The New Europe (The Slav Standpoint)/Chapter 2
II.—THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY.
6. National Sentiment and National Idea.
13a. The demand of the Allies for a proper consideration for the small nations as well as for the great, resulted from the recognition of the principle of nationality. In order to have a proper understanding of the war and to have a just basis for the conclusion of a lasting peace, it is very important that the principle of nationality should be made clear.
The principle of nationality has made itself felt in Europe with greater intensity since the 18th century, and not merely in the political and social sphere, but also in philosophy, art and life in general. Since the middle of the 18th century one may perceive in Italy and Germany a growing desire and endeavour for the unification of the nations, divided since the Middle Ages into numerous states. At the same time enslaved nations struggle for unification and liberation; in the Balkans the Serbians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians rise against Turkey; the same thing may be seen in Austria and Russia. Simultaneously with the French Revolution the historians record the national awakening and renaissance of the Czechs and Slovaks, Magyars, Jugoslavs, and in general of all nations in Austria, Russia, etc., and the same applies to the Germans and Italians. This process of national individualisation is so powerful that we find attempts to create a separate existence for the Slovak, Ukrainian and other dialects and languages that had not as yet literary cultivation. There arose the Flemish, Norwegian, and similar questions. From the philosophical standpoint the national sentiment and idea makes its influence felt in all literature; in the 18th century, for instance, there is the beginning of the study of folk song, and men like Herder and others strive to grasp in the folk-songs the nationality, the spirit of the nation, as it is usually called. At that period also there arose the intensified study of the languages and their comparison: we witness the foundation of the scientific study of the German, Slav and Romance languages. At the same time much attention is paid to history and all social sciences with the express purpose of grasping philosophically the substance of one’s own and foreign nations in all the manifestations of spiritual life and of understanding the development of the nations and of mankind (for instance, the so-called historical school of jurisprudence, Savigny—the national economists like List, etc.). All nations cultivate conscious national philosophy; Pangermanism, as has been shown, is the political organisation and philosophical synthesis of this movement in Germany. Alongside of it we find in Russia the Slavophils, in Bohemia and among the Jugoslavs the humanists, in Poland the Messianists; in France, Italy and Scandinavia—everywhere under varions forms we see the same movement. The fact that up to now history of philosophy has paid little attention to this phase merely proves how one-sided, narrow and unpolitical school philosophy is, a scholastic island in the stormy political and social ocean of modern life.
The principle of nationality is new, modern. In the Middle Ages Europe was organised by the church, the empire and the states; the organisation of society was theocratic and is still so to a large extent. In the ancient era the national principle was likewise non-existent; the various nations were opposed to each other, but simply as stranger against stranger; within the nations themselves, each part stood separate and antagonistic in its relation to the other. Only occasionally the consciousness of nationality came to the surface (as, for instance, with the Greeks in the time of Alexander), but there was no consciousness of a principle of nationality. Hence the political kaleidoscope of the map of Europe throughout the Middle Ages and down to the 18th century.
Reformation and renaissance mark the first stirring up of the consciousness of nationality. The national tongues begin to be used in church services, the translation of the Bible equally hallows the language of the people as against the aristocratic church-language of Latin, Greek, and so on. There arises national non-Latin literature in the fields of philosophy and science, as well as in belles lettres; literature becomes a cultural power. In the political sphere democracy is strengthened, and with it the influence of the people and their language becomes supreme in parliament and in administration; Latin and French lose their political privileges.
Philosophy of the 18th century, like contemporary philosophy, proclaims the humanitarian principle and ideal; the French Revolution proclaims the rights of man; Herder, “the high priest of pure humanity,” declares nations to be the natural organs of humanity, rejecting at the same time states as the artificial organs. Europe becomes more and more politically organised in accordance with the principles of nationality.
13b. Nationality manifests itself practically through language, of course the spoken language (mother tongue); statistics of nations are given on the basis of languages; grammarians investigate how far dialects differ from actual languages. There is, for instance, a possible controversy whether German and French, or Russian and German are independent and different languages; but there is also a controversy as to whether the Ukrainian is an independent language and therefore the Ukrainians a separate nation, etc.
The importance of language as the determining factor of nationality is easily understood: the tongue serves as the immediate expression of the feelings and thoughts of men. Le Style c’est l’homme is true here also. And language has a tremendous social significance—makes possible the contact of man. Nationality, national spirit, manifests itself therefore in literature; that fact is acknowledged generally as to belles lettres—great poets are looked upon as the most expressive representatives of their nations. But even science and philosophy have their national character—even mathematics, an abstract science, differs in the different nations; science and philosophy differ both in contents (what interests the different nations) and by method. Plastic arts are equally acknowledged to be an expression of nationality; but the same may also be said of religion, customs and laws of labour (agriculture and industry), all of which vary according to each nation; there is a variety in cooking, housing, etc., in statecraft and in politics. Thus the Orthodox religion is looked upon as distinctly Slav, Catholic as Latin, Protestant as German; distinctions are made between Roman, German and Slav laws; differences are pointed out between the Prussian state and the English or Russian, etc. All these problems demand careful examination. We must not accept hasty generalisations; for instance, the Western Slavs are Catholics, and still the Czechs carried out the first reformation—in this brief outline one can merely call attention to the rich contents of scientific philosophy of nationality.
The principle of nationality is a distinctive and very powerful feeling; it is the love for the mother tongue and for the group of men speaking the same or very nearly related language, and for the soil on which this group lives, and for the manner how it lives. But this love is not only the feeling arising out of the natural habitual life, but it is also an idea of conscious love; nations have their own cultural and political program growing out of a common history and in its turn directing this history; it is modern patriotism in this wide and complicated sense, different from the old patriotism of loyalty to the dynasty and ruling classes. There is a real principle of nationality, the ideal of nations and not merely national feeling or instinct.
The question of how various nations have arisen and developed, how nations become individualised, is rather controversial. People generally imagine that certain parts of mankind, nations, have special, common, physical and mental qualities; the conception is prevalent that mankind is divided into races (the European, Mongolian, etc.) and races into nations, these again into tribes and still smaller subdivisions. At first, science decided upon a small number of races (five); but as scientific analysis progressed, anthropologists and ethnographers declared the number of races to be much greater.
