The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Interim Report/Appendices
APPENDICES
Appendix 1:
Sheffield Wednesday Football Club.
Hillsborough Ground.
Appendix 2:
Leppings Lane: the perimeter gates and turnstiles.
Appendix 3: The west stand and terraces.
Appendix 4:
Arrangement of Barriers at West Terrace
Prepared by The Health & Safety Executive
Appendix 5: The west terraces at 2.59 p.m.
APPENDIX 6
SPECIFIC INCIDENTS
Mr Hicks' Evidence
1. Mr and Mrs Hicks' two daughters died in the disaster. They had arrived early en famille but had tickets for different sections. The two daughters had standing tickets; they went into pen 3. Mrs Hicks had a seat in the north stand. Mr Hicks took up a standing position in pen 1 just below and to the west of the police box at about 2.15 pm From there, he had a view of the centre pens. He kept an eye on them as they filled up since he knew his daughters to be there.
2. His evidence was that by 2.50 pm he could see people were in distress. At about 2.55 pm he and others called to a senior police officer at the top of the steps to the control box to draw his attention to the crushing. Mr Hicks was only about 10 feet from the officer. He described him as wearing a flat cap with gold or silver braid and a light coloured anorak. Mr Hicks believed he was the officer who stopped the match. Mr Greenwood, who did stop the match, was certainly not wearing a light coloured anorak, as can clearly be seen on the video.
3. Mr Hicks says that he and others shouted several times to this officer in attempts to alert him to the distress in the pens. There was no reaction although Mr Hicks believes the officer must have been in earshot.
4. That officer descended from the steps and two cameramen whom Mr Hicks believed were from television came and appeared to direct their cameras towards the pens. Another senior officer appeared two steps down from the platform. He was a stocky figure; he also wore a flat cap but with black braid. Mr Hicks says that he and two or three others tried several times to capture this officer's attention without success. Then Mr Hicks says he shouted "For Christ's sake! Can't you see what's going on? We can, and you have cameras". The officer is said to have replied dismissively "Shut your fucking prattle".
5. When the disaster occurred the two Hicks girls were crushed. Victoria was put in an ambulance and Mr Hicks accompanied her to hospital where she was found to be dead. Sarah died at the ground.
6. Mr Hicks was an impressive witness and, despite his grievous loss, remarkably stoical. He gave his evidence clearly and without rancour. He was certainly mistaken about Mr Greenwood being one of those on the steps and it has not been possible to identify either officer from Mr Hicks' descriptions. He may well also have been imprecise as to timings. Nevertheless, I see no reason to doubt that what he described did occur in relation to two officers. As Mr Hicks generously said himself, the dismissive abuse from the second officer (although reprehensible) may have been due to his being preoccupied with trying to see what was happening at pens 3 and 4 around kick-off time.
The Goalkeeper and Gate 4
7. Mr Barnbrock, a Liverpool supporter, said he went through the tunnel. He would have liked to have turned back when he saw how crowded the pens were. He went with his father and 13 year old brother Stephen towards the front of pen 4. He saw the teams come onto the pitch. Conditions at the front were, he said, alright until about 2 minutes to 3. Then the pressure in the pen increased and he and his father became separated. His feet came off the ground. He shouted to police officers through the fence to get them out and help them. The police did not react. The Liverpool goalkeeper, Bruce Grobbelaar, spoke to a policeman on the track. The gate was then opened by a blonde policewoman and about 25 to 30 people went through it. They included the witness's father and his brother Stephen who had a broken arm. A police Constable shut the gate. It was then reopened by the same policewoman, the witness thought, and he got out.
8. Mr Eccleston, a male nurse and an impressive witness, was sitting in the north stand. He noticed pens 3 and 4 were full and realised something was wrong when fans started coming over the perimeter fence but did not invade the pitch. He said the Liverpool goalkeeper appeared to notice this too.
9. Mr Grobbelaar was out of the country during the Inquiry and was therefore not called. However, he made a statement which was put in as his evidence. In the course of it he said:
"Kick-off happened and we got into our stride pretty quickly — we forced a corner pretty early on and the ball came down to my end — I rolled it out to the full back once and play went on until Peter Beardsley hit the crossbar of the Nottingham Forest goal from a corner and came back into play. I remember just after that there were shouts and screams from the crowd just behind me, it was different; not the ordinary crowd noise and I turned around to look. What amazed me first was the concentration and squash of fans in the centre section, the end areas still had plenty of space. It was only then I became conscious that the crowd was squashing forward and wasn't able to go sideways and that's when I noticed the fencing alongside them holding them in. I saw fans being pulled up into the stand above the terraces, I saw fans climbing over into the empty areas at the side and I saw fans climbing out over the front onto the pitch which was particularly difficult because of the spikes on the top of the fencing but they were getting out.
