Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations/Part 2/Chapter 9

by D. P. Heatley

Layout 2

 

9

Literature of International Ethics

1. 'The true interest of everything is to conform to its own constitution and nature; and my nature owns reason and social obligation. Socially, as Antoninus, I have for my city and country Rome; as a man, the world.'^[1]

2. The mediaeval ideal^[2]—of the sacerdotium, as of Pope Hildebrand; of the imperium, as of Frederick Barbarossa; of the studium, in the thought of Aquinas, on one side, as well as in the thought of Dante,^[3] on the other side—is the unity and concord of the Christian Commonwealth, whether a World-Church (and it was the Church, before and more than the secular power, in the Middle Ages that had the attributes and majesty of 'the State'), or a World-State, Christian.

'Throughout the Middle Age,' it has been said,^[4] 'and even for a while longer, the outward framework of all Political Doctrine consisted of the grandiose but narrow system of thoughts that had been reared by the Medieval Spirit. It was a system of thoughts which culminated in the idea of a Community which God Himself had constituted and which comprised All Mankind. This system may be expounded, as it is by Dante, in all its purity and all its fulness, or it may become the shadow of a shade; but rudely to burst its bars asunder is an exploit which is but now and again attempted by some bold innovator.'

'Political Thought when it is genuinely medieval starts from the Whole, but ascribes an intrinsic value to every Partial Whole, down to and including the Individual.'^[5] 'In the Universal Whole, Mankind is one Partial Whole with a final cause of its own, which is distinct from the final causes of Individuals and from those of other Communities.^[6] Therefore, in all centuries of the Middle Age Christendom, which in destiny is identical with Mankind, is set before us as a single, universal Community, founded and governed by God Himself Mankind is one "mystical body"; it is one single and internally connected "people" or "folk"; it is an all-embracing corporation (universitas), which constitutes that Universal Realm, spiritual and temporal, which may be called the Universal Church (ecclesia universalis), or, with equal propriety, the Commonwealth of the Human Race (respublica generis humani). Therefore that it may attain its one purpose, it needs One Law (lex) and One Government (unicus principatus).'^[7]

'Le moyen âge fournit un beau chapitre à l'intéressant sujet de l'idéal de la paix dans histoire.'^[8]

3. Projects of Perpetual Peace^[9] (Modern). The best-known are those of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant.

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Projet de Paix perpétuelle^[10] was published at the time of the Peace of Utrecht, the Conference of which was attended by him; and his Abrégé du Projet de Paix perpétuelle.^[11] in which his plan is developed, was published in 1729.

Wheaton has drawn attention to the 'almost verbal coincidence' between certain articles in Saint-Pierre's Project and those of the fundamental act of the Germanic Confederation established by the Congress of Vienna. He goes on to say: 'Fleury, to whom Saint-Pierre communicated his plan, replied to him: "Vous avez oublié un article essentiel, celui d'envoyer des missionnaires pour toucher les cœurs des princes et leur persuader d'entrer dans vos vues." But Dubois bestowed upon him the highest praise expressed in the most felicitous manner, when he termed his ideas: "les rêves d'un homme de bien." And Rousseau published in 1761 a little work to which he modestly gave the title of Extrait du Projet de Paix perpétuelle de M. l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre, but which is stamped with the marks of Rousseau's peculiar genius as a system-builder, and reasoner upon the problem of social science.'^[12]

'Une lettre d'envoi était jointe à l'ouvrage', says M. Nys, writing on the Project of Saint-Pierre. 'C'est un projet, y lit-on, dont peut-être ni vous ni moi ne verrons jamais un fruit; mais par reconnaissance de ce que nous avons reçu de bien de nos ancêtres, ne devons-nous pas tâcher d’en procurer encore plus grands à notre postérité? Noble affirmation non point seulement de la continuité du progrès, mais du devoir pour tout homme de travailler à ce développement des forces de l'humanité, qu'au début du xiv^e siècle, Dante entrevoyait et qu'il appelait de ce beau mot, civilitas, la civilisation.'^[13]

One of the articles of Saint-Pierre’s Project stipulated that if any of the allied Powers should refuse to give effect to the judgements of the grand alliance, or should negotiate treaties in contravention of these judgements, the alliance should oppose the force of arms to the offending Power until it was brought to obedience.^[14] The succeeding article of confederation declared that the general assembly of plenipotentiaries of this European alliance should have power to enact by a plurality of votes all laws necessary and proper to give effect to the objects of the alliance; but no alteration in the fundamental articles was to be made without the unanimous consent of the allies.

