Executive Order 13140

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Executive Order 13140 of October 6, 1999

1999 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including chapter 47 of title 10, United States Code (Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 801-946), in order to prescribe amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, prescribed by Executive Order 12473, as amended by Executive Order 12484, Executive Order 12550, Executive Order 12586, Executive Order 12708, Executive Order 12767, Executive Order 12888, Executive Order 12936, Executive Order 12960, and Executive Order 13086, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Part II of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, is amended as follows:

  1. R.C.M. 502(c) is amended to read as follows:
    "(c) Qualifications of military judge. A military judge shall be a commissioned officer of the armed forces who is a member of the bar of a Federal court or a member of the bar of the highest court of a State and who is certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which such military judge is a member. In addition, the military judge of a general court-martial shall be designated for such duties by the Judge Advocate General or the Judge Advocate General's designee, certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge of a general court-martial, and assigned and directly responsible to the Judge Advocate General or the Judge Advocate General's designee. The Secretary concerned may prescribe additional qualifications for military judges in special courts-martial. As used in this subsection "military judge" does not include the president of a special court-martial without a military judge."
  2. R.C.M. 804 is amended by redesignating the current subsection (c) as subsection (d) and inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection (c):
    "(c) Voluntary absence for limited purpose of child testimony.
    (1) Election by accused. Following a determination by the military judge that remote live testimony of a child is appropriate pursuant to Mil. R. Evid. 611(d)(3), the accused may elect to voluntarily absent himself from the courtroom in order to preclude the use of procedures described in R.C.M. 914A.
    (2) Procedure. The accused's absence will be conditional upon his being able to view the witness' testimony from a remote location. Normally, a two-way closed circuit television system will be used to transmit the child's testimony from the courtroom to the accused's location. A one-way closed circuit television system may be used if deemed necessary by the military judge. The accused will also be provided private, contemporaneous communication with his counsel. The procedures described herein shall be employed unless the accused has made a knowing and affirmative waiver of these procedures.
    (3) Effect on accused's rights generally. An election by the accused to be absent pursuant to subsection (c)(1) shall not otherwise affect the accused's right to be present at the remainder of the trial in accordance with this rule."
  3. The following new rule is inserted after R.C.M. 914:

    "Rule 914A. Use of remote live testimony of a child
    (a) General procedures. A child shall be allowed to testify out of the presence of the accused after the military judge has determined that the requirements of Mil. R. Evid. 611(d)(3) have been satisfied. The procedure used to take such testimony will be determined by the military judge based upon the exigencies of the situation. However, such testimony should normally be taken via a two-way closed circuit television system.
    At a minimum, the following procedures shall be observed:
    (1) The witness shall testify from a remote location outside the courtroom;
    (2) Attendance at the remote location shall be limited to the child, counsel for each side (not including an accused pro se), equipment operators, and other persons, such as an attendant for the child, whose presence is deemed necessary by the military judge;
    (3) Sufficient monitors shall be placed in the courtroom to allow viewing and hearing of the testimony by the military judge, the accused, the members, the court reporter and the public;
    (4) The voice of the military judge shall be transmitted into the remote location to allow control of the proceedings; and (5) The accused shall be permitted private, contemporaneous communication with his counsel.
    (b) Prohibitions. The procedures described above shall not be used where the accused elects to absent himself from the courtroom pursuant to R.C.M. 804(c)."
  4. R.C.M. 1001(b)(4) is amended by inserting the following sentences between the first and second sentences:
    "Evidence is aggravation includes, but is not limited to, evidence of financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on or cost to any person or entity who was the victim of an offense committed by the accused and evidence of significant adverse impact on the mission, discipline, or efficiency of the command directly and immediately resulting from the accused's offense. In addition, evidence in aggravation may include evidence that the accused intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person."
  5. R.C.M. 1003(b) is amended-
    (1) by striking subsection (4) and (2) by redesignating subsections (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), and (11) as subsections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10), respectively.
  6. R.C.M. 1004(c)(7) is amended by adding at end the following new subsection:
    "(K) The victim of the murder was under 15 years of age."