"Play was still going on and I was in a terrible position trying to concentrate on play and having my attention taken by what was happening behind me. The ball came down to our end and Nottingham Forest won a corner, it was taken and we cleared our box area and as play was going forward over the centre line I heard a shout, 'Bruce - please help' - a desperate shout from a fan squashed up against the fencing to the right of my goal as I looked at Leppings Lane terraces. He screamed, 'Please get the fucking gate open - Help, help'. All the people who could speak were pleading for help. There were two policemen near the gate right alongside the fan who had shouted to me and so I shouted to them, 'Get the gate open'. I was still trying to concentrate on play and was still having my attention taken by what was happening behind me - there were lots of fans on the pitch behind the goal area by them too. I called again to the policemen, 'Open the fucking gate' and one just turned away from me and looked back at the crowd but the other went to the gate and opened it and it was like taking the top off a shaken coke bottle - people were everywhere on the play area around my goal. Play was still going on and it came down towards me again for the left hand corner. It was a Nottingham Forest throw-in, away to my left, the ball was out of play and a fan came up to me on the pitch and said, 'Bruce, they're killing us'. I said 'Who's killing you?', and he said 'They're crushing us-our fans'. I said 'Go and get some help', and then a policeman came on and spoke to this fan. I don't know who the fan was, and then he led him off. It was about this time I saw a policeman running onto the pitch from my right across my box and to the referee who blew up, recovered the ball and told all players to clear the pitch."
10. It is clear from the video that Mr Grobbelaar's recollection of the sequence of events, even with regard to the game, is inaccurate in a number of respects. For example, the two Nottingham Forest corner kicks occurred minutes before Beardsley struck the bar. Further, it seems highly probable from other evidence that gates 3 and 4 were open continuously well before Mr Grobbelaar says the fan asked him to get the gate open. It seems surprising too that with all the noise Mr Grobbelaar would hear the precise words of an individual fan, let alone respond twice to them, whilst the game was in progress.
11. As to Mr Barnbrock's account, the evidence of PC Fiona Richardson was that she was the only policewoman on the track in the early stages although others came from the seated area as the incident developed. PC Richardson began at gate 1 and, although she did go and help people out through gate 3, she did not go to gate 4, and did not open it twice or even once. The two officers who spoke of opening gate 4 were both male.
12. I think Mr Grobbelaar did become conscious of distress in the crowd behind him and did speak to a police officer at some stage, probably earlier than he now thinks. Not to reach that broad conclusion would involve attributing his whole account to invention or fantasy and I see no grounds for doing so. However, his detailed account was not tested in cross-examination and its inconsistencies and errors when compared with other incontrovertible evidence would make it unsafe to derive more than the broad conclusion stated above. The incident shows how honest witnesses can become confused and their evidence flawed when recollecting events experienced under tension or emotion.
13. As to the opening of gate 4 there was an apparent conflict of evidence. PC Illingworth said that about five minutes to 3 he opened it and guided fans emerging through it to gate 5. PC Hooson said that it was he who opened gate 4 just before kick-off. I am satisfied from the evidence of a number of fans that, like gate 3, gate 4 was opened more than once. The probability is, therefore, that whilst PC Illingworth was shepherding fans to gate 5, gate 4 had been closed again until it was re-opened by PC Hooson two or three minutes later.
Oxygen
14. It was alleged by a doctor that an oxygen cylinder provided to him on the pitch was empty. Dr Phillips, a Liverpool supporter, had been in pen 3 with his brother and others. He came under pressure and climbed into pen 2. When the disaster occurred and gate 2 was opened, he went through it, injuring his head as he did so. He came onto the pitch sometime after 3.10 pm and started resuscitation procedures. He was given an oxygen cylinder. He believes this was from St John Ambulance. It was, he thought, too early to be the fire service. The cylinder was switched on but Dr Phillips says it gave no oxygen since it was empty. There was one oxygen cylinder on the St John's ambulance which came to the scene. Mr Wells, the Divisional Superintendent of St John, took that cylinder onto the pitch. He said it was effective. In particular, he recalls going to a patient being treated by Dr Phillips and says that oxygen was flowing into that patient. Moreover, Mr Wells tested the cylinder afterwards and found it was still half full. It has a capacity that will last for 5 hours 40 minutes on a high setting.