These two articles form the link in the Projects of Perpetual Peace of Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant, and Bentham.

How were the rights of the Federation to be extended and secured without impairing those of sovereignty? How is each State to be left master in its own house, and yet fulfil the duty which it owes to the Federation? That, as Rousseau clearly saw, was the vital problem, and to no political thinker could it be more real and critical than to the interpreter and champion of the general will in politics and the upholder of the rights of small States and of the saving function of Federation in their behalf.

We may express the problem in the terms of the problem of the Social Contract: 'Trouver une forme d'association qui défende et protège de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun, s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même, et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant.'^[15]

'En effet, chaque individu peut, comme homme, avoir une volonté particulière contraire ou dissemblable à la volonté générale qu'il a comme citoyen; son intérêt particulier peut lui parler tout autrement que l'intérêt commun; son existence absolue, et naturellement indépendante, peut lui faire envisager ce qu'il doit à la cause commune comme une contribution gratuite, dont la perte sera moins nuisible aux autres que le paiement n'en est onéreux pour lui; et regardant la personne morale qui constitue l'état comme un être de raison, parceque ce n'est pas un homme, il jouiroit des droits du citoyen sans vouloir remplir les devoirs du sujet; injustice dont le progrés causeroit la ruine du corps politique.

'Afin donc que le pacte social ne soit pas un vain formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet engagement, qui seul peut donner de la force aux autres, que quiconque refusera d'obéir à la volonté générale y sera contraint par tout le corps; ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu'on le forcera d'être libre; car telle est la condition qui, donnant chaque citoyen à la patrie, le garantit de toute dépendance personnelle; condition qui fait l'artifice et le jeu de la machine politique, et qui seule rend légitimes les engagements civils, lesquels, sans cela, seroient absurdes, tyranniques, et sujets aux plus énormes abus.'^[16]

'Tout malfaiteur, attaquant le droit social, devient par ses forfaits rebelle et traître à la patrie; il cesse d'en être membre en violant ses lois; et même il lui fait la guerre. Alors la conservation de l'état est incompatible avec la sienne, il faut qu'un des deux périsse; et quand on fait mourir le coupable, c'est moins comme citoyen que comme ennemi.'^[17]

Rousseau's Contrat Social ou Principes du Droit politique was only part of the Institutions politiques planned by him. In the concluding chapter he made it clear that it could not fall within his purpose in that work to examine the principles of international right, although it was a task that might very well be undertaken as a supplement to his endeavour in the Social Contract to lay down the true principles of right in politics and to found the State on that secure basis.^[18] Already in his Extrait de la Paix perpétuelle^[19] and in his Jugement sur la Paix perpétuelle,^[20] as well as in Émile, which was published in the same year^[21] as the Social Contract, Rousseau shows his attitude of mind on the larger and wider questions of the external and international relations of States.

'Si jamais vérité morale fut démontrée, il me semble que c'est l'utilité générale et particuliére de ce projet. Les avantages qui résulteroient de son exécution, et pour chaque prince, et pour chaque peuple, et pour toute l'Europe, sont immenses, clairs, incontestables; on ne peut rien de plus solide et de plus exact que les raisonnements par lesquels l'Pauteur les établit. Réalisez sa république européenne durant un seul jour, c'en est assez pour la faire durer éternellement, tant chacun trouveroit par l'expérience son profit particulier dans le bien commun. Cependant ces mêmes princes, qui la défendroient de toutes leurs forces si elle existoit, s'opposeroient maintenant de même à son exécution, et l'empêcheront infailliblement de s'établir comme ils l'empêcheroient de s'éteindre. Ainsi l'ouvrage de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre sur la paix perpétuelle paroît d'abord inutile pour la produire et superflu pour la conserver. C'est donc une vaine spéculation, dira quelque lecteur impatient. Non, c'est un livre solide et sensé, et il est très important qu'il existe.'^[22]

