United States Reports/Volume 601/Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer/Opinion of Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
Deborah Laufer has filed hundreds of lawsuits against hotels she has no intention of visiting, claiming that their websites lack accessibility information mandated by a federal regulation. At both parties’ request, this Court agreed to answer a question that has divided the Courts of Appeals: whether plaintiffs like Laufer have standing to bring these claims. The Court decides not to decide that question because, after briefing began, Laufer voluntarily dismissed her claim in the District Court. I would answer this important and recurring question, which, as all agree, we have the authority to do. And, I conclude that Laufer lacks standing.
I
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation,” such as a hotel. 42 U. S. C. §§ 12182(a), 12181(7)(A). Title III defines discrimination to include “a failure to make reasonable modifications” when “necessary to afford … services … or accommodations to individuals with disabilities.” § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). To enforce the ADA’s prohibition on discrimination, Title III creates a private cause of action that permits “any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability” to sue for violations. § 12188(a)(1). Only injunctive relief and attorney’s fees are available to private litigants. Ibid.; see also §§ 12205, 2000a–3(a). The Attorney General, however, may obtain damages or assess civil penalties. § 12188(b)(2).
The Department of Justice promulgated a regulation known as the Reservation Rule to aid in the implementation of the ADA’s prohibition on discrimination. The rule requires hotels to “[i]dentify and describe accessible features … in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs.” 28 CFR § 36.302(e)(1)(ii) (2022). The rule also applies to reservations made “through a third party.” Ibid.
Laufer, who is wheelchair bound, is a self-described “tester” of compliance with the Reservation Rule. From her home in Florida, Laufer scours the internet for hotel websites that do not contain the required accessibility information. When she finds a deficient website, she sues the hotel. She often offers to settle immediately for $10,000 in attorney’s fees and corrective action. See Report and Recommendation in In re Gillespie, No. 1:21–mc–14 (D Md., June 30, 2023), ECF Doc. 13, p. 5; No. 1:21–mc–14 (July 5, 2023), ECF Doc. 14, p. 1, vacated on other grounds by In re Gillespie, No. 23–1819 (CA4, Nov. 14, 2023) (per curiam). In the past five years, Laufer has filed over 600 lawsuits against hotels.
In this case, Laufer visited the website of a bed and breakfast located in Maine, the Coast Village Inn. She filed suit against the Coast Village Inn’s owner, Acheson Hotels, for failing to provide sufficient accessibility information. She also contended that 13 third-party booking websites, such as Expedia, failed to provide accessibility information for the Coast Village Inn. Laufer initially alleged that she was planning to visit the Coast Village Inn as part of a cross-country trip from Florida to Maine to Colorado. But she later disclaimed any intent to travel to Maine (or the Coast Village Inn). 50 F. 4th 259, 267, n. 3 (CA1 2022); see also Brief for Appellant in No. 21–1410 (CA1), p. 4, n. 1.
The District Court concluded that Laufer lacked standing and dismissed her complaint. The First Circuit reversed, relying primarily on this Court’s holding in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363 (1982), that a tester had standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act. When Acheson Hotels petitioned for certiorari, Laufer agreed. She highlighted that the Circuits were split as to her standing and argued that “clarity from this Court is badly needed.” Brief in Opposition 1. After we granted certiorari and set the case for argument, Laufer filed a notice in the District Court of her voluntary dismissal of her claim with prejudice. And, even though Acheson Hotels (and several amici) had already filed briefs, Laufer requested that we dismiss this case as moot. We denied her request at that time, but agreed to consider it at oral argument. The case has been fully briefed and the Court has heard argument on the merits. Today, however, the majority opts to resolve this case on mootness. We can—and should—address the question on which we granted certiorari.
II
I would not dismiss this case as moot. There is no question that we have authority to address Laufer’s standing. Standing and mootness are both jurisdictional doctrines that flow from Article III. And, there is no mandatory “sequencing of jurisdictional issues.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 584 (1999). Indeed, as the majority and Laufer herself acknowledge, we have the discretion to determine either “ ‘threshold groun[d] for denying audience to a case on the merits.’ ” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U. S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U. S., at 585); ante, at 4; Suggestion of Mootness 9 (“[T]his Court has discretion to resolve either issue first”).