Sec. 2. Part III of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, is amended as follows:

  1. Insert the following new rule after Mil. R. Evid. 512:

    "Rule 513. Psychotherapist-patient privilege
    (a) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication made between the patient and a psychotherapist or an assistant to the psychotherapist, in a case arising under the UCMJ, if such communication was made for the purpose of facilitating diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental or emotional condition.
    (b) Definitions. As used in this rule of evidence:
    (1) A "patient" is a person who consults with or is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist for purposes of advice, diagnosis, or treatment of a mental or emotional condition.
    (2) A "psychotherapist" is a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or clinical social worker who is licensed in any state, territory, possession, the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico to perform professional services as such, or who holds credentials to provide such services from any military health care facility, or is a person reasonably believed by the patient to have such license or credentials.
    (3) An "assistant to a psychotherapist" is a person directed by or assigned to assist a psychotherapist in providing professional services, or is reasonably believed by the patient to be such.
    (4) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional services to the patient or those reasonably necessary for such transmission of the communication.
    (5) "Evidence of a patient's records or communications" is testimony of a psychotherapist, or assistant to the same, or patient records that pertain to communications by a patient to a psychotherapist, or assistant to the same for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental or emotional condition.
    (c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient or the guardian or conservator of the patient. A person who may claim the privilege may authorize trial counsel or defense counsel to claim the privilege on his or her behalf. The psychotherapist or assistant to the psychotherapist who received the communication may claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. The authority of such a psychotherapist, assistant, guardian, or conservator to so assert the privilege is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
    (d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
    (1) when the patient is dead;
    (2) when the communication is evidence of spouse abuse, child abuse, or neglect or in a proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime against the person of the other spouse or a child of either spouse;
    (3) when federal law, state law, or service regulation imposes a duty to report information contained in a communication;
    (4) when a psychotherapist or assistant to a psychotherapist believes that a patient's mental or emotional condition makes the patient a danger to any person, including the patient;
    (5) if the communication clearly contemplated the future commission of a fraud or crime or if the services of the psychotherapist are sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the patient knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud;
    (6) when necessary to ensure the safety and security of military personnel, military dependents, military property, classified information, or the accomplishment of a military mission;
    (7) when an accused offers statements or other evidence concerning his mental condition in defense, extenuation, or mitigation, under circumstances not covered by R.C.M. 706 or Mil. R. Evid. 302. In such situations, the military judge may, upon motion, order disclosure of any statement made by the accused to a psychotherapist as may be necessary in the interests of justice; or (8) when admission or disclosure of a communication is constitutionally required.
    (e) Procedure to determine admissibility of patient records or communications.
    (1) In any case in which the production or admission of records or communications of a patient other than the accused is a matter in dispute, a party may seek an interlocutory ruling by the military judge. In order to obtain such a ruling, the party shall:
    (A) file a written motion at least 5 days prior to entry of pleas specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is sought or offered, or objected to, unless the military judge, for good cause shown, requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and
    (B) serve the motion on the opposing party, the military judge and, if practical, notify the patient or the patient's guardian, conservator, or representative that the motion has been filed and that the patient has an opportunity to be heard as set forth in subparagraph (e)(2).
    (2) Before ordering the production or admission of evidence of a patient's records or communication, the military judge shall conduct a hearing. Upon the motion of counsel for either party and upon good cause shown, the military judge may order the hearing closed. At the hearing, the parties may call witnesses, including the patient, and offer other relevant evidence. The patient shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend the hearing and be heard at the patient's own expense unless the patient has been otherwise subpoenaed or ordered to appear at the hearing. However, the proceedings shall not be unduly delayed for this purpose. In a case before a court-martial composed of a military judge and members, the military judge shall conduct the hearing outside the presence of the members.
    (3) The military judge shall examine the evidence or a proffer thereof in camera, if such examination is necessary to rule on the motion.
    (4) To prevent unnecessary disclosure of evidence of a patient's records or communications, the military judge may issue protective orders or may admit only portions of the evidence.
    (5) The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing shall be sealed and shall remain under seal unless the military judge or an appellate court orders otherwise.".
  2. Mil. R. Evid. 611 is amended by inserting the following new subsection at the end:
    (d) Remote live testimony of a child.
    (1) In a case involving abuse of a child or domestic violence, the military judge shall, subject to the requirements of subsection (3) of this rule, allow a child victim or witness to testify from an area outside the courtroom as prescribed in R.C.M. 914A.
    (2) The term "child" means a person who is under the age of 16 at the time of his or her testimony. The term "abuse of a child" means the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, or negligent treatment of a child. The term "exploitation" means child pornography or child prostitution. The term "negligent treatment" means the failure to provide, for reasons other than poverty, adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care so as to endanger seriously the physical health of the child. The term "domestic violence" means an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person and is committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim; by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common; by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian; or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.
    (3) Remote live testimony will be used only where the military judge makes a finding on the record that a child is unable to testify in open court in the presence of the accused, for any of the following reasons:
    (A) The child is unable to testify because of fear;
    (B) There is substantial likelihood, established by expert testimony, that the child would suffer emotional trauma from testifying;
    (C) The child suffers from a mental or other infirmity; or (D) Conduct by an accused or defense counsel causes the child to be unable to continue testifying.
    (4) Remote live testimony of a child shall not be utilized where the accused elects to absent himself from the courtroom in accordance with R.C.M. 804(c).".

