The Spirit of Laws (1758)/Book III

by Montesquieu

BOOK III.
Of the Principles of the three kinds of Government.

CHAP. I.
Difference between the Nature and Principle of Government.

Book III.
Chap. I. & 2.AFTER having examined the laws relative to the nature of each government, we must investigate those that relate to its principle.

There is this difference^[1] between the nature and principle of government; its nature is that by which it is constituted, and its principle that by which it is made to act. One is its particular structure, and the other the human passions which set it in motion.

Now laws ought to be no less relative to the principle than to the nature of each government. We must therefore inquire into this principle, which shall be the subject of this third book,

CHAP. II.
Of the Principle of different Governments.

IHAVE already observed that it is the nature of a republican government, that either the collective body of the people, or particular families Book III.
Chap. 3.should be possessed of the sovereign power: of a monarchy, that the prince should have this sovereign power, but in the execution of it should be directed by established laws: of a despotic government, that a single person should rule according to his own will and caprice. No more do I want to enable me to discover their three principles; these are from thence most naturally derived. I shall begin with a republican government, and in particular with that of democracy.

CHAP. III.
Of the Principle of Democracy.

THERE is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of laws in one, and the prince's arm in the other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue.

What I have here advanced, is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of historians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things. For it is clear that in a monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue than in a popular government, where the person intrusted with the execution of the laws, is sensible of his being subject himself to their direction.

Clear it is also that a monarch, who through bad advice or indolence ceases to enforce the execution of the laws, may easily repair the evil: he has only to follow other advice; or to shake off this indolence. But when in popular Book III.
Chap. 3government, there is a suspension of the laws, as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is certainly undone.

A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent efforts the English made for the establishment of democracy. As those who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of all virtue, as their ambition was inflamed by the success of the most daring of their members^[2], as the spirit of a faction was suppressed only by that of a succeeding faction, the government was continually changing: the people amazed at so many revolutions, fought every where for a democracy, without being able to find it. At length after a series of tumultuary motions and violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which they had so odiously proscribed.

When Sylla wanted to restore Rome to her liberty, this unhappy city was incapable of receiving it. She had only some feeble remains of virtue, and as this was every day diminishing, instead of being roused out of her lethargy, by Caesar, Tiberius, Caius, Claudius, Nero, Domitian, the riveted every day her chains; the blows the struck were levelled against the tyrants, but not at the tyranny.

The politic Greeks who lived under a popular government, knew no other support but virtue. The modern inhabitants of that country are intirely taken up with manufactures, commerce, finances, riches and luxury.

Book III.
Chap. 3.When virtue is banished, ambition invades the hearts of those who are disposed to receive it, and avarice possesses the whole community. The desires now change their objects; what they were fond of before, becomes indifferent; they were free, while under the restraint of laws, they will now be free to act against law; and as every citizen is like a slave escaped from his master's house, what was a maxim of equity, they call rigour; what was a rule of action, they call constraint; and to precaution they give the name of fear. Frugality, and not the thirst of gain, now passes for avarice. Formerly the wealth of individuals constituted the public treasure; but now the public treasure is become the patrimony of private persons. The members of the commonwealth riot on the public spoils, and its strength is only the power of some citizens, and the licentiousness of the whole community.

Athens was possessed of the same number of forces, when she triumphed with so much glory, and when with so much infamy she was inslaved. She had twenty thousand citizens^[3], when she defended the Greeks against the Persians, when she contended for empire with Sparta, and invaded Sicily. She had twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them^[4], as slaves are told by the head in a market. When Philip attempted to reign in Greece, and appeared at the gates of Athens^[5], she had even then lost nothing but time. We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to awake her: the Book III.
Chap. 3.dreaded Philip not as the enemy of her liberty, but of her pleasures^[6]. This famous city, which had withstood so many defeats, and after having been so often destroyed, had as often risen out of her ashes, was overthrown at Chaeronea, and at one blow deprived of all hopes of resource. What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners, if he does not return her men? It was ever after as easy to triumph over the Athenian forces, as it would have been difficult to triumph over her virtue.