We should address Laufer’s standing, rather than resolve this case on mootness. As an analytical matter, whether Laufer had standing the day she filed her suit is logically antecedent to whether her later actions mooted the case. More importantly, whether Laufer has standing to bring her Reservation Rule claims is a recurring question that only this Court can definitively resolve. As the majority explains, “Laufer has singlehandedly generated a circuit split” on her standing. Ante, at 3. And Laufer is far from the only Reservation Rule tester. See, e.g., Harty v. West Point Realty, Inc., 28 F. 4th 435 (CA2 2022); Love v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., No. 20–cv–7523 (ND Cal., Mar. 29, 2021); Sarwar v. Om Sai, LLC, No. 2:20–cv–483 (D Me., May 18, 2021). Beyond answering this question for our colleagues on the Courts of Appeal and District Courts, we should answer it for Acheson Hotels, which has spent significant time and resources fully briefing a question that will now go unanswered.
What is more, the circumstances strongly suggest strategic behavior on Laufer’s part. After this case was well underway in this Court, Laufer filed a notice with the District Court voluntarily dismissing her claim with prejudice, ostensibly because another court sanctioned one of her attorneys for misconduct related to some of Laufer’s ADA cases. But the attorney in question had nothing to do with the case before us. Suggestion of Mootness 3 (acknowledging at-issue attorney “had no involvement in the present case before this Court”). Laufer’s logic is thus that she dismissed her claim—and the Court should no longer address whether she had standing—because an attorney she hired in an entirely different case engaged in misconduct. An unrelated attorney’s conduct does nothing to change the analysis required to determine a plaintiff’s standing. Laufer admits as much, arguing only that the alleged misconduct “could distract from the merits of her ADA claims and everything she has sought to achieve for persons with disabilities like herself.” Id., at 4. I would not reward Laufer’s transparent tactic for evading our review. Although the majority leaves the door open to “exercise [its] discretion differently in a future case,” we have needlessly invited litigants to follow Laufer’s path to manipulate our docket. Ante, at 5. We should not resolve this case about standing based upon mootness of Laufer’s own making.[1]
III
Turning to the question presented, Laufer lacks standing to bring her ADA claims. Article III of the Constitution extends the “judicial Power” to all “Cases” and “Controversies.” Standing doctrine serves to “limi[t] the ‘judicial power’ to ‘ “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” ’ ” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 343 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 774 (2000)). In doing so, standing “preserve[s] separation of powers by preventing the Judiciary’s entanglement in disputes that are primarily political in nature.” Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 344.
As I have previously explained, “[t]he mere filing of a complaint in federal court … does not a case (or controversy) make.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 446 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Our “judicial power [does not extend] to every violation of the constitution [or law] which may possibly take place, but to ‘a case in law or equity,’ in which a right, under such law, is asserted in a Court of justice.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 405 (1821). To have standing, a plaintiff must assert a violation of his rights. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 563 (1992) (“[T]he party seeking review [must] be himself among the injured” (internal quotation marks omitted)). After all, “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803). It is not to address a plaintiff’s claim of “only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the … laws.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 573.[2]
Laufer lacks standing because her claim does not assert a violation of a right under the ADA, much less a violation of her rights. Her claim alleges that Acheson Hotels violated the ADA by failing to include on its website the accessibility information that the Reservation Rule requires. Yet, the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the … services … of any place of public accommodation.” 42 U. S. C. § 12182(a). In other words, the ADA prohibits only discrimination based on disability—it does not create a right to information.
Laufer’s ADA claim is thus different from the tester’s claim under the Fair Housing Act that the Court addressed in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363. In contrast to the ADA, the Fair Housing Act explicitly prohibits “represent[ing] to any person because of race … that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” § 3604(d). Accordingly, when Havens Realty told a black tester that no apartments were available but told a white tester that it had vacancies, the Court found that the black tester had standing to sue. The Court explained that the statute created “a legal right to truthful information about available housing.” Id., at 373. The black tester had been personally denied that truthful information, so she had standing to bring her claim. Havens Realty thus has no bearing on Laufer’s standing as a tester of compliance with the ADA, which provides no such statutory right to information.