'Un prince qui met sa cause au hasard de la guerre n'ignore pas qu'il court des risques; mais il en est moins frappé que des avantages qu'il se promet, parcequ'il craint bien moins la fortune qu'il n'espère de sa propre sagesse: s'il est puissant, il compte sur ses forces; s'il est foible, il compte sur ses alliances; quelquefois il lui est utile au-dedans de purger de mauvaises humeurs, d'affoiblir des sujets indociles, d'essuyer même des revers; et le politique habile sait tirer avantage de ses propres défaites. J'espére qu'on se souviendra que ce n'est pas moi qui raisonne ainsi, mais le sophiste de cour, qui préfère un grand territoire, et peu de sujets pauvres et soumis, à l'empire inébranlable que donnent au prince la justice et les lois sur un peuple heureux et florissant.'^[23]

'Il ne faut pas non plus croire avec l'abbé de Saint-Pierre que, même avec la bonne volonté que les princes ni leurs ministres n'auront jamais, il fût aisé de trouver un moment favorable à l'exécution de ce système; car il faudroit pour cela que la somme des intérêts particuliers ne l'emportât pas sur l'intérêt commun, et que chacun crût voir dans le bien de tous le plus grand bien qu'il peut espérer pour lui-même. Or ceci demande un concours de sagesse dans tant de têtes, et un concours de rapports dans tant d'intérêts, qu'on ne doit guère espérer du hasard l'accord fortuit de toutes les circonstances nécessaires: cependant si cet accord n'a pas lieu, il n'y a que la force qui puisse y suppléer; et alors if n'est plus question de persuader, mais de contraindre; et il ne faut plus écrire des livres, mais lever des troupes.

'Ainsi, quoique le projet fût très sage, les moyens de l'exécuter se sentoient de la simplicité de lauteur. Il s'imaginoit bonnement qu'il ne falloit qu'assembler un congrès, y proposer ses articles, qu'on les alloit signer, et que tout seroit fait. Convenons que, dans tous les projets de cet honnête homme, il voyoit assez bien l'effet des choses quand elles seroient établies; mais il jugeoit comme un enfant des moyens de les établir.'^[24]

This very difficulty confronted Rousseau in his Social Contract. Men and conditions being what they are, how was a true system of legislation to be instituted in any State? What was the right moment for instituting it? How was it to be sustained? By what sanction?

'Le corps politique a-t-il un organe pour énoncer ses volontés? Qui lui donnera la prévoyance nécessaire pour en former les actes et les publier d'avance? ou comment les prononcera-t-il au moment du besoin? Comme une multitude aveugle, qui souvent ne sait ce qu'elle veut, parcequ'elle sait rarement ce qui lui est bon, exécuteroit-elle d'elle-même une entreprise aussi grande, aussi difficile, qu'un système de législation? De lui-même le peuple veut toujours le bien, mais de lui-même il ne le voit pas toujours. La volonté générale est toujours droite, mais le jugement qui la guide n'est pas toujours éclairé. Il faut lui faire voir les objets tels qu'ils sont, quelquefois tels qu'ils doivent lui paroître; lui montrer le bon chemin qu'elle cherche, la garantir de la séduction des volontés particuliéres, rapprocher à ses yeux les lieux et les temps, balancer l'attrait des avantages présents et sensibles par le danger des maux éloignés et cachés. Les particuliers voient le bien qu'ils rejettent; le public veut le bien qu'il ne voit pas. Tous ont également besoin de guides. Il faut obliger les uns à conformer leurs volontés a leur raison; il faut apprendre à l'autre à connoître ce qu'il veut. Alors des lumières publiques résulte union de l;entendement et de la volonté dans le corps social; de la l'exact concours des parties, et enfin la plus grande force du tout.'^[25]

Rousseau wrote his Jugement sur la Paix perpétuelle in the year of the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. The right moment for instituting a league for perpetual peace might well seem dim and distant. How could one, in the circumstance of that time, look for a common accord, or hope for a sudden inspiration?^[26] How should one criticize, and yet commend, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre?