There is the question, of course, how races arose. To put it clearly: do they all descend from one Adam? Or were there more Adams? Modern evolution, Darwinism, etc., have not yet given a satisfactory answer.
It is emphasised that nearly all races and nations are greatly mixed, that there is no nation, no blood strictly pure; and the question is discussed, whether mixed nations are stronger or weaker, of better physical and mental qualities than those not mixed. What are the limits and degrees of favourable mixture of races and nations? Nations in the course of time change—to what extent and by what means? Do they change physically by crossing? By their daily occupation? By living in the cities? By what they eat? Perhaps even by endemic diseases? And does a change in the body, that is to say of the skeleton, affect mental qualities? Do mental qualities of nations change independently of physical qualities, and in what way? Do these qualities change of themselves or do they develop under the influence of foreign mental contacts? By taking over foreign ideas, manners, institutions? The difficult problem arises of how far nations are original, how far their culture may prove to be independent and self-sufficient.
Such are briefly the problems of the science or philosophy of nationality, a science that has not as yet been firmly constituted as a separate branch of knowledge; these problems are studied by historians, anthropologists, ethnographers, geographers, philosophers of history and sociology—the great extent and depth of these studies in the 19th century and the present century constitute a further proof that nationality is a principle generally recognised and pervading all life of society.
14. It is very important for the understanding and appreciation of the principle of nationality to determine more exactly the relation of the nation to the state. The Pangermanists, even though they appeal also to the principle of nationality, put the state above the nation; in the state they see the sum of social organisation, the highest and leading power, and frequently they declare that the principle of nationality has become antiquated. Similarly, others declare the church to be the highest organisation, others again, the proletarian class. It is my opinion that nation and nationality should be held to be the aim of social effort, while the state should be the means; de facto, every self-conscious nation tries to have its own state.
The principle of nationality is comparatively new, unsettled, whereas the state is a very old institution and so universal that many for that very reason look upon it as the most necessary and most valuable achievement of human society.
There are 27 states in Europe (the German states, 26 in number, are not counted here, and Austria-Hungary is counted as one state), but there are more than twice that many nations in Europe. Ethnographers and linguists do not agree upon the number of individual nations. For instance, some join the Letts with the Lithuanians, others separate them; Mazurians are enumerated as a nation distinct from the Poles, and in a similar way the Ukrainians are distinguished from the Russians, and so on. The problems are not sufficiently cleared up and there are no proper statistics; so it may be stated only approximately that in Europe there are about 70 nations and languages (not dialects). This discrepancy between the number of nations and states means that there are many states nationally mixed: states purely national, composed of one nation only, are practically non-existent. Only a few small and just the smallest states are purely national—Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Luxemberg, Monaco, Denmark (perhaps Portugal and Holland?).
All larger states are mixed: one can say the larger, the more mixed. Germany (Prussia), Austria-Hungary, Russia (and Turkey) are the most mixed states. The degree of mixture increases from West to East.
This contrast between the boundaries of states and nations as well as the fact that the nations in the mixed states are striving for independence indicate that the states arose by conquest; if Herder calls nations the natural organs of humanity and states only artificial organs, he brings out fairly accurately the function of state as against nation.[1] In mixed states one nation is the so-called dominant nation; as a rule it is a larger nation than the subject nations. Only Austria-Hungary and Turkey portray the type of states, in which the minority rules over the majority.
The difference between the nation and state has been characterised by some Pangermanists by the comparison: Goethe-Bismarck. A nation is a spiritual and cultural organisation—a free organisation given by nature; the state, being above all organised force, has been the subjugator of its own nation and of other nations. The present state developed out of the primitive military and religious organisation; having been organised by a dynasty and a certain class (aristocracy-plutocracy), it paid no attention to national differences; that is why states are mixed.
The states were formed at a time, when the spirit of domineering, of aggression and exploiting had been rampant and general; the principle of nationality is comparatively modern and has been established in opposition to the state. The nation exerts its influence freely (the influence of Shakespeare, Byron, Goethe, &c.), the state exerts its influence through its power of compulsion (the influence of Bismarck, not only as long as he was in office as against the influence of Goethe, but also the influence of Bismarck’s idea after his death). The nation is a democratic organisation—each individual is called, each one may make himself felt;—while the state is an aristocratic organisation, compelling, supressing: democratic states are only now arising.
Specialists in the science of state find it perplexing to explain the rise and substance of state. History teaches that there are two fundamental forms and quatities of the political organisation of society: aristocracy and democracy. Aristocracy has an oligarchical character, and a special form of oligarchy is the monarchy, which, in the low state of scientific and philosophical criticism hitherto existing, was conceived (not by the masses only!) as theocracy: the primitive anthropomorphism could not conceive of democracy, therefore a monarch became the representative and at the same time the almost deified wielder of all power (the sovereign). The ideas of God and sovereign are found together in a strange way. All monarchies were theocratic, and in the Middle Ages in particular, the great papal imperial theocracy was constituted. By the Reformation this great theocracy was broken up into smaller theocracies. Thus arose the modern absolutist states; but in opposition to them and within them, democracy gained strength. So at the present stage of political development, monarchical theocracies and the beginnings of democracy stand opposed to each other (republics, constitutional monarchies, various attempts of national autonomy, federation and self-government within the states).
One of the powerful democratic forces is the national movement: the striving of subject nations for political independence and their striving for the recognition of their nationality as a higher and more valuable principle than the state. In Prussia, Austria, Russia, Turkey, the national movements naturally fought against absolutism, and absolutism was the enemy of nationalism.
