The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Interim Report
CONTENTS
Paragraph | Page | |
INTRODUCTION | 1 | |
PART I - WHAT HAPPENED AT HILLSBOROUGH? | ||
CHAPTER 1 - THE GROUND AND PRE MATCH ARRANGMETS | 4 | |
Fixing The Venue | 21 | |
The Ground | 22 | |
The Turnstiles | 29 | |
Travel to the Ground | 33 | |
Allocation of Places and Tickets | 35 | |
Access from Leppings Lane | 37 | |
Inside the Leppings Lane Turnstiles | 40 | |
Policing Arrangements | 47 | |
Sheffield Wednesday's Arrangements | 48 | |
Police Communications | 49 | |
CHAPTER 2-15 APRIL: THE BUILD UP TO 2.30 pm | 9 | |
Early Arrivals | 54 | |
Public Houses | 55 | |
The Gathering Crowd | 57 | |
CHAPTER 3 - THE CRISIS AT THE TURNSTILES | 11 | |
"Open the Gates" | 66 | |
CHAPTER 4-THE DISASTER | 13 | |
CHAPTER 5-THE AFTERMATH | 15 | |
Rescue Attempts | 81 | |
First Aid | 87 | |
In the Control Room | 91 | |
No Information | 97 | |
Misinformation | 98 | |
Public Announcements | 100 | |
Fire Brigade | 101 | |
South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) | 105 | |
Gymnasium | 107 | |
The Dead and the Injured | 108 | |
CHAPTER 6 - SPECIFIC INCIDENTS | 19 | |
PART II - WHY DID IT HAPPEN? | ||
CHAPTER 7 - THE LAYOUT AT THE LEPPINGS LANE END | 21 | |
The History | 119 | |
The 1981 Semi-final | 123 | |
Three Pens | 125 | |
The 1985 Changes | 127 | |
New Radial Fences | 128 | |
Barriers | 129 | |
The Turnstiles and Concourse | 130 | |
Barrier 144 | 133 | |
Effects of the Layout | 134 | |
CHAPTER 8 - LACK OF FIXED CAPACITIES FOR THE PENS | 24 | |
Departures from the Green Guide | 139 | |
Safety Certificate | 143 | |
Why was the Safety Certificate not Amended? | 147 | |
The City Council | 150 | |
Summary | 159 | |
CHAPTER 9 - LACK OF EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE TERRACES | 28 | |
Who should Monitor the Terraces? | 161 | |
The Interim Popplewell Report | 163 | |
The Final Popplewell Report | 164 | |
Arrangements at Hillsborough | 166 | |
Case for the South Yorkshire Police | 168 | |
Harris -v- Sheffield United Football Club Limited | 169 | |
Police Practice at the Leppings Lane End | 170 | |
"Find Their Own Level" | 171 | |
When is an Area "Full"? | 175 | |
Fear of Hooliganism | 182 | |
Summary | 183 | |
CHAPTER 10 - THE BUILD-UP AT THE TURNSTILES | 33 | |
The Physical Layout | 186 | |
The Number of Turnstiles | 187 | |
The "Late" Arrival of Liverpool Fans | 191 | |
Traffic Delays | 193 | |
Fine Weather and Drinking | 194 | |
Was Drunkenness a Major Factor in the Crisis at the Turnstiles? | 196 | |
Reduced Efficiency of the Turnstiles | 198 | |
Were Fans Without Tickets a Major Factor in the Build-Up? | 200 | |
The "Conspiracy" Theory | 203 | |
Liverpool Supporters at Away Matches | 205 | |
No Conspiracy | 208 | |
The Police Operation at Leppings Lane | 209 | |
Previous Experience | 213 | |
Policing in 1988 | 214 | |
Police Intelligence in Advance | 216 | |
Police Intelligence on the Day | 221 | |
Mr Marshall and Mr Greenwood | 222 | |
Control Lost | 223 | |
Postponement of Kick-off | 226 | |
Summary | 228 | |
CHAPTER 11 - THE BLUNDER ON OPENING THE GATES | 40 | |
CHAPTER 12 - THE BARRIERS IN PEN 3 | 41 | |
Barrier 144 | 233 | |
When did Barrier 124a Fail? | 236 | |
Dr Eastwood's Testing of the Barriers | 237 | |
Corrosion | 240 | |
Causation | 243 | |
CHAPTER 13 - THE CRUSHING NOT RECOGNISED | 43 | |
Observation from Control Room | 244 | |
Officers on the Track | 245 | |
CHAPTER 14 - THE RESPONSE OF THE POLICE | 44 | |
The Officers in Command | 250 | |
Police on the Pitch | 253 | |
Fans on the Pitch | 255 | |
False Reports | 257 | |
CHAPTER 15 - THE PERIMETER GATES WERE TOO SMALL | 45 | |
PART III - CONCLUSIONS | ||
CHAPTER 16 - BRIEF SUMMARY OF CAUSES | 47 | |
CHAPTER 17 - THE FA'S CHOICE OF GROUND | 48 | |
CHAPTER 18 - POLICE | 49 | |
Choice of Ends by the Police | 272 | |
Police Planning | 273 | |
Policing on the Day | 277 | |
The Police Case at the Inquiry | 285 | |
CHAPTER 19 - THE CITY COUNCIL AND THE SAFETY CERTIFICATE | 51 | |
CHAPTER 20 - THE CLUB AND DR EASTWOOD | 52 | |
CHAPTER 21 - FIRST AID AND EMERGENCY SERVICES | 53 | |
No Fault by the Emergency Services | 296 | |
CHAPTER 22 - COMMUNICATIONS | 54 | |
PART IV - INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS | ||
CHAPTER 23 - INTRODUCTION | 55 | |
Limited Objectives | 304 | |
Perimeter Fences | 306 | |
Reduced Numbers | 313 | |
Safety Certificate | 314 | |
CHAPTER 24 - THE RECOMMENDATIONS | 57 | |
Maximum Capacities for Terraces | 1 | |
Filling and Monitoring Terraces | 4 | |
Fences and Gates | 6 | |
Crush Barriers | 11 | |
Safety Certificates | 13 | |
Duties of each Football Club | 18 | |
Police Planning | 26 | |
Communications | 31 | |
Co-ordination of Emergency Services | 35 | |
First Aid, Medical Facilities and Ambulances | 39 | |
APPENDICES |
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