15. There was evidence from Assistant Chief Fire Officer Hornsby that a Maxaman resuscitator had failed to work properly. It was delivering an oxygen flow appropriate to a "child" setting rather than a full "adult" flow. On examination, it was found that a retaining nut in the control knob had worked loose, possibly due to vibration in transit, and this had affected the flow of oxygen. The device had last been tested on 10 April 1989.
16. I accept the evidence of Mr Wells that the St John Ambulance cylinder was charged with oxygen and working properly. In my view, Dr Phillips may have been mistaken as to the cylinder of which he complains being empty. He agreed he was under great pressure, in an awkward situation; his head was injured and he became very angry at what he regarded then as wholly the fault of the police. He conceded that if the cylinder was not empty there was a possible alternative - that the master tank top valve was shut. It seems unlikely that he could have been referring to the fire service resuscitator as he was clear that the bottle he received was a simple piece of equipment not designed to breathe for the patient but merely to supply oxygen.
17. I conclude that on a balance of probabilities the evidence does not justify a finding that an empty cylinder was brought to the scene.
Calling the Fire Service
18. PC Bichard's call to police Headquarters at 3.13 pm for the fire service to bring hydraulic cutting equipment to cut metal fences (see paragraph 101 supra) was heard by Chief Inspector Edmundson. He went into the adjacent operations room to give instructions for the message to be passed to the fire service. There, a temporary control room assistant was already speaking to the fire service about a house fire. Mr Edmundson interrupted the call and asked the assistant to tell the fire service that cutting equipment was wanted at Hillsborough. There followed a conversation between the assistant and Miss Davies at the fire service in the following terms:-
| Police | Can we have cutting gear for Hillsborough, please - straight away? |
| Fire Control | Just a minute. Right - what's the address? |
| Police | Cutting equipment for Hillsborough football ground - straight away. |
| Fire Control | Hillsborough football ground? |
| Police | Yes, Hillsborough football ground. |
| Fire Control | What road is that on? Do you know? |
| Police | There has been a major accident, all the ambulances are up there. |
| Fire Control | What road is it on? |
| Police | I have no idea; Hillsborough football ground. |
| Fire Control | What road is it on? Do you know? |
| Police | "Hillsborough football ground - what road is it on?" (this was said to someone in Police Force Control) - "Penistone Road" (to Fire Control). |
| Fire Control | Penistone Road. |
| Police | Penistone Road, OK. |
| Fire Control | Penistone Readjust a minute - what's exactly involved? |
| Police | It's football, a big match, Liverpool v Notts Forest. |
| Fire Control | Yes, but why do you want us; you said it was an RTA [Road Traffic Accident]. |
| Police | No, no, no; major incident inside the ground. |
| Fire Control | Major incident inside - do you know exactly what it is? |
| Police | No, I don't; they want all the cutting gear. |
| Fire Control | For what - do you know? |
| Police | Hang on a sec. |
At that point Chief Inspector Edmundson intervened and spoke for the police. The conversation concluded:-
| Police | (Male voice) - Hello! |
| Fire Control | Hello! Now you wnt some cutting gear - what exactly is it for? |
| Police | There has been a major accident at Hillsborough football ground where the semi-final is; the crowds have forced their way in, they have broken fences and gates down. I don't know exactly what it is but there are people trapped. |
| Fire Control | Right! OK - leave it with us. |
That conversation took 1 minute 13 seconds. It was published in a number of newspapers with strong critical comment mostly against the fire service. The thrust of the criticism was that valuable time was wasted by the fire service asking unnecessary questions as to where and why cutting equipment was required.
19. There was a meeting of the emergency services in August 1988 to discuss procedure in the event of a major disaster at Sheffield Wednesday's ground. It was pointed out and minuted that "It was imperative that the Police Control give the exact location of any fire or incident and as much detail as possible. No senior fire officer is on duty at the match... Fire service will attend via Penistone Road or Leppings Lane as directed by the police."
20. The message from PC Bichard contained all the necessary information - Leppings Lane end, hydraulic cutting equipment, to cut metal fences. Regrettably, it was not passed on by Headquarters in those terms. Miss Davies had rightly been trained to require a precise location and needed to know the problem which would face the fire service so that the appropriate response could be made. In fact, there are several football grounds in the Hillsborough district although clearly Sheffield Wednesday's ground is the principal one. In the result, although Chief Inspector Edmundson clarified, to an extent, the nature of the problem, the locus which emerged in the course of the conversation (Penistone Road) was not that contained in the original message from ground control (ie "Leppings Lane end.") Whilst on the face of the conversation the fire service may seem to have been slow in the uptake or perhaps pedantic, in my view the police ought to have been more specific. They had the necessary information to be so.