The difference between the Allies and the Central Powers is the difference between democracy and theocratic monarchies: on the side of the Allies stand republics and constitutional monarchies—Prussia and Germany stand at the head of the mediæval theocratic monarchies. Prussia-Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria did not become allied simply because they were neighbours, but also on account of the internal political kinship. These are undemocratic, absolutist, theocratic states, in which the parliament, even though it nominally makes the laws, has only an advisory and secondary function—political decision and leadership are left to the monarch and his aristocratic co-rulers. This difference, therefore, shows itself also in the treatment of the question of nationality: the Allies declare for the rights of nations and self-determination, the state thus being made subordinate to nationality; the Central Powers are non-national and even anti-national.[2]
7. The Right of Nations to Self-Determination.
15. Nationality might have become political power merely as a historical fact, but the Allies recognise the right to self-determination of nations. President Wilson declared that no nation shall be forced to have a government which is not its own nor for its own interests. The so-called “Real”-politicians, whenever it suits them, are ready to accept things as they are, substituting facts for what is right; but what has been or what exists is not thereby made right—history and social life is the constant struggle of those who defend right and justice against those who adhere to convenient facts.
Although nationality is a strong political power, the right of nationality has been so far formulated but very imperfectly in modern constitutions and laws; in countries nationally mixed some language rights are codified, but so far there does not exist an exact definition of nationality, and the subject of language and national rights has not been adequately determined by any code.
The justification of nationality is found for the first time in the previously quoted formula of Herder. This enthusiastic herald of humanity based the right of nations upon the principle of humanity; the nation, not the state, is the natural organ of mankind. Humanitism, beginning in modern times with Humanism and the Reformation, in both its extensive meaning (mankind) and its intensive meaning (to be human) found general acceptance and became the recognised foundation of all modern morals; the 18th century is the century of humanity and enlightenment; in the name of humanity (philanthropy, sympathy, etc.) reforms are demanded in all spheres of social institutions and activities.
From the humanitarian principle is also derived the justification of and necessity for democracy, socialism and nationality: leaders and theorists of democracy and socialism, equally with the leaders of the national movement, based the justification and righteousness of democracy, socialism and nationality on the Christian commandment to love one another. This might be considered rather a tactical argument, but in reality there is no other foundation for morality, and therefore for politics, than respect and love for one another, whether it be called humanity, philanthropy, altruism, sympathy, equality, or solidarity. The humanitarian principle was adopted by the French Revolution in the famous motto: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; and it was codified as the Rights of Man. The recognition accorded to the value of the human personality is what establishes the civic value and the right to exist of organised social bodies—states, churches, nations, classes and parties and their subordinate constituent parts. This is not contradicted by the fact that social bodies are given also utilitarian values—the faculty and power to realise certain useful aims for individuals and the collective bodies.
As soon as one admits the rights of the human person, the individual, one admits also his right to his own language (mother tongue); that is a matter of course in uninational states, but in multinational states the official recognition of languages is a matter of national contest and the right to language must be recognised and codified.
With the strengthening of democracy national tongues receive recognition in the administration of the states, and where in accordance with mediæval tradition Latin or the language of the ruling classes of a nation were used, the state gradually comes to employ in its administration languages formerly not used but suppressed. This is true of nationally mixed states, Austria, Russia, etc.[3]
The mother tongue, as a means of intercourse, is intimately associated with the thoughts, feelings and the entire spiritual and cultural life of individuals and nations. To the extent in which all nations in Europe participated in promoting culture, the various languages became richer and more valuable from the cultural point of view, and the result is the growing, cultural equality of languages in analogy to political and international equality in the rights of nations. Modern means of communication made possible the achievement of a cultural unity among the dismembered parts of nations ruled by various states—nationality became a conscious force, language its practical exponent, and social literature in its widest meaning became the expression and the most valuable organ of nationality.
That is why the political dependence of nations and parts of nations in mixed states is so keenly felt and so strongly and so generally resented. What extremely barbarian act it was to cut the Polish nation into three parts and to forbid even children to speak Polish, as was done in Prussia and Russia! By what right are the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, etc., oppressed politically, when other and smaller nations (Danes, Dutch, and other) are free? And is it not quite absurd to have the Roumanian in Roumania free, while his neighbor and brother in Hungary is oppressed? Why should the Albanians have their own state, and the Jugoslavs not?
This disparity in the official valuation of nationality and state is based on the mediæval valuation of states, consecrated by the church; this valuation was taken over by modern absolutism. This absolutism was sustained by dynasties and aristocracies; but when in the 18th century the Great Revolution (a revolution that was not political only, but also moral and intellectual) organised democracy and republicanism, when absolutism, monarchism and aristocratism were weakened, then nationality and the language of the people came also to be recognised in the administration of the state. The theocratic over-valuation of the state, and that meant practically of the sovereign, apotheosis of these gave way to a democratic valuation; the state becomes the central organ of administration, not of aristocratic domination, and therefore becomes also the instrument of the nations and of their cultural endeavours. To-day all European nations struggle for liberation and political unity, for the political organisation of Europe on the basis of nationality. The intrinsic historical connection of democracy with nationality explains why the democratic states, France, England, Italy, &c., and now revolutionary Russia, declare solemnly in favour of the right of all nations to self-determination.
And it is equally clear why militaristic monarchies of the mediæval type, why Prussia-Germany, Austria and Turkey (Ferdinand of Bulgaria fits in well with this trinity) oppose the principle of nationality, placing the state above the nation and arguing from their narrow etatism, that the Allies have no business to interfere in the “internal” affairs of their states.
The self-determination of nations cannot, of course, be realised as long as this pharisaic principle is respected. A great German newspaper declared the slaughter of the Armenians to be an “internal” affair of Turkey. The oppression of Slavs, Roumanians, and Italians in Austro-Hungary is also claimed to be an internal affair, and so is the cultural murder of the Poles in Prussia. And yet these “internal affairs” gave rise to the present “outward” world-war.