Sec. 3. Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, is amended as follows:

  1. Insert the following new paragraph after paragraph 100:
    100a. Article 134-(Reckless endanger-ment) a. Text. See paragraph 60.
  2. Elements.
    (1) That the accused did engage in conduct;
    (2) That the conduct was wrongful and reckless or wanton;
    (3) That the conduct was likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm to another person; and
    (4) That under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
  3. Explanation.
    (1) In general. This offense is intended to prohibit and therefore deter reckless or wanton conduct that wrongfully creates a substantial risk of death or serious injury to others.
    (2) Wrongfulness. Conduct is wrongful when it is without legal justification or excuse.
    (3) Recklessness. "Reckless" conduct is conduct that exhibits a culpable disregard of foreseeable consequences to others from the act or omission involved. The accused need not intentionally cause a resulting harm or know that his conduct is substantially certain to cause that result. The ultimate question is whether, under all the circumstances, the accused's conduct was of that heedless nature that made it actually or imminently dangerous to the rights or safety of others.
    (4) Wantonness. "Wanton" includes "reckless," but may connote willfulness, or a disregard of probable consequences, and thus describe a more aggravated offense.
    (5) Likely to produce. When the natural or probable consequence of particular conduct would be death or grievous bodily harm, it may be inferred that the conduct is "likely" to produce that result. See paragraph 54c(4)(a)(ii).
    (6) Grievous bodily harm. "Grievous bodily harm" means serious bodily injury. It does not include minor injuries, such as a black eye or a bloody nose, but does include fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to internal organs, and other serious bodily injuries.
    (7) Death or injury not required. It is not necessary that death or grievous bodily harm be actually inflicted to prove reckless endangerment.
  4. Lesser included offenses. None.
  5. Maximum punishment. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.
  6. Sample specification. In that ___________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board-location)(subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about __________ 19__, wrongfully and recklessly engage in conduct, to wit: (he/she)(describe conduct) and that the accused's conduct was likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to ________."

Sec. 4. These amendments shall take effect on 1 November 1999, subject to the following:

  1. The amendments made to Military Rule of Evidence 611, shall apply only in cases in which arraignment has been completed on or after 1 November 1999.
  2. Military Rule of Evidence 513 shall only apply to communications made after 1 November 1999.
  3. The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Martial 502, 804, and 914A shall only apply in cases in which arraignment has been completed or on after 1 November 1999.
  4. The amendments made to Rules for Courts-Martial 1001(b)(4) and 1004(c)(7) shall only apply to offenses committed after 1 November 1999.
  5. Nothing in these amendments shall be construed to make punishable any act done or omitted prior to 1 November 1999, which was not punishable when done or omitted.
  6. The maximum punishment for an offense committed prior to 1 November 1999, shall not exceed the applicable maximum in effect at the time of the commission of such offense.
  7. g. Nothing in these amendments shall be construed to invalidate any nonjudicial punishment proceeding, restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial in which arraignment occurred, or other action begun prior to 1 November 1999, and any such nonjudicial punishment, restraint, investigation, referral of charges, trial, or other action may proceed in the same manner and with the same effect as if these amendments had not been prescribed.

Signature of William J. Clinton
William J. Clinton
The White House,
October 6, 1999.
[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 8:45 a.m., October 8, 1999]
Billing code 3195–01–P


Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984


This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

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