The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself/Chapter 19
XIX
THE MEXICAN PARADOX
Beginning in 1845, the Mexican War was a series of unexampled victories, from Palo Alto to Buena Vista on the North, from Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo to the Mexican Capital on the South.
Successes so brilliant would apparently denote the perfection of military policy, yet paradoxical as it may seem, they were achieved under the same system of laws and Executive Orders which in the preceding foreign war had led to a succession of calamities, terminating in the capture of Washington City. The explanation of this paradox is found in the different character of our adversaries, but more particularly the difference in the quality of the army with which we began the two wars.
The Mexican War broke out three years after the Florida War ended, when we had a large number of well-trained men. Comparing it with the War of 1812 we find that in the War of 1812 the combined force of regulars, and volunteers of one year or more of service, was but 12 per cent of the total troops employed, while 88 per cent were raw recruits. In the Mexican War these figures were exactly reversed — 88 per cent of our troops were either regulars, or volunteers who had seen at least twelve months' service. In the one war an army of 5,401 raw troops fighting in defense of our National Capital, fled before 1,500 redcoats, with a loss of 19 killed and wounded. In the other, a force of less than 5,000 trained volunteers, supported by a few regular troops, overthrew the Mexican army of four times their number.
In the one war 5,000 regulars held Canada, baffling all of our efforts at invasion; in the other our army numbering 6,000 combatants triumphantly entered the enemy's Capital.
There is still another reason, growing out of the foresight of George Washington in establishing the military academy at West Point. General Scott himself has forcibly stated this reason, "I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share. Whereas, in less than two campaigns, we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish."
That's fine! That's the way I want my soldiers to talk and fight. But we had our worriments during that Mexican War, mostly growing out of the same old muddle of militia and short-term enlistments. And, also, out of the military innocence cherished by our friends the statesmen on Capitol Hill.
In order to avoid any possible variation in our method of courting calamity, General Taylor, who commanded on the Texas border, was instructed to resist invasion, and if expedient to carry the war into Mexico. For this purpose he was empowered to call upon the militia of the surrounding states, and particularly the Texans.
Here we go again, limping off on the same old crippled foot, trying to do again the very thing which caused the loss of an army at Queenstown, where our militia refused to serve outside the United States. Of course, it was a palpable violation of the Constitution to send militia on a foreign invasion. Our regular force at that time, on paper, was about 4,000 men. By actual figures this "army of occupation" on the frontiers of Texas, in May, 1846, numbered 73 companies, with 209 officers and 2,839 men actually present. Each of these companies, but for a defect in the law, should have mustered 100 men; which would have raised the total force to about 8,000.
His numerical weakness, however, did not bluff General Taylor. What he had was good. Four-fifths of his officers were West Pointers, trained to their trade. Six months in a camp of instruction at Corpus Christi had brought his troops to the highest point of discipline and esprit de corps.
On the 25th of April Thornton's Dragoons, in a skirmish on the east bank of the river lost 16 killed and 11 wounded. The emergency had arisen, and Taylor promptly called upon the Governors of Louisiana and Texas for 5,000 volunteers. But the call came too late. Volunteers could not reach him.
On April 26th the enemy crossed the Rio Grande in large force, and next day Taylor accepted their challenge at Palo Alto. The fight began at two o'clock in the afternoon, and by dark the Americans were masters of the field. The following day Taylor routed the Mexicans at Resaca de la Palma and drove them across the Rio Grande. Now, here's the point. Instead of having 8,000 men, General Taylor's force numbered 173 officers and 2,049 men, of whom 1,700 were engaged. His loss was 10 per cent — 170 killed and wounded. The enemy's force was estimated at 6,000 with a loss of 1,000. Reënforcements reached the Americans three days too late for salvation, if General Taylor had been overwhelmed.
In response to Taylor's call the veteran General Gaines at New Orleans promptly set to work organizing and equipping an army on his own responsibility. So rapidly did he proceed, calling on the Governors of Alabama, Mississippi and Missouri, that he sent 8,000 troops to General Taylor before he could be relieved of command and stopped.
And thereby hangs another distressing tale; 5,389 men were sent from Louisiana to General Taylor after the emergency had passed. Destitute of equipment and transportation, they were compelled to fret in idleness until discharged. Called out for three months they returned home without the satisfaction of having fired a shot. Their losses by death were 145 — just 25 less than were killed and wounded in the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Casualties of carelessness nearly equaled those of battle. Which is a mighty good reason why men should hate to volunteer, and expose themselves to a futile death.
Now think of this: While some 20,000 volunteers were hastily dispatched to the theater of war, not a solitary wagon reached General Taylor until after his capture of Monterey. The fact of it is, there was neither gossip nor information on file at Washington as to whether or not wagons could be used in Mexico. We had no Bureau of Military Statistics. When Taylor began his march on Monterey with 6,000 men, for lack of transportation and subsistence he was compelled to leave behind him 6,000 other men.
Providence condones the blunders of these United States, and this wagon oversight switched round to our advantage. It enabled General Taylor to form the volunteers who were left behind into an army of the second line, to drill and prepare them for future campaigns. Those whom he carried with him, he put through a course of six hours' drilling per day. Never was the value of disciplined men more triumphantly demonstrated; 4,759 men, of whom but 517 were regulars, at the battle of Buena Vista, defeated the entire Mexican army of 18,133 men, with 20 pieces of artillery. General Taylor, in his official report, comments upon the "high state of discipline and instruction of several of the volunteer regiments."