By the Allies’ note to President Wilson questions of nationality became international questions. The question of Belgium, Serbia and the Jugoslavs in general; of Alsace-Lorraine; of the Danes and of Schleswig; of the Italians, Roumanians, Czecho-Slovaks, and Slavs in general in Austria-Hungary, and those of the Poles are international problems, problems of Europe and humanity. Pangermanists, of course, deride now all humanitarian ideals, even though they have been proclaimed by the greatest and best Germans; one of their prominent leaders, Professor Haase, declares expressly that love for one’s neighbour can exist only as between individuals, but cannot be at all thought of as between nations. On this moral foundation the Pangermanists formulate their aggressive, purely militaristic demands: the Germans must arrange their frontiers—the Germans must provide bread for their growing population—the Germans are surrounded by foreign nations, and therefore they must be militarists, etc. As if other nations likewise did not have unfavourable frontiers or were not surrounded by foreigners, as, for instance, we, the Czechs, or do not have to provide for food—no, it is either Kant or Bismarck, either Schiller or William, either Lessing or Bernhardi! Czar William constantly appeals to God and declares himself to be God’s instrument—to Jesus, of course, he does not appeal; this Prussian Jahve is in reality the political power of a state-recognised and privileged church which gives to the Czar and his state a pastor for each village as God’s gendarme. It has been stated above that European states are still theocratic, therefore democracy everywhere is opposed to the state and the church; democracy has a human foundation, and not a divine foundation in the theocratic sense; it has its foundation in morality, not in official religion. Only in so far as morality—love for one another—is hallowed by true, pure, non-political religion, does democracy recognise politics subspecie aeternitatis. Such politics is possible on the basis of the teachings of Jesus and of his two great commandments, and only on that basis.[4]
8. The Problem of Small Nations and States. The Federation of Small Nations.
16. The definition and significance of Great Powers has changed much in recent years; fewer Great Powers are now recognised, old ones step aside, new ones take their places. The standard of greatness has become relative by the growth of the population. The Pangermanists recognise only three, at most four, Great Powers in Europe—Germany, Russia, Great Britain, and perhaps France; many will not recognise even France for a Great Power. Those who emphasise the previously mentioned natural weaknesses of Russia (the contrast of the inadequate number of the population with the vast uncultured territory, etc.) speak only of two Great Powers, Germany and Great Britain; from this point of view frequently Germany is declared to be the Great Power par excellence, and therefore the natural and predestined master of Europe and the world.
The Pangermanists appeal to history, claiming that evolution leads to the organisation of great non-national, mixed states; there have even been writers who declare mixed states to be a higher type than purely national states. The German Social Democrats here agree with the Pangermanists on the ground that greater territories are needed to accomplish the economic and social reforms of Marxian Socialism. In general, the public political opinion of Europe favours great states. The watchword is imperialism. Smaller states and nations are spoken of with pity or a sort of contempt. The German view of a state as a power was formulated by Treitschke, when he said that there is something ridiculous in the idea of a small state.
Let us see what history tells us. Now and then, great nationally mixed states have been organised. The last attempt was made by Napoleon; before him was the mediæval Empire, the Franks, Rome, Byzantium, etc., as we go backward. All these empires perished, and out of them arose smaller states. The mediæval Empire was a peculiar alliance of various states and the church, and in general, the composition of these great empires varied greatly. On the whole, great multinational empires are an institution of the past, of a time when material force was being cherished and the principle of nationality had not been recognised, because democracy had not been recognised. Great multinational empires and autocracy are almost synonymous.
History teaches that some new great states arose by the union of smaller states of the same nationality—Germany, Italy: the growth of these states is something very different from the subjugation of various nations by one nation.
History also teaches that in modern times alongside of the few greater states arising through national unification, there arose many more small states; since the end of the 18th century we witnessed the birth of Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Norway, Albania; (Switzerland was re-organised). Non-national Great Powers are decaying; Turkey has fallen; just now the greatly mixed Russia is already dismembered, giving rise to smaller and small states; and non-national Austria-Hungary is following her example.
History teaches that evolution very decidedly favours the rise of smaller national states. Out of 27 states in Europe, only Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, England, France, and Italy may be accepted as large states; the others, therefore a great majority, are smaller, either of moderate size like Spain or small (Denmark, Montenegro, etc.). The assertion of the Pangermanists and Marxists is quite patently not justified.
Quite erroneous is the identification of imperialism with capitalism as the Marxists make it: the great empires arose before modern capitalism, and imperialistic and aggressive designs cannot be traced merely to financial and economic motives.[5]
17. The modern state, having far more complicated aims than the older state, needs a great deal of money, to express it briefly; the citizen is obliged, in addition to his home and private needs, to give up a considerable part of his income and earnings to the administration of the state. All countries are not equally rich and fertile, do not possess equally favourable geographical locations or equally good neighbours—so it is natural that the smaller, less rich states and nations (whether by nature or by their degree of economic and cultural development) cannot afford to their citizens all the advantages which may be found in the richer and larger states. But where is it written that all nations must be equally rich or that they must be equal in general?
A small nation may intensify all its work and thereby make up to a large extent its lack of numbers; a large nation proceeds in all its activities rather extensively. One may compare it to the economic exertions as between the owner of a small piece of land and one who is the owner of a great estate. Therefore in the large states individual parts claim various forms of autonomy against centralisation.
The adversaries of small nations and states emphasise that small states do not prosper, not merely from the economic and military point of view, but also in the matter of culture—the small nation is said to have small and stunted ideas and ideals. This claim must be settled by carefully ascertaining the facts and clearing up the concepts. Let us, for example, take the Czechs; a nation far smaller than the Germans (the figures now are about 10 to 80) managed to hold its own against the strong German pressure for centuries and continues to do so down to this day, although the Slavs who settled further west and north have been Germanised. Politically Bohemia occupied an important place in the family of nations and played for a time even imperialistic politics, having incorporated German-Austria with Vienna and even Brandenburg, where Berlin lies to-day. In culture Bohemia was eminent as early as the 14th century; and the Czechs were the first to break the authority of the mediæval theocracy and to open the new era by their reformation; the names of Zizka, Hus, Chelcicky and Comenius are among the greatest. When they had been beaten by the united effort of all Europe, the Czechs, after merely existing for 200 years, roused themselves at the end of the 18th century to new cultural life—the renaissance of the Czecho-Slovak nation is proof of strong national vitality. Why, therefore, and by what right do the Pangermanists deny the Czechs and Slovaks independence? The present-day great nations have laid the foundation of their culture at a time when they were smaller or as small; and it is especially significant that in the former days there did not exist the modern methods of communication, industry, and the like, which are said to be necessary for the development of the up-to-date culture, but these conditions now are just as accessible to the small nations as to the great. Dante, Shakespeare, Moliere, and others lived in the days of small things. And Jesus and His followers grew up in a small remote Asian region. Just like the Czech nation, so grew the Danes, Norwegians, Swedes, Finns, and their like, constituting the proof that cultural accomplishments cannot be measured merely by square miles of territory or statistical figures.