'Qu'on ne dise donc point que si son système n'a pas été adopté, c'est qu'il n'étoit pas bon; car le mal et les abus, dont tant de gens profitent, s'introduisent d'eux-mêmes. Mais ce qui est utile au public ne s'introduit guère que par la force, attendu que les intérêts particuliers y sont presque toujours opposés, Sans doute la paix perpétuelle est à présent un projet bien absurde; mais qu'on nous rende un Henri IV et un Sully, la paix perpétuelle redeviendra un projet raisonnable: ou plutôt admirons un si beau plan, mais consolonsnous de ne pas le voir exécuter; car cela ne peut se faire que par des moyens violents et redoutables à l'humanité.

'On ne voit point de ligues fédératives s'établir autrement que par des révolutions: et, sur ce principe, qui de nous oseroit dire si cette ligue européenne est a desirer ou à craindre? Elle feroit peut-être plus de mal tout d'un coup qu'elle n'en préviendroit pour des siècles,'^[27]

In Émile Rousseau shows how, in fulfilling the plan of his Institutions politiques, he would have connected his study of the Social Contract with the study of Federation and of international relations.

'Après avoir ainsi considéré chaque espèce de société civile en elle-même, nous les comparerons pour en observer les divers rapports: les unes grandes, les autres petites; les unes fortes, les autres foibles: s'attaquant, s'offensant, s'entre-détruisant; et dans cette action et réaction continuelle, faisant plus de misérables, et coûtant la vie à plus d'hommes que s'ils avoient tous gardé leur premiére liberté. Nous examinerons si l'on n'en a pas fait trop ou trop peu dans l'institution sociale; si les individus soumis aux lois et aux hommes, tandis que les sociétés gardent entre elles l'indépendance de la nature, ne restent pas exposés aux maux des deux états, sans en avoir les avantages; et s'il ne vaudroit pas mieux qu'il n'y eût point de société civile au monde que d'y en avoir plusieurs. N'est-ce pas cet état mixte qui participe à tous les deux et n'assure ni l'un ni l'autre, per quem neutrum licet, nec tanquam in bello paratum esse, nec tanquam in pace securum? N'est-ce pas cette association partielle et imparfaite qui produit la tyrannie et la guerre? et la tyrannie et la guerre ne sont-elles pas les plus grands fléaux de l'humanité?

'Nous examinerons enfin l'espèce de remèdes qu'on a cherchés à ces inconvénients par les ligues et confédérations, qui, laissant chaque État son maitre au dedans, l'arment au dehors contre tout agresseur injuste. Nous rechercherons comment on peut établir une bonne association fédérative, ce qui peut la rendre durable; et jusqu'a quel point on peut étendre le droit de la confédération, sans nuire à celui de la souveraineté.

'L’abbé de Saint-Pierre avoit proposé une association de tous les États de l'Europe pour maintenir entre eux une paix perpétuelle. Cette association étoit-elle praticable? et, supposant qu'elle eût été établie, étoit-il à présumer qu'elle et duré?^[28] Ces recherches nous mènent directement à toutes les questions de droit public qui peuvent achever d'éclaircir celles du droit politique.'^[29]

The Utopians thought that leagues are useless things, and that, if the common ties of human nature do not knit men together, the faith of promises will not be of great effect on them: the partnership of human nature, that which is of all men and for all men, is instead of a league.^[30]

But the contribution made by Rousseau, and partly by Saint-Pierre through him, to the promulgation of projects of Perpetual Peace has been so influential, and subsequent contributors have added so little of positive value, that a more explicit account of what he said and how he reasoned, may be allowed and may be of use.

The imperfections of governments, Rousseau argued, are due less to their constitution than to their external relations. The greater part of the care which ought to be devoted to internal administration and welfare is withheld owing to the need of mere external security; not the perfecting of itself, but the mere preservation of the State against others, has the larger claim upon its time and energies. The ordering of social relations is not, as is too often assumed, the work of reason; rather is it the work of the passions. We have gone either too far or not far enough; we have done either too much or too little. Society is so organized that each of us is a fellow-citizen with the members of his own State, and yet is in a state of nature toward all the rest of mankind. In other words, men have prevented the lesser wars only to kindle wars that are greater and a thousand-fold more terrible. They have made particular unions among themselves and in so doing have really become enemies of the human race.

