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CONTENTS.
2. | Fifth Counter-proposition, | 145 |
3. | Distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter, | 146 |
4. | Character of the secondary qualities, | 146 |
5. | Character of the primary qualities, | 148 |
6. | Defects of this distinction, | 149 |
7. | It runs into a contradiction, | 151 |
8. | Psychological conception of idealism, | 151 |
9. | Psychological refutation of idealism, | 152 |
10. | This refutation, if logically conclusive, is founded on a contradiction and therefore cannot be accepted, | 154 |
11. | The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be abandoned as useless, or worse, | 155 |
PROPOSITION VI. | ||
The Universal and the Particular in Cognition, | 156 | |
Demonstration, | 157 | |
Observations and Explanations, | 157 | |
1. | Explanation of words, | 158 |
2. | In what sense the contingent element is necessary, and in what sense it is contingent, | 158 |
3. | Why this proposition is introduced, | 160 |
4. | Question concerning the particular and the universal instead of being made a question of Knowing, | 161 |
5. | Was made a question of being by the early philosophers. Thales, | 163 |
6. | Parmenides. What change he effected on the question, | 163 |
7. | It still related to Being—not to Knowing, | 164 |
8. | Indecision of Greek speculation. The three crises of philosophy, | 165 |
9. | Plato appeared during the second crisis. His aim, | 167 |
10. | The coincidence of the known and the existent must be proved, not guessed at, | 168 |
11. | Plato's deficiencies, | 168 |
12. | His merits. The question respecting the particular and the universal demands an entire reconsideration, | 169 |
13. | A preliminary ambiguity, | 170 |
14. | Further statement of ambiguity, | 171 |
15. | Illustration of the ambiguity, | 171 |
16. | Is the Platonic analysis of cognition and existence a division into elements or into kinds?, | 173 |
17. | Rightly interpreted, it is a division into elements, | 174 |
18. | It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds, | 176 |
19. | Explanation of this charge, | 177 |
20. | Sixth Counter-proposition, | 179 |
21. | This counter-proposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers, | 180 |
22. | Review of our position, | 181 |
23. | Misinterpretation of the Platonic analysis traced into its consequences, | 182 |
24. | Perplexity as to general existences, | 183 |
25. | Realism, | 183 |
26. | Realism is superseded by Conceptualism, | 184 |