Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| DATE | EVENT OR DOCUMENT | DESCRIPTION |
| 14 Nov 1961 |
and strengthen the administrative and political bases of government.…Do not propose to introduce into GVN the U.S. combat troops now but propose a phase of intense public and diplomatic activity to focus on infiltration from North. Shall decide later on course of action should infiltration not be radically reduced." Diem's taking necessary measures -- political, military, economic -- to improve his government and relations with the people were a prerequisite to further U.S. assistance: "Package should be presented as first steps in a partnership, in which the U.S. is prepared to do more as joint study of facts and GVN performance makes increased U.S. aid possible and productive." Strictly for his own information, Nolting was told Defense was "preparing plans for the use of U.S. combat forces in SVN under various contingencies, including stepped up infiltration as well as organized…(military) intervention. However, objective of our policy is to do all possible to accomplish purpose without use of U.S. combat forces." And, Nolting was to tell Diem: "We would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as they affect the security situation." | |
| 22 Nov 1961 | NSAM 111 | Called the "First Phase of Vietnam Program" this NSAM approved all Rusk/McNamara recommendations of 11 November except the first one: their initial recommendation that the U.S. commit itself to saving South Vietnam was omitted. |
| 7 Dec 1961 | Alexis Johnson/Rostow Redraft ("Clarification") of Nolting's 14 November guidance | "What we have in mind is that in operations directly related to the security situation, partnership will be so close that one party |