A more exact analysis and comparison of great and small nations would have to take into account the natural endowment and capacity of the various nations; in that respect the intensive effort of many small nations is evidence of a considerable natural endowment. A small nation, defending itself against a large nation, thinks far more intensively than its great neighbor, who relies more on his numerical superiority. The current opinion of the cultural degree and accomplishment of nations is very inexact and unscientific. (According to measurements of even German anthropologists, the Czechs, and I believe the Croatians, show the highest skull and brain index.)
18. The opponents of small states and nations point to Austria as the classic demonstration that small nations must unite themselves into larger federated bodies, and as a proof that they cannot maintain their independence.
It is true that the Turkish danger brought about in 1526 the union of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary; but it is equally true that the Austrian Hapsburgs very shortly abused the free union and oppressed both Bohemia and Hungary. The Hapsburgs became the right arm of the threatened theocracy and broke, with the help of Empire and Europe, Bohemia and her Hussite Revolution. With blood and iron and Jesuitism the Hapsburgs crushed the Czech Revolution (1618) and culture. The whole history of Austria and her efforts for a uniting, centralising and Germanising state is proof and example of dynastic domination, but of no federation of nations. Austria was a federation only as long as it was the union of three free states; Austria-Hungary of to-day is not a federation of small nations. Such a federation can be found only in the writings of weak-minded courtier-historians and politicians: Austria-Hungary is the organised oppression of the majority by the minority; Austria-Hungary is the continuation of mediæval dynastic absolutism.
The Dual Monarchy is composed of nine nations: Germans, Czechs with the Slovaks, Poles, Ukrainians, Serbo-Croats, Slovenes, Rumanians, Italians, Magyars. Some count the Slovaks as a separate nation; the Latins in the Tirol are a separate nation, and a part of the Jews claim again nationality. In all other nationally mixed states, even in Russia, the so-called ruling nation is in the majority; only in Austria and Hungary the minority rules over the majority. What is Austria? A dynasty with the aristrocacy, the army and its higher officers, the higher bureaucracy and the church (hierarchy) furnishing the necessary spiritual police. Mickiewicz properly compares this anti-national state to the East India Company, in which 200 families exploit the nations.
Turkey also was a “federation” of nations—and she fell; with Turkey will fall also the anomaly of Austria, as Mazzini correctly foretold.
A real federation of nations will be accomplished only when the nations are free to unite of their own accord. The development of Europe points to that end. The program of the Allies answers fully to this development: free and liberated nations will organise themselves, as they find necessary, into greater units, and thus the whole continent will be organised. Should there be federations of smaller states, they will be federations freely entered upon, out of the real needs of the nations, not out of dynastic and imperialistic motives. Federation without freedom is impossible; that must be emphatically stated to those Austrian and other politicians who are promising autonomy and federation. We have now three examples of federated states, and in all three instances they are free independent states that have become federated: Switzerland, America, and even Germany. Switzerland and America are republics, Germany is a monarchy, but her single states are independent. Do the Hapsburgs want a real federation of independent states and nations? Surely not; in any case the Germans threatened that they would not permit a federalisation of Austria.
According to the program of the Allies, the small nations and states shall be treated with the same respect politically and socially as the great nations and states. A small nation, an enlightened and culturally progressing nation, is just as much of a full-fledged unit and cultural individual as a great nation. The problem of small nations and states is the same as the problem of the so-called small man; what matters is that the value of the man, the individuality of the man, is recognised without regard to his material means. This is the proper sense and kernel of the great humanitarian movement which characterises modern times, and as manifested in socialism, democracy and nationalism. The modern humanitism recognises the right of the weak; that is the meaning of all efforts for progress and for the recognition of human dignity: the strong will always help himself—the protection of the weaker and the weak, the protection of the small, of the individual, of corporations and classes, of nations and states; that is the task of modern times. Everywhere the weak, oppressed and exploited unite themselves—association is the watchword of our era: federation, the free federation of small nations and states will be the consummation of this principle securing the final organisation of the whole of mankind.[6]
9. Nationality and Internationality.
19. Enemies of small nations point to the tendency of the historical development which, according to them, aims at the formation of large states in which the small, national states are merged; at the same time they lay stress on the value of internationalism and condemn small nations and states as tedious obstacles to international universalism.
The supposed tendency of progress favouring the formation of great states has already been discussed; it remains to examine the assertion about internationalism and its relation to nationality.
That the smaller and small nations should become independent is not contrary to the tendency of the development which makes the inter-state and inter-national relations ever closer and closer; individuals and nations, it is true, have a direct need for union with others, and history aims at the organisation of all mankind.
This historical development is a double process: together with the individualisation of all departments the organisation of individuals is taking place. Politically expressed: there is going on the development of autonomy and self-government of individuals, classes, nations; and at the same time individuals, classes, and nations are uniting closer, are being organised and centralised. This process goes on within the nations themselves, but also between one nation and another—interstatism and internationalism become more intimate. Europe emphatically tends towards a continental organisation.
The principle of nationality stands alongside of the international (interstate) principle. The European nations, while becoming individualised, tend to draw closer together economically and with respect to communication (railroads, &c.) and their entire technical culture; but individualisation and centralisation are deepened also spiritually by a growing interchange of ideas and of all culture (knowledge of foreign languages, translation, &c.). Europe and humanity are becoming more unified.
Between nationality and internationality there is no antagonism, on the contrary, agreement: nations are the natural organs of humanity. Humanity is not supernational, it is the organisation of individual nations. If, therefore, individual nations struggle for their independence and attempt to break up states of which they have heretofore been parts, that is not a fight against internationality and humanity, but a fight against aggressors, who misuse states for the purposes of levelling them and enforcing political uniformity. Humanity does not tend to uniformity, but to unity; it will be the liberation of nations which will make possible the organic association, the federation of nations, of Europe, and of all mankind.