21. I am satisfied, however, that the delay of 1 minute 13 seconds over the call, and even the delay occasioned by the cutting equipment going to Penistone Road rather than Leppings Lane, did not affect the outcome. Even had those with cutting equipment gone directly after a briefer 'phone call they would not have arrived at a stage early enough to make cutting the fencing a helpful exercise.
Mr Kenny Dalglish
22. When the Liverpool manager went to the control room and agreed to make the announcement broadcast at 3.56 pm, he says in a statement that he could not get the Tannoy to work. Spectators could see him trying to address them and indicated to him manually that nothing could be heard. An officer pressed buttons on the machine and Mr Dalglish says he tried again with similar lack of success. He was then taken under the police box to the room used by the disc jockey to broadcast pre-match music. There, the microphone worked and he broadcast his message.
23. Mr Dalglish was not called. There was no other evidence about this incident. I accept it occurred as he described. Why the Tannoy could not at that time be successfully operated from the police box is, however, strange and unexplained. Unlike the radio, it had operated satisfactorily from the police box at the critical times save that its messages may not always have been heard above the prevailing noise. It had worked at about 3.30pm when it called for medical staff. I can see no grounds for criticising the police in regard to this incident and certain it is that the brief delay in relaying Mr Dalglish's message can have had no significant effect.
APPENDIX 7
LIST OF PARTIES AND THEIR REPRESENTATION
1. Mr Andrew Collins QC, Mr Alan Goldsack and Mr Bernard Phillips of Counsel, instructed by the Treasury Solicitor, appeared on behalf of the Inquiry.
2. Mr Benet Hytner QC and Mr Timothy King of Counsel, instructed by the Hillsborough Steering Committee, appeared on behalf of the bereaved and injured.
3. Mr John Jackson of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Hill Dickinson, appeared on behalf of the Football Supporters' Association.
4. Mr John Dyson QC and Mr David Gibson-Watt of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Freshfields, appeared on behalf of the Football Association.
5. Mr Richard Maxwell QC and Mr Michael Murphy of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Keeble Hawsons, appeared on behalf of Sheffield City Council.
6. Mr Edwin Glasgow QC and Mr Stuart Catchpole of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Davies Arnold Cooper, appeared on behalf of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club.
7. Mr William Woodward QC and Mr Patrick Limb of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Hammond Suddards, appeared on behalf of the South Yorkshire Police.
8. Mr Franz Muller QC and Mr Andrew Robertson of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Crutes, appeared on behalf of the South Yorkshire Fire and Civil Defence Authority.
9. Mr Michel Kallipetis QC, instructed by Messrs Dibb Lupton Broomhead, appeared on behalf of Trent Regional Health Authority.
10. Mr Roger Toulson QC, instructed by Messrs Reynolds Porter Chamberlain, appeared on behalf of Dr W. Eastwood.
APPENDIX 8
LIST OF THOSE GIVING ORAL EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE
Stephen Martin FOSTER
Michael Joseph BRADLEY
Peter William JACKSON
Alison Jane BENNETT
Daniel Joseph HENNESSEY
Keith GOLDING
Ian John CLARKE
David PERRY
David Anthony CRUICE
Patrick CUNNINGHAM
Keith LEONARD
Wayne David WINDEVER
Gary GAINS
Mark Ian HUGHES
David HUGHES
Anthony BARNBROCK
David CUNNINGHAM
Peter DARCY
Ian Kenneth DEVINE
Peter Joseph GARRETT
David Peter LOWE
Geoffrey Nigel MOODY
Christopher MORAN