Laufer points to the Reservation Rule, alleging that it creates an entitlement to accessibility information. But even assuming a regulation could—and did—create such a right, Laufer asserts no violation of her own rights with regard to that information. Laufer does not even harbor “ ‘some day’ intentions” of traveling to Maine to visit the Coast Village Inn. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 564. Her lack of intent to visit the hotel or even book a hotel room elsewhere in Maine eviscerates any connection to her purported legal interest in the accessibility information required by the Reservation Rule. To put it in the “more pedestrian terms” used by then-Judge Scalia, standing asks “ ‘What’s it to you?’ ” The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983). Acheson Hotels’ failure to provide accessibility information on its website is nothing to Laufer, because she disclaimed any intent to visit the hotel.
Rather than assert a violation of her own rights, Laufer casts herself in the role of a private attorney general, surfing the web to ensure hotels’ compliance with the Reservation Rule. Laufer has described herself as “an advocate on behalf of both [her]self and other similarly situated disabled persons.” App. 17a. She admits that, “[a]s a tester, [she] visit[s] hotel online reservation services to ascertain whether they are in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Ibid. As a public official would do, Laufer even monitors those hotel websites she has found lacking. She uses “a system” to track each of the hundreds of hotels she has sued. Id., at 19a. “Once a case is settled, [she] mark[s] the date … when the defendant has agreed to fix its websites,” and on that date, she “revisit[s]” the website to ensure the hotel has complied. Id., at 19a–20a.
Laufer sues “not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm” on her, but to force hotels to comply with the Reservation Rule. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 761 (1984). “Vindicating the public interest … is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,” however, not private plaintiffs. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 576. The President is tasked with the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U. S. Const., Art. II, § 3, and Executive Branch officials have discretion to choose whether and how to enforce the law, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 831–832 (1985). Yet, as Judge Newsom has explained, “[t]esters exercise the sort of proactive enforcement discretion properly reserved to the Executive Branch,” with none of the corresponding accountability. Laufer v. Arpan, LLC, 29 F. 4th 1268, 1291 (CA11 2022) (concurring opinion).
This case exemplifies the dangers. An official could have informed Acheson Hotels that its website failed to comply with the Reservation Rule, and Acheson Hotels could have updated its website to explain it had no accessible rooms. Laufer, however, chose to “enforce” each technical violation of the ADA she could uncover with a lawsuit. Because she is a private plaintiff, no discretion was required or exercised. And, of course, Laufer has been willing to forgo her suits if a hotel pays up, even though the ADA provides for no damages for private litigants. Laufer’s aggressive efforts to personally impose financial penalties for violations of the Reservation Rule go far beyond the role that Congress envisioned for private plaintiffs under the ADA. Without a violation of her own rights, Laufer lacks standing to sue hotels under the ADA. Ensuring and monitoring compliance with the law is a function of a Government official, not a private person who does not assert a violation of her own rights.
IV
Standing ensures that courts decide disputes over violations of a person’s rights, not a defendant’s compliance with the law in the abstract. Because Laufer has not asserted a violation of a right owed to her, she has no standing to bring her Reservation Rule claims. The Court should not have avoided reaching that conclusion due to Laufer’s eleventh-hour tactics. I respectfully concur in the judgment because I would vacate and remand, with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.
- ↑ The majority vacates the opinion below in Laufer’s favor, and rightly so. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).
- ↑ The traditional distinction between public and private rights shapes the contours of the judicial power. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 344 (2016) (opinion of Thomas, J.); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U. S. 665, 713 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Private rights, such as the classic rights to life, liberty, and property, were “so called because they ‘appertain[ed] and belong[ed] to particular men … merely as individuals,’ not ‘to them as members of society [or] standing in various relations to each other’—that is, not dependent upon the will of the government.” Id., at 713 (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 119 (1765)). By contrast, public rights “belon[g] to the public as a whole.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575 U. S. 138, 171 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 5 (1772). And “quasi-private rights, or statutory entitlements, are those ‘ “privileges” ’ or ‘ “franchises” ’ that are bestowed by the government on individuals.” B&B Hardware, 575 U. S., at 171. We need not classify Laufer’s legal interests because, regardless of which type of right a plaintiff asserts, he must allege “the violation of his private legal right” or his own injury based on a violation of a public right. Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 344 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (emphasis added); see also A. Woolhandler & C. Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine? 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 723 (2004); C. Nelson, Vested Rights, “Franchises,” and the Separation of Powers, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1429, 1433, 1437–1438 (2021). For the reasons provided, Laufer has not alleged a violation of her rights or a cognizable injury to herself.