The diversity of languages is not an obstacle. In the Middle Ages, and even during a long part of the Modern Era, Latin was the international tongue; in modern days it was displaced by French, to the extent that France politically and culturally held the leadership of Europe. To-day the English language is the most widely spread, not merely in Europe, but also in the other continents; the growth of the English nation accounts for it.
To-day the knowledge of languages is widely spread in all nations, and especially among the small nations; men able to speak two languages are more numerous every day, and that renders intimate intercourse among nations possible. During the prevalence of French or Latin this intercourse was not more perfect, quite the contrary; the knowledge of these tongues was limited to the educated classes and the nobility. To-day education and also the knowledge of languages is more general, more democratic.
Internationalism of to-day is something different from the cosmopolitanism of the 18th century; it was an aristocratic cosmopolitanism limited to the nobility and the educated classes. In the 20th century, in addition to the French and English, other nations and their languages achieved prominence (German, Italian, Russian), and at the same time the improved means of communication and the evergrowing intermigration of nations, especially of working men, strengthened democratic internationalism. The socialist “International” is its peculiar organ; but not merely the working men, to-day all classes—scientists and philosophers, engineers, merchants, lawyers, artists, &c., are organised internationally.
This internationalism makes possible a division and organisation of labour of the nations, not merely economic labour, but all cultural labour. Europe and humanity are becoming more unified. Internationalism is not impeded by small nations, as was proved even in this war.
10. Political Independence and National Autonomy.
20. Political independence is for an enlightened, civilized nation a vital need,—politically dependent nations have even in the most civilized states been oppressed and exploited economically and socially. The more thoughtful and energetic the nation, the more it feels its subjection; and there are cases where the political master is less educated, less efficient than the subject people. The greatest Polish poets gave a very penetrating analysis of the constant revolutionary sentiment of an oppressed enlightened nation; Mickewicz summed it up in the words “The only weapon of a serf is treason.” The forcible suppression and denationalisation is a tremendous loss of energy, a lowering of the moral level; it hurts also the dominant oppressing nation in that it commits violence and does not amalgamate with itself the best characteristics of the oppressed nation. The Hungarian State, with its Magyarisation by violence, is an ugly example of the deterioration of character by forcible denationalisation.
Political independence is, of course, becoming more and more relative, but that is no argument against the concession of independence to oppressed nations. The former sovereignty of absolute states is passing away by the growing interstatism and internationalism; that sovereignty was, to a large extent, conditioned by isolation. Contemporary political alliances are a manifest weakening of former sovereignty. It may be admitted that small states feel the pressure of large neighbors—an example may be seen in the relations of Austria-Hungary to the Balkan States. It has been, therefore, often suggested that it would be better for small states and nations if they became directly a part of the large hostile states; Serbia—so its adversaries said—would, if annexed by Austria-Hungary, increase the number of the Jugoslavs and even unify them, and would oppose its enemy more efficiently than as an independent state.
These and similar counsels are derived from the principles of contemporary Machiavellian politics. The development of Europe and humanity tends towards democratization, that is, humanization of interstate and international relations; politics will cease to be carried on on Machiavellian principles, national independence and self-existence will freely develop along with increasing internationalism.
In recent days champions of the existing great mixed states, principally of Austria-Hungary, proposed national autonomy as the means for solving national questions; that is also the program of many socialists. (The Austrian socialists Springer, Renner, and Bauer give a detailed program, but in England and in other countries also some socialists, even during the war, recommended similarly national autonomy.)[7]
National autonomy honestly carried out, recognition of language rights in schools, public offices and parliament, may be sufficient in certain cases, especially for national minorities, but it is not sufficient for national majorities and nations, such as the Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, and others, who, by sheer violence, were deprived of their independence and are striving to regain it.
11. Radical Reconstruction of Europe on the Foundation of Nationality.—National Minorities.
21. Europe has been organized by states and churches and has been organized in days when the principle of nationality was not accorded the recognition that it obtains in modern times, and for that reason, as was already pointed out, nearly all the states are nationally mixed, and are now disturbed by the problem of nationality.
Many statesmen of a conservative turn of mind, while admitting the justice of the principle of nationality, advocate a non-radical solution of national problems; and they agree to the formation of certain new national states, but they favour the maintenance, as far as possible, of the political status quo by proposing to solve the national problems to the largest possible extent by national and language autonomy.
Much has already been said of autonomy. It is true that some nations, smaller and less highly developed, would be satisfied with autonomy, at least for the time being; it is true that there are several nations that have no national and political aspirations at all. So, for instance, the Flemings declared during this war that they do not want to be separated from their Walloon fellow-citizens. But it is not a question of nations like these, but rather of nations who will not be satisfied with autonomy in a foreign state and who demand political independence.
If Europe is to be truly democratic, and if we are to have a permanent peace, a more radical solution of national problems is necessary. Nevertheless, as things are, it is to be expected that even in the reconstructed Europe there will be national minorities, and therefore mixed states. The problem is to make these minorities as small as possible. But when two nations (Belgium) or three (Switzerland), themselves decide to maintain their mixed state, the will of such national parts will surely be respected.
National difficulties and struggles are to a large extent questions of national minorities. For instance, the Poles in Prussia form a minority of all Prussia; but in the Polish territory of Prussia there are again German minorities, and similar conditions exist elsewhere. Very important is the problem of minorities scattered here and there on territory of another nation, as in cities or industrial centres. Such minorities will remain even in the reconstructed states. The rule for reconstruction must be to have the minorities as small as practicable, and to have them protected in their civic rights. It would therefore be desirable that the Peace Congress should adopt an international agreement for the protection of national minorities; perhaps there could be erected an international arbitration tribunal for national questions.
The Pangermans often proposed the transmigration of quite large national minorities; the example of the Zionists and emigration in general suggest these means. It is doubtful whether it may be carried out without compulsion and injustice. De facto, Pangerman politicians intend by this proposal to weaken non-German minorities, not to satisfy their national aspirations.