How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground? When Hannibal, upon his being made praetor, endeavoured to hinder the magistrates from plundering the republic, did not they complain of him to the Romans? Wretches, who wanted to be citizens without a city, and to be beholden for their riches, to their very destroyers! Rome soon insisted upon having three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages; the obliged them next to surrender their arms and ships; and then she declared war against them^[7]. By the efforts made by this defenceless city, when reduced to despair, one may judge of what she might have done in her full strength, and assisted by virtue.

CHAP. IV.
Of the Principle of Aristocray

AS virtue is necessary in a popular government, so it is necessary also under an Book III.
Chap. 4.aristocracy. True it is, that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite.

The people, who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects with regard to the monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have therefore less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy. But how are the nobility to be restrained? Those who are to execute the laws against their collegues, will immediately perceive they are acting against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body by the very nature of the constitution.

An aristocratical government has within itself a certain strength which a democracy has not. The nobles form a body, who by their prerogative and through particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient here that there are laws in being to fee them executed.

But as easy as it is for the body of the nobles to contain the people within bounds, so difficult is it to contain themselves^[8]. Such is the nature of this constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them.

Now such a body as this can restrain itself only two ways; either by a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility in some measure on a level with the people, and may be the means of forming a great republic; or by an inferior virtue, which puts them at least upon a level with one another, and on this their preservation depends.

Book III.
Chap. 5.Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government; a moderation I mean founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity.

CHAP. V.
That Virtue is not the Principle of a monarchical Government.

IN monarchies, policy makes people do great things with as little virtue as she can. Thus in the finest machines, art has contrived as few movements, springs, and wheels as possible.

The state subsists independently of the love of our country, of the thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the ancients, and which to us are known only by story.

The laws supply here the place of thole virtues; they are by no means wanted, and the state dispenses with them: an action performed here in secret is in some measure of no consequence.

Though all crimes be in their own nature public, yet there is a distinction between crimes that are really public, and those that are private, which are so called, because they are more injurious to individuals than to the whole society.

Now in republics private crimes are more public, that is, they attack the constitution more than they do individuals; and in monarchies public crimes are more private, that is, they are more prejudicial to private people than to the constitution.

Book III.
Chap. 5.I beg that no one will take this amiss; my observations are founded on the unanimous testimony of historians. I am not ignorant that virtuous princes are no such very rare fight; but I venture to affirm that in a monarchy it is extremely difficult for the people to be virtuous^[9].

Let us compare what the hifsorians of all ages have said concerning the courts of monarchs; let us recollect the conversations and sentiments of people of all countries in respect to the wretched character of courtiers; and we shall find, that these are not mere airy speculations, but things confirmed by a sad and melancholy experience.

Ambition joined to idleness, and baseness to pride , a desire of obtaining riches without labour, and an aversion to truth , flattery, treason, perfidy, violation of engagements, contempt of civil duties, fear of the prince's virtue, hope from his weakness, but above all a perpetual ridicule cast upon virtue, are, I think, the characteristics by which most courtiers in all ages and countries have been constantly distinguished. Now it is exceeding difficult for the leading men of the nation to be knaves, and for the inferior sort of people to be honest; for the former to be cheats, and for the latter to rest satisfied to be only dupes.

But if there should chance to be some unlucky honest man^[10] among the people, cardinal Richelieu Book III.
Chap. 6.in his political testament^[11] seems to hint that a prince should take care not to employ him^[12]. So true is it that virtue is not the spring of this government!

CHAP. VI.
In what manner Virtue is Supplied in a monarchical Government.

