certain'd: How can we suppose, that a different Faculty of the Mind is employ'd in fixing the other?
On the other Hand, those, who would resolve all moral Determinations into Sentiment, may endeavour to show, that 'tis impossible for Reason ever to draw Conclusions of this Nature. To Virtue, say they, it belongs to be amiable, and Vice odious. This forms their very Nature or Essence. But can Reason or Argumentation distribute these different Epithets to any Subjects, and pronounce a priori, that this must produce Love, and that Hatred? Or what other Reason can we ever assign for these Affections, but the original Fabric and Formation of the human Mind, which is naturally adapted to receive them?
The End of all moral Speculations is to teach us our Duty; and by proper Representations of the Deformity of Vice and Beauty of Virtue, beget correspondent Habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever to be expected from Inferences and Conclusions of the Understanding, which, of themselves, have no Hold of the Affections, nor set the active Powers of Men in Motion and Employment? They discover Truth; but where the Truths they discover are indifferent, and beget no Desire or Aversion, they can have no Influence on Conduct and Behaviour. What is ho-nourable,
