The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself/Chapter 18
XVIII
A LONESOME GENERAL
During 1838 and 1839 we had another serious complication with Great Britain along the Niagara frontier which seemed to foreshadow a third great war. There were armed invasions of British territory by Americans; an expedition crossed from Canada to our side, killed several persons, set the steamer Caroline on fire, and drifted her over the falls. 200,000 Americans banded themselves together under the name of "Canadian Patriots" with the avowed object of invading and annexing Canada. At this critical juncture General Scott was dispatched to the frontier, with full authority to call on the governors of all the border States, including Virginia and Kentucky, for such force of militia as he might deem expedient. Here we were again, blindly trying the same militia experiment.
In addressing excited crowds along the border, General Scott was obliged to inform the people: "I stand before you without troops, and without arms, save the sword at my side." Which would make a wonderful historical painting, a dramatic and spectacular opera bouffe, but is no businesslike method of conducting a modern campaign.
We patched up our squabble with Great Britain to renew it next year in a dispute over the boundaries of the State of Maine. There is no guessing when the most peaceable chap is going to mix up in a scrap with neighbors. All this time the Florida War was likewise dragging along. We never brought it to a close until 1842, and, after seven years of fruitless fighting, had to give the Indians their own way to get peace. Didn't know that, did you? That's torn out of the popular histories.
Here is what we should have learned from these Indian wars:
First. That the expense was tripled, if not quadrupled, by that feature of the law of 1821 which gave the Government, in times of emergency, no discretion to increase the number of enlisted men in the army.
Second. That, after successfully employing militia and volunteers for short periods of service, and exhausting their enthusiasm, Congress found it more humane and economical to continue operations with regular troops enlisted for the period of five years.
Third. That for want of a well-defined peace organization, a nation of seventeen millions of people contended for seven years with 1,200 warriors, and finally closed the struggle without accomplishing the forcible emigration of the Indians — which was the original and sole cause of the war.
These were the lessons which Congress and our people failed to learn.