that the course of public af
fairs is going ill, and that our Government has misman- aged, that faults are being committed and dangers are being incurred, we have no absolute Sovereign to whom we can appeal in order to correct the evil; our abso- lute Sovereign is the people of this country, and it is they, and they alone, who can bring a remedy to the mischief which is going on. You have a form of Gov- ernment which in many points is purely democratic, and you must take it with the incidents which naturally adhere to it, and one of these incidents is publicity of deliberation. The Cabinet is the people, and their de- liberations are conducted in the open field. If they are to be rightly informed, you must deal fully and frankly with the subjects which form the basis of their deter- mination. It is, no doubt, a drawback so far as it goes, but it is a drawback you must face, and you cannot help it if Foreign Powers overhear, so to speak, the privi- leged communications between you and those by whose verdict you must stand. You cannot suppress the argu- ment because somebody else outside hears it and you may be adversely affected by it. . . ."
The concealment of important obligations and the growing secrecy of diplomatic affairs during the first decade of the Twentieth Century brought on many expressions of dissatisfaction in the House of Commons. After the secret agreement concerning Morocco became known, Mr. John Dillon expressed himself as follows, in a speech in the House of Commons in September, 1911 :
"I do not believe any representative assembly in the history of the world has ever been called upon to dis
cuss a matter so vital and so far-reaching as that which the House of Commons has before it to-day to consider, and with so absolute a lack of information. . . . The House was summoned for this discussion to-day without any papers whatsoever. . . . We ought at all events to have had an account of diplomatic correspondence be- tween the four great Powers intimately interested in the question of Morocco, as is customary to be given to the House of Commons on such an occasion. This would have enabled members of the House before the debate commenced, to form a really well-grounded judgment upon the whole matter. We have heard a good deal to- night of the secrecy of the Foreign policy of this coun- try. It is no use attempting to deny it. Those of us who have been a long time in this House, and can re- member the methods of the Foreign Office twenty-five years ago, know as a matter of fact, which cannot be successfully denied, that the Foreign Office policy has become during the last ten years progressively more secret every year. Until this present year this has gone on, when the intense pressure of Foreign Affairs and the danger of war has forced the hands of the Minister to give some time for the discussion of Foreign Office af- fairs. For ten years the Foreign policy of this coun- try has been conducted behind an elaborate screen of secrecy. Some of us pointed out years ago that the se- crecy of Foreign Affairs was the inevitable and logical result of that new departure which was heralded about ten years ago, and which we heard praised once more on the floor of this House to-night. I refer to what is known as the policy of the continuity of the Foreign policy of this country; of the withdrawal of the For- eign policy of this country from the sphere of party politics."
At the same session Mr. Swift MacNeill ex- pressed himself very strongly on the subject of withholding information from Parliament, in the following terms:
"From generation to generation, you have allowed treaties involving the highest international obligations involving questions of peace and war to be taken absolutely out of the hands of the House. It is no ex- aggeration to say, so far as international policy is oon- cerned, you have rendered the House as little effectively powerful as any man walking over Westminster Bridge. Over and over again treaties involving matters of life and death, involving questions of first-class importance, have been ratified behind the back of Parliament. . . . The people themselves must be allowed to know all about this diplomacy and what it is. And there should be no secrecy in regard to high diplomatic statecraft about it. The House of Commons is sample judge of what is dis- creet and what is indiscreet, and it is a complete ab- surdity for others to treat us as children or for us to allow ourselves to be so treated in matters of such high international importance as those involving questions of peace and war."
Sir Edward Grey in his reply stated that secrecy up to a certain point was necessary and that par- ticularly the ratification of treaties could not be previously discussed. He then made the very sig- nificant remark that not until the House of Com
mons "was really free to devote itself to discus- sions of imperial affairs would it get control." In other words as long as the House of Commons remains a body occupied primarily with domestic and local legislation it cannot spare the attention necessary for an effective control of foreign pol- icy.
Early in 1914, evidence was taken by a select committee on House of Commons procedure. Mr. Balfour during these discussions rather empha- sized the need of secrecy in dealing with foreign affairs. He thinks that such matters should not be aired too frequently in the House of Commons, because indiscreet speeches, which can be per- fectly appraised in the House, may make bad blood when reported. Diplomatic conversations must be kept confidential if you are to work the European system at all. But though the House of Commons does not and cannot know the cur- rent details of international negotiations, it is not uninformed. This plainly is the language of a statesman to whom the idiosyncrasies of the Euro- pean system are so familiar that they seem to be the only natural state of affairs. The statement is made from the point of view of the expert who rather resents any sort of interference on the part of the less well inf ormed.