The delimitation of ethnographic frontiers will be governed by the parliamentary and democratic principle. For example, in restored Poland and Bohemia there will be German minorities; in Bohemia these minorities will be considerable; but the number of the German population in free Poland and free Bohemia will be far smaller than the number of Poles and Czechs in Polish and Czech territories at present under German and Austrian rule. Poles and Czechs are equal to the Germans in rights and worth, the Germans are not superior to them, and it is therefore more equitable than the present condition that there should be in Poland and Bohemia German minorities that will be smaller than the present Slav bodies oppressed by the Germans.
It should also be remarked that we lack at present reliable statistics of nationality. Ruling nations have used pressure of all kind to diminish the number of the oppressed, using arbitrary, inexact language and national criteria (as, for instance, the “Umgangs-Sprache,” language of intercourse, &c.). To gather careful demographic statistics is a trying need, not merely of history and science in general, but especially of politics.
The settlement of ethnographic boundaries after the storm of war will possibly be provisional in some cases; as soon as the nations quiet down and accept the principle of self-determination, a rectification of ethnographic boundaries and minorities will be carried out without excitement and with due considerations of all questions involved.
12. Every National Question a Special Problem.
22. Every national question is an independent, peculiar problem, requiring the knowledge of existing conditions. One cannot emphasise sufficiently this rule of procedure. Justice to other nations requires knowledge of their problems; and just in this respect there is too little real knowledge of the language and nationality questions among the politicians and statesmen of Europe.
The contents of national controversies are very intricate. In some cases the language question plays the principal part; elsewhere the political problem is the main one, but both may be combined; the Czechs, for instance, carry on a language fight, but also a political fight to reclaim their historical right to an independent state. The Poles also appeal not merely to the ethnographic principle but also to their historical right; as against that, the Irish have practically no language question, their fight is more religious, social and political. Elsewhere economic questions are in the forefront, &c.
Nationality is expressed not merely through language, but through the entire culture—science and philosophy, jurisprudence and politics, morality and religion, art and technical science; custom and manners vary according to nationalities. For that reason national characteristics are felt and determined unequally. Not all nations are equally enlightened and determined to defend their nationality and its cultural contents against another nationality; therefore, for instance, the Bolsheviks propose the principle that the degree of development and civilisation, or backwardness, as the case may be, does not diminish the right to self-determination. Viewing all the intricacy of the problem it may be said that there are as many national questions as there are nationalities—there is no single rule of dealing with all national questions.
13. Marxism and Nationality.
23. The Social Democracy, based upon Marxism, was unable to understand and judge correctly this war: the Marxist historical (economical) materialism does not possess true psychology, is unable to see and appreciate properly individual and social forces which cannot be reduced to the so-called economic conditions. Marxists, therefore, do not realise that nationality, the national idea and principle, constitutes an independent political force alongside of economic interests; neither are they able to appreciate the religious and other forces. The reduction of all political phenomena to the economic interest is a psychological impossibility.
This is true, of course, above all, of German Marxists. Marx himself, before and even after the year 1848, looked upon nationality in the same light as all the German radicals and liberals of that time; then the struggle was for liberal reforms and for revolution against absolutism; there did not exist at that period a national question in Germany, just as there was none in England and France. But in Austria and Prussia and Turkey (in the Balkans) the liberal and democratic movement was at the same time national. Marx based his theories on his experiences in Germany, France, and England; he at that time, just as the German radicals, judged national movements by the degree in which they were revolutionary; being ignorant of national movements and aims he speaks of them, particularly of the smaller Slav nations, quite uncritically, in fact in a surprisingly superficial way. He gave his recognition to the Magyars, because they were against Austria and against Prussia; in Russia, Marx saw the quintessence of absolutism, just like all other liberals, radicals, and socialists; therefore, he gave his recognition to the Poles also, in the same way as the other liberals of his day. But all these Polonophiles failed to see the Poles of Prussia—they saw only those of Russia.
Later on, when he formulated and elaborated his historical materialism, Marx condemned nationalism, as he condemns all other “ideologies,” and he identified nationality with the State, and the State is to him only the greedy violence of the wealthy classes oppressing and exploiting the working people.
That the ideas of Marx on the question of nationality are uncritical and incorrect, and his judgments of the individual nations irrelevant and unjust, is to-day sufficiently evident; Marx is wrong, even if we accept his materialism. For that reason his followers in all the nationally mixed countries recognised the principle of nationality as an independent political factor alongside of the economic factor—the French, Italian, Polish, Czech, Jugoslav, &c. Marxist Socialists are also nationalists. The German socialists are not nationalists in theory, but they are so in practice, especially in Austria; in this war they (the majority) even joined the Pangermans. In England and America the national questions of the European continent are little understood. The same is true of the Russians, who are acquainted at home only with official nationalism which was working for the Russification of the other races. In fact all of them rejected nationalism as chauvinism.[8]
From the analysis of the idea of nationality as given above, it is evident that nationality and language, given by nature and history, cannot be reduced either to the economic or to the political factor—nationality is an independent social force. Analysis makes it also evident that socialism cannot reject nationality: a nation subjugated politically is exploited economically, socially—the democratic program of liberty, equality and fraternity is at the same time a political, social, national, religious program. Therefore socialism and nationalism develop simultaneously and on the same ethical and humanitarian foundation.
24. The lack of understanding of the principles of nationality leads many Marxists to an incorrect interpretation of the war.
The favored phrase of the Marxists is that the present war is a capitalistic war. But capital is on both warring sides, how then did it become the motive of the war? The Germans declare that Russia started the war; and here the German Marxists get into a very queer position, when they claim in harmony with William and his chancellors that Serbia and Russia, countries that are not capitalistic, or only half so, were responsible for the war. That would really give us an agrarian aggression and capitalistic defence. Of course the situation is complicated by the alliance of Russia with capitalistic France, and the accession of capitalistic England and America.
The Marxists get by their explanation into a peculiar position, for this reason also, that they themselves accept and support capitalism to a certain extent, rejecting only its exploitation. They recognise its economic productiveness and its superiority to the agrarian and other degrees of economic development.