These are dangerous contradictions in the ordering of the affairs of men and the world. If there be any means of removing them, perhaps it is only through some form of federal government by which peoples may be united by ties similar to those which unite individuals; by which peoples not less than individuals are rendered subject to laws.^[31] This government, moreover, has this superiority over all others, that it combines the advantages of large and small States: it will be formidable without, owing to its power; laws will be enforced; it alone among Governments will contain at once subjects, persons in authority, and foreigners. In certain respects it is a new form of government. But it was not unknown to the ancients.^[32] The ancient confederations, however, were inferior in wisdom to the Germanic and the Helvetic and to the States-General. Such confederations are still few and they are far from perfection. But that only shows that in politics as in ethics the range of our knowledge does little more than convince us how great are our evils.

Besides these leagues of a public and positive character, there may be tacit unions less apparent and yet not less real, resulting from a harmony of interests, an affinity of principles, a conformity of customs, or other factors that induce some common relationship between peoples who are divided. Thus may we say that all the Powers of Europe form a 'system'^[33] among themselves uniting them by community of commerce, letters, manners, religion, and international law, and by regard for the maintenance of a resulting equilibrium, which it may be no one's special concern to maintain but which it would be less easy to destroy than many people think. There is a Society of the Peoples of Europe, with its roots in the past. From Rome have come to some of them codes of law. A stronger bond still, and one affecting more of them, is their religion. We must allow also for the facilities and the vast variety of intercourse among the peoples of Europe. We can speak, therefore, of 'a Europe' in a real sense in which we cannot conceive Asia or Africa. In Asia or in Africa we have merely a collection of peoples with nothing in common except that they belong to the same continent. But when we speak of 'Europe' the word at once suggests to the mind a real society founded on a community of manners, customs, religion, and even laws; and none of the peoples making up this Society can recede from its place and function in it without at once being the cause of troubles.

No doubt, it is easy to make sharp the contrasts that facts seem to force upon us—easy to set perpetual dissensions and the savagery of wars against the benevolence of the religion that is professed, the cruelty of the deed against the humanity of the maxim, the harshness of policy against the so great wisdom of the politics of the books, the excellent intentions of the heads of States, and the misery and degradation of their peoples, a fraternity of the peoples of Europe, against their mutual animosity. 'The Society of the Peoples of Europe' may well seem to be but a term of derision—an irony to express more pointedly the mutual distrust of the nations of Christendom.

The relative state of the Powers of Europe is in itself a state of war; let that be granted. Mutual engagements are entered upon. There is a lack of effective guarantees for their observance. Thus it is that each treaty, which from its very nature is merely partial and between some only of these Powers, is rather a short-lived truce than a true peace—is a provocative to war as soon as a change of circumstances shall have given fresh strength to claims of ambition or of right. Nor must it be forgotten that the public law of Europe has not been established or authorized by consent; it is devoid of general principles; it is ever changing according to time and place; its rules are full of contradictions which make it a prey to 'the right of the strongest'. In this condition of things reason is denied its sway. There is no trustworthy guide where things are so doubtful and hazardous. Reason may be excused for bending and conforming itself to selfish interest; and from the sway of selfish interest wars will continue to be unavoidable. And yet each in his own mind would be just, but for circumstances, There is a general sense of insecurity, for harmony has not been attained in the ordering of the interests and government of the several States themselves, much less between State and State. 'Voilà les causes générales et particuliéres qui nous unissent pour nous détruire, et nous font écrire une si belle doctrine sociale avec des mains toujours teintes de sang humain.'