BUT it is high time for me to have done with this subject, lest I should be suspected of writing a satire against monarchical government. Far be it from me; if monarchy wants one spring, it is provided with another. Honor, that is, the prejudice of every person and rank, supplieth the place of virtue, and is every where her representative: here it is capable of inspiring the most glorious actions, and joined with the force of laws may lead us to the end of government as well as virtue itself.

Hence in well regulated monarchies, they are almost all good subjects, and very few good men , for to be a good man, a good intention is necessary^[13].

CHAP. VII.
Of the Principle of Monarchy.

AMonarchical government supposeth, as we have already observed, pre-eminences, and Book III.
Chap. 7. ranks, and likewise a noble descent. Now as it is the nature of honor to aspire to preferments and distinguishing titles, it is therefore properly placed in this government.

Ambition is pernicious in a republic. But in a monarchy it has some good effects, it gives life to the government, and is attended with this advantage, that it is no way dangerous, because it may be continually checked.

It is with this kind of government as with the system of the universe, in which there is a power that constantly repels all bodies from the center, and a power of gravitation that attracts them to it. Honor sets all the parts of the body politic in motion; by its very action it connects them; and thus each individual advances the public good, while he only thinks of promoting his own particular interest.

True it is, that, philosophically speaking, it is a false honor which moves all the parts of the government, but even this false honor is as useful to the public, as true honor could possibly prove to private people.

Is it not a very great point, to oblige men to perform the most difficult actions, such as require a great degree of fortitude and spirit, without any other recompence, than the fame and reputation arising from the actions themselves ?

CHAP. VIII.
That Honor is not the Principle of despotic Government.

HONOR is far from being the principle of despotic government: men being here all Book III.
Chap. 9.upon a level, no one can prefer himself to another; men being here all slaves, they can give themselves no preference at all.

Besides, as honor has its laws and rules, as it knows not how to submit, as it depends in a great measure on a man s own caprice, and not on that of another person, it can be found only in countries in which the constitution is fixed, and where they are governed by settled laws.

How can a despotic prince bear with any such thing as honor? Honor glories in contempt of life, and here the prince s whole strength consists in the power of taking it away. How can honor ever bear with a despotic prince? It has its fixed rules, and constant caprices, but a despotic prince is directed by no rule, and his own caprices destroy all others.

Honor therefore, a thing unknown in despotic governments, where very often they have not so much as a fit word to express it^[14], is the prevailing principle in monarchies; here it gives life to the whole body politic, to the laws, and even to the virtues themselves.

CHAP. IX.
Of the Principle of despotic Government.

AS virtue is necessary in a republic, and in a monarchy honor, so fear is necessary in a despotic government: with regard to virtue, there is no occasion for it, and honor would be extremely dangerous.

Here the immense power of the prince is devolved intirely upon those to whom he is pleased to intrust Book III.
Chap. 9.Persons capable of setting a value upon themselves would be likely to create revolutions. Fear must therefore depress their spirits, and extinguish even the least sense of ambition.

A moderate government may, whenever it pleases, and without any danger relax its springs. It supports itself by its laws, and by its own force. But when a despotic prince ceases one single moment to lift up his arm, when he cannot instantly demolish those whom he has entrusted with the first posts and employments^[15], all is over: for as fear, the spring of this government, no longer subsists, the people are left without a protector.

It is probably in this sense the Cadis maintained that the grand Seignor was not obliged to keep his word or oath, when he limited thereby his authority^[16].

It is necessary that the people should be judged by laws, and the great men by the caprice of the prince; that the lives of the lowest subjects should be safe, and the bashaw's head always in danger. We cannot mention these monstrous governments without horror. The Sophi of Persia dethroned in our days by Mahomet the son of Miriveis, saw the constitution subverted before this revolution, because he had been too sparing of blood^[17].

History informs us that the horrid cruelties of Domitian struck such a terror into the governors, that the people recovered themselves a little under his reign^[18]. Thus a torrent lays one side or a whole country waste, and on the other leaves fields Book III.
Chap. 10.untouched, where the eye is refreshed with the fight of some distant meadows.