In March, 1918, it was moved in the House of Commons :
"That, in the opinion of this House, a Standing Com- mittee of Foreign Affairs should be appointed, repre- sentative of all parties and groups in the House, in order that a regular channel of communication may be estab- lished between the Foreign Secretary and the House of Commons, which will afford him frequent opportunities of giving information on questions of Foreign policy and which, by allowing Members to acquaint themselves more fully with current international problems, will enable this House to exercise closer supervision over the general conduct of Foreign Affairs. ..."
Mr. Balfour expressed himself quite in length on this motion and further elaborated the ideas which he had put forward in 1914. In a speech delivered March 19th, he gave what is probably the most complete and persuasive exposition of the value of traditional methods in diplomacy:
"... A Foreign Office and a Diplomatic Service are great instruments for preventing, as far as can be pre- vented, and diminishing, even when you cannot prevent, friction between States which are, or which ought to be, friendly. How is the task of peace-maker because that is largely the task which falls to diplomatists and to the Foreign Office, which controls diplomatists to be pur- sued if you are to shout your grievances from the house- top whenever they occur? The only result is that you embitter public feeling, that the differences between the two States suddenly attain a magnitude they ought never to be allowed to approach, that the newspapers of the two countries agitate themselves, that the Parlia- ments of the two countries have their passions set on fire, and great crises arise, which may end, have ended sometimes, in international catastrophes. . . . Office of- ficials, or officials of any Department, to expend some of their energy in getting ready for cross-examination, you will really be destroying the public service. There is nothing on which I feel more strongly than that. They are not accustomed to it, and they ought not to be accustomed to it. ... I do not hold the view that antique methods are pursued by diplomatists which no man of common sense adopts in the ordinary work of everyday life. On the contrary, the work of diplomacy is exactly the work which is done every day between two great firms, for instance, which have business relations, or between two great corporate entities which have in- terests diverging or interests in common. If you are a man of sense you do not create difficulties to begin with. You try to get over all these things without the embit- terment which advertisement always brings with it. It is when you begin to press your case in public that an- tagonism arises. In private in conversation which need not go beyond the walls of the room in which you are, you can put your case as strongly as you like, and the gentleman with whom you are carrying on the discus- sion may put his case as strongly as he likes, and if good manners are observed and nothing but fair discussion takes place no soreness remains and no one is driven to ignore the strong points of his opponent's case. Di- rectly a controversy becomes public all that fair give- and-take becomes either difficult or impossible. . . . But if all you mean ... is that it is wrong for the nations
of the world to find themselves hampered in their mu- tual relations by treaties of which those countries know nothing, that, I think, is an evil. . I do not say that there have not been secret treaties which were inevitable; but I do say that, if they are necessary, they are a necessary evil. Please remember that two nations make a treaty together for their mutual advantage. Both are desirous of passing it. One nation says, 'It is against our interest that this treaty should be made public at present.' The other says, 'We do not like being com- mitted to any treaty the terms of which we cannot make public at once.' Which is going to prevail? ... It does not rest with any single Foreign Office, British or other. It is always an arrangement between two pos- sibly three or four, Foreign Offices. You cannot lay down and I do not think you would be wise to lay down, an absolute rule that under no circumstances, and for no object, could you so far concede the point as to say that a treaty is to be made which is not to become public property. I am perfectly ready to admit that that is not a process which, to me, is a very agreeable one. To reduce secret treaties to the narrowest possible limits should, I think, be the object of every responsible statesman who has the control of foreign affairs. Be- yond that I do not feel inclined to go. I do not see any signs of a grasp of the true realities of life in the Mo- tion before us. You should have your control over those who manage your affairs, but it is not the kind of control which the honorable Member wishes to set up with his Committee of forty or fifty. It is quite a dif- ferent control. You must know, broadly speaking, what the general lines of policy are, and I maintain that that is thoroughly known with regard to foreign affairs at this moment by every man in this House who takes the
trouble to think. The general lines on which we are proceeding are thoroughly known."
This argument brings out all the strong points of the system of secret diplomacy under the ex- isting conditions of international politics, but it contains no hint that these conditions need im- provement. They cannot, as a matter of fact, be improved until some strong nations, even at the risk of disadvantage to themselves, take the lead in placing diplomatic affairs on a broader basis.