To know the causes is to know the remedy, if there is one, We all see that there can be no society without a community of interests, and that all division arises from an antagonism of interests. Reason would ask: Why leave so much, and so much that is vital, to mere chance and to the unceasing hazard of things that in themselves are most trivial? Reason would say: When there is a society there must needs be a compulsory power to order and regulate the movements of its members; without this power thus applied the community of interests and all reciprocal compacts can have no stability; and we are thrust back on a state of contradictions, uncertainties, insecurity, unlaw, and war. Let no one make the grave error of a false hope where so much is at stake: let no one imagine that this state of violence will pass away from the sheer force of things and without calling in the aid of art and of political thought which must guide that art. 'The system of Europe has precisely that degree of stability which suffices to maintain it in perpetual agitation without entirely overthrowing it; and if the evils we have thus to endure cannot be augmented, still less should we look forward to an end being put to them by any great revolution.'

Howsoever the existing balance of power in Europe has come about—whether from geographical necessity and thus by nature, or by art—we have to reckon with it, and to recognize that it is self-existing, self-supporting, for do we not see that when it is disturbed in one part it gives way only to re-establish itself forthwith in another? Princes who have been charged with aiming at universal monarchy have shown therein, if the charge is well-founded, more ambition than genius. A moment's reflection shows how absurd is the project. No European potentate can hope to vanquish the rest of the Powers of Europe in their existing state of development, military, economic, and political, and with the facilities they possess for co-operation against the ambitions of the aggressor; nor can we imagine a combination of great Powers sufficiently sincere, harmonious and durable, to be able to subjugate and to hold in subjection the rest of Europe. It is not that the sea, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees are obstacles that no ambition can surmount. These physical obstacles are fortified by others that spring from the nature and contrivances of men. The give-and-take of negotiations is an essential aid to the same end: 'preserve the balance' is the almost unvarying watchword. There is a more solid support. This support is the Germanic body which, placed almost in the centre of Europe, may be thought to contribute even more to the maintenance of its neighbours in their existing states than to that even of its own members. It is a body formidable on account of the extent of its territories and the vast number and valour of its peoples, Its very constitution renders it formidable, for that is of such a nature as to take from it both the desire and the means of conquest, and at the same time to make it a stout obstacle to those who are ambitious to conquer. This constitution of the Empire has undoubted defects, and yet it is certain that while it subsists the equilibrium of Europe will never be entirely destroyed, and that no sovereign of a European State need fear that he will be driven from his throne by another; the treaty of Westphalia will perhaps remain for ever the basis of our political system. Thus public law, a study which Germans cultivate with so much diligence, is even more important than they suppose. It is not only the public law of the Germanic body; it is the public law of the whole of Europe.

The existing system may be durable, but it is far from being one of rest: it is an uneasy equilibrium. The system is maintained only by an action and reaction which, without suddenly displacing any of the Powers, keeps them in continual agitation. Their efforts are ever in vain and yet ever being renewed, even as waves of the sea which without ceasing agitate its surface but cannot change its level. Suffering falls on the peoples of Europe, and there is no appreciable gain to their sovereigns. As an association of States the system is imperfect. It is necessary to erect in its stead a solid confederation that shall last. That cannot be done unless all its members are brought into a state of mutual dependence, so that no one of them shall be in a position to resist all the rest, and any combination formed for particular and selfish ends, inimical to the interests of the confederation, shall have obstacles opposed to it fully adequate to prevent these ends from being attained. There are several clear requisites. The confederation must include all the Powers of Europe; at least, no Power that is not one of the weakest shall decline to be a member. There must be a common tribunal with power to establish general laws and regulations binding on all the members. It must have a coercive power capable both of compelling and restraining the action of each in conformity with the decisions that have been taken in common. It must have power capable of preventing any member from seceding from the confederation at its own whim and impulse, as soon as it imagines that its own particular interest is contrary to the general interest. Without the recognition of this general interest no such confederation can be formed; without it none that may incautiously be formed can endure. There are two prerequisites: sufficient reason to see what is useful, and sufficient courage to do what is essential to the welfare and happiness of society.^[34]

The 'Germanic body' was far spent in decay and was preparing its self-destruction even while Rousseau was writing. The Peace of Westphalia might well seem to many to have been traitorously treated, and with it the whole of 'the system of Europe' undermined, when Austria and France were joined in alliance, and were allies against Prussia. The first Partition of Poland was the dying testament of the old Europe, and from Corsica, the cherished island of Rousseau's expectations of right established in a State, there came the great disturber of the peace, the rights, and the equilibrium of the States of Europe, and the destroyer of the Germanic body. Both Rousseau and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre might well seem to have been the dreamers of an empty dream—empty but for the heaviness of the consequences of a slothful overtrust for their fellow-men.