Roy PARRY
John Stewart PHIMESTER
David POSTLETHWAITE
Thomas Kenneth HILTON
Nicholas BELL
Stephen Mark WESTERGREEN
Trevor HICKS
Ian William BURKE
William Hamilton COMERFORD
Diane Susan CONNOLLY
Peter Jeffrey GARRETT
David HARTLEY
Thomas Bentley MATTHEWS
David Thomas JONES
Paul McCAFFREY
David Stephen MOORE
Maxwell ROSS
Anthony Christopher SMITH
Steven ALLEN
P. MAHER
Michael Gerrard HILL
Neil FITZMAURICE
Angela HOCKENHULL
Lee Edward OXLEY
Constance SWEET
Janet Ann ELLIS
Frederick James ECCLESTON
Adam James PEMBERTON
John Randolph Tom BARTHOLOMEW
Judith WATSON
Duncan STURROCK
Susan DAWES
Albert LINDLEY
PC Ian BROWN
Chief Superintendent Brian Leonard MOLE
Chief Superintendent David Godfrey DUCKENFIELD
Assistant Chief Constable Walter JACKSON
Superintendent Roger MARSHALL
Superintendent Bernard Dean MURRAY
Superintendent Roger GREENWOOD
Bruce David GROBBELAAR*
Chief Superintendent John Arthur NESBIT
Superintendent John Harris BROUGHAM
Detective Superintendent Graham McKAY
Inspector Paul HAND-DAVIS
Chief Inspector Robert Wallace CREASER
Inspector Peter Colin DARLING
Inspector David BULLAS
Inspector Gordon SYKES
Inspector Robert PURDY
Inspector Stephen ELLIS
Inspector John Joseph BENNETT
Sergeant Stephen John PAYNE
PC Graham DUFFY
PC D. EVANS
PC Andrew BEST
PC Brian Robert HUCKSTEPP
PC Alistair John TAYLOR
Sergeant John MORGAN
WPC Alison TAGG
Sergeant Lionel PROCTOR
WPC Jane Borthwick BURNLEES
Sergeant Philip Sidney SMITH
PC Stephen Frank FRY
PC F.N.GRUNNILL
WPC Elizabeth Jayne WILSON
Sergeant William Cameron CRAWFORD
PC Paul BRANSTON
WPC Jacqueline BURTON
Sergeant Robert BURNS
WPC Helen Kay PEARSON
PC Alexander AITKIN
Sergeant Paul BURMAN
PC Stephen Andrew SHEAR WOOD
Sergeant Edward HIGGINS
Sergeant Peter CHAPMAN
PC Peter Edward SMITH
PC Gerrard St Clare FINNEGAN
PC David Alfred ILLINGWORTH
WPC Fiona RICHARDSON
PC James Oscar PACKER
PC Michael BUXTON
Detective Sergeant Paul MORTON
Detective Sergeant David GUTCHER
PC Michael Vincent RYAN
Sergeant Michael GODDARD
Peter WELLS
PC Trevor BICHARD
John Edmund TOWLER
Frank GODLEY
Philip Martin SAXTON
PC Harold GUEST
Inspector Ian TURNER
Chief Inspector McROBBIE
PC Kenneth ROOK
FC OP Susan Elizabeth DAVIES
Station Officer J SWAIN
Station Officer FLETCHER
A.C.O. A. D. HORNSBY
Leading Fireman HOUSLEY
George LLOYD
Raymond John LLOYD
Brian SAYLES
Randolph SAYNOR
Stephen Michael COPELAND
Albert RHODES
Steven Charles RHODES
Wayne Austin HALL
Allan John HASKINS
Stuart Roland THORPE
Kenneth CASTLEY
John Philip CASTLEY
Albert Ronald MARSH
Robert William COBB
Brian RIDGE
Richard William BEADSLEY
Malcolm BAIN
Stephen Craig CARDWELL
Gary VAUX
Alan Keith SEAMAN
Frederick MADDOX
Dr William PURCELL
Station Officer Patrick HIGGINS
Station Officer Paul Anthony James EASON
Control Superintendent Raymond CLARKE
Deputy Chief Metropolitan Ambulance Officer Alan HOPKINS
Chief Metropolitan Ambulance Officer Albert PAGE
Lawrence YOXALL
David John WALKER
Maurice KAYQC
Dr Andrew Jolyon BYRNE
Graham KELLY
Dr John ASHTON
Dr Naderassen Carpoosamy CURPEN
Kenneth EVANS
Glen KIRTON
Dr Wilfred EASTWOOD
Dr Glyn PHILLIPS
Ferenc MORATH
Andrew SANDERSON
PC Philip HOOSON
PC Gary CAMMOCK
David BOWNES
Inspector Clive William CALVERT
Graham Henry MACKRELL
Inspector Steven Robert SEWELL
Douglas John LOCK
Garry TAYLOR
David George Lawrence WATTS
Superintendent Terence Willis STUART
PC Brian WAUGH
In addition, statements of evidence from many others were admitted to the Inquiry. Some 80 letters were received from Members of the House of Commons and three from Members of the House of Lords. Some 1,470 letters from the general public were received. Organisations who have submitted evidence addressed to Part II of the Inquiry will be specifically listed in the Final Report.
* Statement read to the Inquiry