Another variation of the explanations given by the Marxists is this: the war arose out of imperialistic capitalism. The Marxists say that imperialism grows out of the modern industrial capitalism: industry needs markets, raw materials, &c., therefore it subjugates colonies and agricultural countries.
The German, English and French industrialism and capitalism have managed to harmonise their interest for quite a long while, since 1871; on several occasions disputes threatening war were peacefully settled (Morocco, &c.). Only a few months before the war Germany concluded a very advantageous agreement with England and the other colonial states; why then did the war break out so suddenly? Industrialism and capitalism do not suffice to explain that. As far as imperialism is concerned, it has already been said that the term is used very ambiguously; the German imperialism does no doubt play a decisive role in the war, but it is not only capitalistic and industrial; it arose long before Germany became a capitalistic and industrial country. As far as colonial imperialism is concerned, it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that the occupation of the colonies has preceded by centuries modern industrialism and capitalism. Besides it is easy to prove that the foundation of colonies had other than merely industrial and capitalistic motives. Even during this war German economists and politicians were demonstrating that colonies did not pay, that on the contrary Germany had to make up an annual deficiency for her colonies; and comparisons of world-trade figures show that Germany exported to England and imported materials from England for her industry to an amount forty times as great as the business done with her own colonies. The Marxists give credit to the shrewdness of merchants and capitalists for being rather sharp at sums and they ascribe to them an unmilitary spirit—and suddenly these merchants are accused of being more anxious for war than Mars himself, and of being fools in addition!
All these Marxist explanations of the war are just as one sided and uncritical as the entire economic materialism and its philosophy of history, and therefore the official Marxist philosophy of this war is insufficient.
No one denies that economic interests play a great part in this war. We have become acquainted with Pangermanism, and know that its exponents emphasize Germany’s need for soil, raw material, cheap labor, &c. Perhaps every war was caused by a desire for material gains (bonna terra, mali vicini—I read in a mediæval chronicle), but the question is, whether economic interests in any war, especially in this war, are the only decisive motives.
Their materialistic view of life brought the Marxists in this war into a compromising association with the Pangermanists; members of the German majority socialists, Lentch, Renner (the Austro-German socialistic leader) and others cannot be distinguished from Pangermanists. It would not, however, be fair, if I did not recall the author of “J’accuse,” who realized the situation very early; and now Kautsky and Bernstein criticize very effectively the Marxist one-sided explanation of the war. In Russia Plechanov did not succumb to the war cries of the one-sided Bolshevism.
- ↑ The racial mixture of almost all nations points to the same fact; here we deal with the nations preserving their different languages.
- ↑ The word nation is also used to designate the body of citizens of a mixed state; for instance, the Swiss nation. The term Austrian nation is not used, because there are in Austria too many nations (nine) and its nationalistic struggles are known, although the term might be used with as much justification as it is used in the case of Switzerland, or Belgium. In the scientific German literature the term political nation is used to designate the whole body of citizens in a mixed state or the ruling nation only. It is of course evident that different nations who have lived together for a long time in one state have to some extent identical views, identical institutions, identical and common traditions; that is why one speaks, for instance, of the Belgian nation, etc. In the case of the Scotch or Irish nations, we must remember that Ireland and Scotland, parts of the present Britain, up to recent times have had political independence, and the people of each used and partly even uses now its own tongue. In another sense again the word nation is applied to Bavaria, Saxony and the various German states, or to Serbia and Montenegro, and to Canada, Australia, and to the people of the United States; but the federation plan for a closer union of English-speaking nations has proved that the national sentiment is stronger than geography and overcomes separation by distances. I see in the attachment of America to England in this war the manifestation of the feeling of nationality.Attention must be called to the distinction between nation and people (natio-populus, nation—peuple, Nation-Volk). The word “nation” is employed generally more in the political sense—the word “people” designates the masses of the nation in a democratic sense. The use of these two terms, especially in the important declarations made during this war, is unsettled and not very exact.
- ↑ That explains why democratic movements, especially revolutions, promoted the language of the masses; during the French Revolution, for instance, important state acts were published in Provençal; and it is known how deeply the French Revolution affected style and rhetoric. The literary use of various dialects also can be explained by popular political movements, etc. The Russian revolution is very interesting in its influence on the various smaller nations in Russia.
- ↑ The fundamental idea of the historical anti-thesis between democracy and theocracy exposed already in 59 is set forth at length in my book on Russia.
- ↑ As far as the conception of imperialism is concerned, I desire to call attention at least to the following: Imperium can be conceived in the Roman sense or in the mediæval sense: the Roman Empire is the creation of expansive militarism; the mediæval imperium was in theory, and at first in fact also, built on a spiritual foundation—the Empire was theocratic, the state and church were one. Later the political empire (the Emperor) grew stronger than the papacy, and in modern times, the various states actually took for their own all mediæval absolutism; the dynasties still hold on to the theocratic foundation. Austria, after making intensive use of the mediæval Empire for its dynasty, gave the Empire up, Prussia renewed it; Russia held on to the idea of the Byzantine Empire. In practice, all these Empires followed the old Roman example—material domination was to them both the means and the end. The mediæval Empire had some justification during a certain time; the modern empire is an anachronism.Often the term imperialism is used, when some kind of peaceful federation of various states is thought of, cf. the chapter on state nationalism.
- ↑ The problem of federation (and self-government) demands a more detailed explanation than can be given in this sketch. It is hardly necessary to call attention to the difference between the American and German federations which are substantially uni-lingual and the federation of three (4) nations; but it is important to state that the advocates of federations do not anticipate the great changes which will be brought about after the war; if Europe will accept the democratic ideas of the Allies, federation will be easier, or rather less necessary, because the whole of Enrope will be more closely organised.
- ↑ A distinction is made between territorial autonomy for territories inhabited by one nation, and personal autonomy for scattered small minorities after the manner of the present religious minorities. In Bohemia both the Czechs and the Germans in various proposals recognised minorities, when they amount to 20 and 25 per cent.
- ↑ The Russian Social Revolutionist and former minister Czernov wrote a pamphlet of some merit on the erroneous ideas of Marx as to nationality; I called attention to this matter long ago in my book on Marxism.