To expect men and nations to conform their actions to reason may be the utmost irrationality. Everything, however, that can be urged for the establishment of a League of Nations to prevent aggression, the domination of force, and injustice, has been said in principle, and even in much of the particulars, by Rousseau. He was endeavouring to ally reason and interest. He recognizes that life for a society is adjustment and harmony of organism and environment. It is his fault, as it is that of his imitators and inferiors, that he does not adequately analyse, nor adequately allow for, the influence of the environment, and that of the past in the present. His error was much less a deficiency of knowledge than an excess of faith. We cannot perfectly agree to everything that was related by Raphael; yet there are things in the commonwealth of Utopia that we rather wish than to-day can hope to see followed in our government. But the call for a high courage is more required than the call to a form of prudence and caution that abandons hope and may never drive business home. A high courage that dispenses with exact and intimate knowledge and regard for facts will be futile and dangerous. But high courage inspired by knowledge and sustained by circumspection is required to counteract the influence of the multitude of men who are 'prudent' because they are timid, who, without either subtlety of intellect or nobility of mind, acquire a vulgar reputation for sagacity, whereas they are neither wise nor efficient.

'A proposal of this sort is one of those things that can never come too early nor too late,' said Bentham when he was introducing his 'Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace'.^[35]

If a citizen of the world, he asked, had to prepare a universal international code, what would he assign to himself as his object? It would be the common and equal utility of all nations.^[36] 'War is mischief upon the greatest scale.'^[37] Among the causes or occasions of war have been 'enterprizes of conquest': means of prevention are confederations of defence, defensive alliances, and general guarantees. Attempts at monopoly in commerce, insolence of the strong toward the weak, and tyranny of one nation toward another, have been the causes or occasions of war: means of prevention are confederations defensive, and conventions limiting the number of troops to be maintained. No one, he asserts, could regard treaties implying positive obligations of this kind as merely chimerical; still less are those implying negative obligation.

'There may arise difficulty in maintaining an army; there can arise none in not doing so. It must be allowed that the matter would be a delicate one: there might be some difficulty in persuading one lion to cut his claws; but if the lion, or rather the enormous condor which holds him fast by the head, should agree to cut his talons also, there would ts no disgrace in the stipulation: the advantage or inconvenience would be reciprocal. Let the cost of the attempt be what it would, it would be amply repaid by success. What tranquillity for all sovereigns!—what relief for all people! What a spring would not the commerce, the population, the wealth of all nations take, which are at present confined, when set free from the fetters in which they are now held by the care of their defence.'^[38]

In the case of bona fide wars a remedy must be sought in 'The Tribunal of Peace'. Bentham's Plan rested upon two 'fundamental propositions'. One is the reduction and fixing of the force of the several nations composing the European system. The other is suggested by the wars of the eighteenth century, especially between Britain and France, and is a commentary upon them: it is 'the emancipation of the distant dependencies of each state'—drastic counsel which its author did not confine to his Plan for Perpetual Peace. The objection, and the only objection, to the plan of a peace that shall be universal and lasting is its apparent impracticability—that it is not only hopeless, but hopeless to such a degree that any proposal to this effect deserves to be called 'visionary and ridiculous'. It is said that the age is not ripe for such a proposal, Then, 'the more it wants of being ripe, the sooner we should begin to do what can be done to ripen it'. Who that bears the name of Christian could refuse to assist with his prayers? What pulpit could refrain from seconding the author with its eloquence? 'Catholics and Protestants, Church-of-England-men and Dissenters, may all agree in this, if in nothing else. I call upon them all to aid me with their countenance and their support.'