CHAP. X.
Difference of Obedience in moderate and despotic Governments.

IN despotic states the nature of the government requires the most passive obedience; and when once the prince's will is made known, it ought infallibly to produce its effect.

Here they have no limitations or restrictions, no mediums, terms, equivalents, parleys, or remonstrances, nothing equal or better to propose: man is a creature that submits to the absolute will of a creature like himself.

In a country like this they are no more allowed to represent their fears in respect to a future event, than to excuse their bad success by the capriciousness of fortune. Man's portion here, like that of beads, is instinct, compliance and punishment.

Little does it then avail to plead the sentiments of nature, respect for a father, tenderness for a wife and children, the laws of honor, or an ill state of health; the orders are given, and that is sufficient.

In Persia when the king has condemned a person, it is no longer lawful to mention his name, or to intercede in his favor. Though he were drunk and beside himself, yet the decree must be executed^[19]; otherwise he would contradict himself, and the law admits of no contradiction. This has been the way of thinking in this country in all ages, as the order which Ahasuerus gave to exterminate the Jews, Book III.
Chap. 10.could not be revoked, they contrived to allow them thc liberty f defending themselves.

There is one thing however that may be opposed to the prince's will^[20]; namely, religion. They will abandon a parent, nay, they will kill him, if the prince so commands; but he cannot oblige them to drink wine. The laws of religion are of a superior nature, because they bind the prince as well as the subject. Bur, with respect to the law of nature it is otherwise; the prince is no longer supposed to be a man.

In monarchical and moderate dates, the power is limited by its very spring, I mean by honor, which like a monarch reigns over prince and people. They will not here alledge to their prince the laws of religion; a courtier would think this would render him ridiculous. But the laws of honor will be alledged on all occasions. Hence arise the restrictions necessary to obedience; honor is naturally subject to whims, by which the subject's obedience will be always directed.

Though the manner of obeying be different in these two kinds of government, yet the power is the same. On which side soever the monarch turns, he inclines the scale, and is obeyed. The whole difference is, that in a monarchy the prince has the assistance of instruction, and his ministers have a far greater capacity and are better versed in affairs than the ministers of a despotic government.

CHAP. XI.
Reflections on the foregoing.

Book III.
Chap. 11.SUCH are the principles of the three sorts of government: which does not imply that in a particular republic they actually are, but that they ought to be, virtuous: nor does it prove, that in a particular monarchy they are actuated by honor, or in a particular despotic government by fear; but that they ought to be directed by these principles, otherwise the government is imperfect.

 

1. This is a very important distinction, from whence I shall draw a great many consequences; for it is the key of an infinite number of laws.
2. Cromwell.
3. Plutarch in Pericle, Plato in Critia.
4. She had at that time twenty one thousand citizens, ten thousand strangers, and four hundred thousand slaves. See Athenaeus, Book 6.
5. She had then twenty thousand citizens. See Demosthenes in Aristog.
6. They had passed a law which rendered it a capital crime for any one to propose applying the money designed for the theatres to the military service.
7. This war lasted three years.
8. Public crimes may be punished, because it is here a common concern; but private crimes will go unpunished, because it is a common interest not to punish them.
9. I speak here of political virtue, which is also moral virtue as it is directed to the public good; very little of private moral virtue; and not at all of that virtue which relates to revealed truths. This will appear better, Book V. chap 2.
10. This is to be understood in the sense of the preceding note.
11. This book was written under the inspection, and from the memoirs of cardinal Richelieu by Messieurs de Bourseis, and d–, who were strongly his adherents.
12. We must not, says he, employ people of man extraction; they are too austere and difficult.
13. See the note p. 34.
14. See Perry, p. 447.
15. As it often happens in a military aristocracy.
16. Ricault on the Ottoman empire.
17. See the history of this revolution by father Dacerceau.
18. His was a military government, which is one of the species of despotic government.
19. See Sir John Chardin.
20. Ibid.