Talk:On the Vital Principle/Whole text
common with many other inquiries, with every inquiry, I mean, instituted for ascertaining the essence and the thing itself, it might hastily be supposed that, as demonstration is the method for studying particular bodies in their accidents, there may be some one special method of investigation when our object is to learn what is the essence of a thing, and that that method ought to be sought for on this occasion. If, however, there is no one common method for ascertaining what any thing in itself is, the systematic treatment of our subject is rendered still more difficult; for, in that case, it will be necessary to adopt, for each particular subject, some one particular method. Although it may be manifest, besides, that the inquiry should be by some kind of demonstration, or division, or other method, there will still remain many difficulties and many liabilities to error in fixing upon the principles from which the inquiry should set out; for the principles of different subjects differ, as those of number are not those of plane surfaces.
It may be well, perhaps, before proceeding further, to distinguish the “genus” to which Vital Principle belongs, and determine what it is—determine, I mean, whether it is a something and essence, or quantity, or quality, or any other of the classified categories; as also, a distinction of no small importance, whether it is among entities in potentiality, or whether rather it is a reality. We have to consider too whether Vital Principle is divisible or without parts, and whether every Vital Principle is or is not the same in kind, and, if not the same, whether the difference is generic or specific; but they who now are engaged in discussing and exploring Vital Principle seem to give exclusive attention to that of man. We must be on our guard against this, however, so that it may not escape us whether there is but one definition for Vital Principle as for animal, or whether it must be different for each creature, as for a horse, a dog, or a man. The term animal, besides, taken in an universal sense, is either without meaning, or of very secondary value; and so equally is every other common term which might be predicated of this subject. If, on the other hand, there are not several Vital Principles, but parts only of a single Principle, we have to settle whether we should commence the inquiry with the Principle as a whole, or, contrariwise, with its parts; and, with respect to the parts, it is difficult to determine which of them have been constituted differently from others; it is difficult also to say whether we should study the parts before their functions, as the mind before thought, or sensibility before sensation; and so for other faculties and functions. If it be expedient to commence the inquiry with functions, it may be a question whether it would not be better here also to study first their opposites; as the object of perception before that which perceives, and thought before that which thinks. Now, the knowledge of any thing in itself seems to be useful towards a right conception of the causes of the accidents in substances; as, in mathematics, the knowledge of straight and curve, line and surface, is requisite for perceiving to how many right angles the angles of the triangle are equal. But the knowledge of the accidents contributes, largely, in its turn, towards knowing what the thing, essentially, is; for whenever we may be able, from the appearance of any substance, to recount the whole or the greater number of its accidents, we are then best prepared to say what its essence is. Thus, the essence is the proper beginning for every demonstration, so that all the definitions, which do not make known, or make it easy to conjecture what may be the accidents of any substance, are to be regarded as dialectic and unprofitable subtleties.
It is difficult to determine whether all the emotions of Vital Principle are common to it and its recipient, or whether some one emotion belongs to it exclusively; and this is a question, which, although not easily settled, it is necessary to entertain. There is scarcely one of the many emotions which are derived from the Vital Principle, (as anger, or courage, desire, or feeling,) in the manifestation of which the Vital Principle can be said to be affected, actively or passively, without the body; the faculty of thought seems to be the peculiar property of the Vital Principle but whether thought be imagination of some kind, or never unaccompanied by imagination, still we must admit that it cannot be exercised without the body. If, then, there is any one function or emotion which is peculiar to the Vital Principle, we should admit that it might be isolated from the body; but, if no one belongs to it, exclusively, then we say that it cannot be separate from one. But, just as many accidents concur in the quality straightness, in so far as straightness (as, for instance, among others, to touch a brazen sphere at a point, which, were it apart from some kind of body, it could not do), so straightness is inseparable from a body, since it is ever found together with one. In the same way all the emotions of the Vital Principle (such as courage, gentleness, fear, pity, daring, joy, love and hatred,) seem to be manifested together with the body; for the body is affected, simultaneously, by them. As evidence of which, there are times when we are neither excited nor alarmed, although misfortunes may be trying and palpable, while, at other times, when the body is plethoric, or in a state akin to that of anger, we are moved by incidents which are trivial and unimportant. And what makes this yet more apparent is, that, at times, without the occurrence of aught to occasion alarm, we are thrown into the state of persons under terror; and if this be true, it is clear that all such emotions are material conditions. So that the definition of any one of them, as that of anger for example, may be said to be the motion of a body of particular nature, or part or function of a body, by such a cause, and for such an end.
Thus, for these reasons, it is for the physiologist to study the Vital Principle, either as a whole, or under some particular manifestation. But the physiologist and the metaphysician would differ widely in their definition of any one of those emotions, as that of anger, for example; which, while the latter would hold to be desire for retaliation, or some such motive, the former would maintain to be ebullition of blood, or excess of heat about the heart. The one of these, in fact, accounts for the passion by the matter, and the other by the form and cause; for the form is the cause of the thing, which, if it is to be, must, of necessity, be in a special matter. Thus, the cause of a house, for instance, is such as this—"to be a shelter to avert injury from rain, wind, and heat;" and here the physiologist will speak of stones, bricks, and rafters, while the metaphysician will, in these materials, only behold the form to be adopted for those purposes. Which, then, of these is the physiologist? Is it he who studies only the matter without reference to the cause, or he who is occupied with the cause only? Or is it rather he who judges both from cause and matter; and which of the two is he? May we not however rather say that there is one who is engaged upon the properties which are inseparable and only in so far as they are inseparable from matter, while to the physiologist it belongs to judge of such emotions and functions as emanate from particular bodies and peculiar matter? Properties different from these belong to another; and some of them to an artisan, a physician or builder, as the case may be, while the mathematician has to do with properties which are not inseparable from matter, but which, as they do not belong to any particular body, admit of being treated as abstractions; and abstract qualities, as abstractions, belong to the transcendental philosopher.
Let us, however, return to the point where our discussion broke off, and repeat that the emotions of Vital Principle, such as anger and fear, for instance, in so far as they are innate, are inseparable from the material frame-work of animals; and that they are not to be regarded as a line or a surface.
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| Edition: | Charles Collier, 1855, Cambridge : Macmillan ; London : D. Nutt |
| Source: | Internet Archive |
| Contributor(s): | 1 (1/0) Chris55 2012-08-19 10:44 2012-08-19 10:44 |
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Not being able to see where Aristotle's text starts, I put this text here directly without preambule. --Zyephyrus (talk) 22:12, 13 May 2014 (UTC)