Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/14

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
x
CONTENTS.
2. Fifth Counter-proposition, 145
3. Distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter, 146
4. Character of the secondary qualities, 146
5. Character of the primary qualities, 148
6. Defects of this distinction, 149
7. It runs into a contradiction, 151
8. Psychological conception of idealism, 151
9. Psychological refutation of idealism, 152
10. This refutation, if logically conclusive, is founded on a contradiction and therefore cannot be accepted, 154
11. The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be abandoned as useless, or worse, 155
PROPOSITION VI.
The Universal and the Particular in Cognition, 156
Demonstration, 157
Observations and Explanations, 157
1. Explanation of words, 158
2. In what sense the contingent element is necessary, and in what sense it is contingent, 158
3. Why this proposition is introduced, 160
4. Question concerning the particular and the universal instead of being made a question of Knowing, 161
5. Was made a question of being by the early philosophers. Thales, 163
6. Parmenides. What change he effected on the question, 163
7. It still related to Being—not to Knowing, 164
8. Indecision of Greek speculation. The three crises of philosophy, 165
9. Plato appeared during the second crisis. His aim, 167
10. The coincidence of the known and the existent must be proved, not guessed at, 168
11. Plato's deficiencies, 168
12. His merits. The question respecting the particular and the universal demands an entire reconsideration, 169
13. A preliminary ambiguity, 170
14. Further statement of ambiguity, 171
15. Illustration of the ambiguity, 171
16. Is the Platonic analysis of cognition and existence a division into elements or into kinds?, 173
17. Rightly interpreted, it is a division into elements, 174
18. It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds, 176
19. Explanation of this charge, 177
20. Sixth Counter-proposition, 179
21. This counter-proposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers, 180
22. Review of our position, 181
23. Misinterpretation of the Platonic analysis traced into its consequences, 182
24. Perplexity as to general existences, 183
25. Realism, 183
26. Realism is superseded by Conceptualism, 184