Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/20

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
6
SECTION I.

nourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes Possession of the Heart, and animates us to embrace and to maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool Assent of the Understanding; and gratifying a speculative Curiosity, puts an end to our Researches.

Extinguish all the warm Feelings and Prepossessions in favour of Virtue, and all Disgust or Aversion against Vice: Render Men totally indifferent towards these Distinctions; and Morality is no longer a practical Study, nor has any Tendency to regulate our Lives and Actions.

These Arguments on both Sides (and many more might be adduc'd) are so plausible, that I am apt to suspect they may, both of them, be solid and satisfactory, and that Reason and Sentiment concur in almost all moral Determinations and Conclusions. The final Sentence, 'tis probable, which pronounces Characters and Actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy or blameable; that which stamps on them the Mark of Honour or Infamy, Approbation or Censure; that which renders Morality an active Principle, and constitutes Virtue our Happiness, and Vice our Misery: 'Tis probable, I say, that this final Sentence depends on some internal Sense or Feeling,which