There are parts of Bentham's Plan that are avowedly related to the rivalry of Britain and France in trade, in colonies and in sea-power; and he believed that a solid and thorough agreement between these two States would remove the principal obstacles to a plan of general and permanent pacification for Europe.^[39] For the maintenance of such a pacification general and perpetual treaties might be formed, limiting the number of troops. to be maintained. Further, 'the maintenance of such a pacification might be considerably facilitated by the establishment of a common court of judicature, for the decision of differences between the several nations, although such court were not to be armed with any coercive powers'. 'It is an observation of somebody's,' says Bentham, 'that no nation ought to yield any evident point of justice to another. This must mean, evident in the eyes of the nation that is to judge, evident in the eyes of the nation called upon to yield. What does this amount to? That no nation is to give up anything of what it looks upon as its rights—no nation is to make any concessions. Wherever there is any difference of opinion between the negotiators of two nations, war is to be the consequence. While there is no common tribunal, something might be said for this. Concession to notorious injustice invites fresh injustice. Establish a common tribunal, the necessity for war no longer follows from difference of opinion. Just or unjust, the decision of the arbiters will save the credit, the honour of the contending party.' Can the arrangement proposed, he asks, justly be called visionary, when it can be established regarding it, that it is to the interest of the parties concerned; that they are themselves sensible of that interest; and that the situation it would place them in is not a new one, but merely that from which they set out? Give up colonies; found no new ones: this will be to the interest both of the mother-country and of the colonies, and it will save the danger of war. Do not seek to encourage particular branches of trade by prohibiting rival manufactures, by taxing rival manufactures, or by means of bounties on the trade meant to be favoured. Do not enter into wars for compelling treaties granting commercial preferences: do not even make alliances for the sake of purchasing such preferences, nor enter into any treaties for ensuring them. Such preferences are useless: 'they add nothing to the mass of wealth; they only influence the direction of it'.

'Mark well the contrast. All trade is in its essence advantageous—even to that party to whom it is least so. All war is in its essence ruinous; and yet the great employments of government are to treasure up occasions of war, and to put fetters upon trade.'

Therefore it is necessary to begin by trying to remove the causes of war, It is necessary to narrow the sphere of operation of jealousy—the vice of the narrow mind, and to expand that of confidence—the virtue of the enlarged mind. 'Clandestinity and secrecy' in negotiation are unnecessary and mischievous.^[40] Establish conditions as favourable as possible in regard to interest and in the conduct of affairs between nations, and thus prepare the ground and the atmosphere appropriate to an international tribunal that is to be The Tribunal of Peace. Even then force may have to be used. 'There might, perhaps, be no harm in regulating, as a last resource, the contingent to be furnished by the several states for enforcing the decrees of the court', for the court will have power to put the refractory State, after a certain time, under the ban of Europe.

Bentham made the practical inception of his Plan depend upon the maintenance and permanence of friendly relations between Britain and France; and already the younger Pitt had repudiated, both in words and by deeds, the rooted conception of Chatham, as well as of the ordinary Englishman, that the two countries were 'natural enemies'—enemies by inheritance and by the inevitable force of events and circumstance. But by an irony the Plan was projected almost on the eve of the French Revolution. It would be doing wrong to Bentham to say that this world-shaking event disturbed and distorted his sense of values. But it made him most anxious and resolute that his own understanding of values should not be misunderstood and perverted by others. 'Is', 'has been', 'ought to be', 'shall be', 'can': all, he exclaimed, are put for one another; all are pressed into the same service, made to answer the same purpose. By this 'inebriating compound' the elements of men's understanding had been put in confusion, every fibre of the heart had been inflamed, the lips had been prepared for every folly, the hand for every crime. 'From imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets, rhetoricians, and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons, come imaginary rights, a bastard brood of monsters, "gorgons and chimaeras dire".' The 'anarchist' may be known by the language which he uses. 'He will be found asserting rights, and acknowledging them at the same time not to be recognized by government', using instead of 'ought and ought not, the words is or is not—can or can not. In former times, in the times of Grotius and Puffendorf, these expressions were little more than improprieties in language, prejudicial to the growth of knowledge; at present, since the French Declaration of Rights has adopted them, and the French Revolution displayed their import by a practical comment, the use of them is already a moral crime, and not undeserving of being constituted a legal crime, as hostile to the public peace'.^[41] Bentham grossly misapprehended the meaning and force of Natural Right in the history of reasoning on politics. It was in keeping with the tenor of his own scheme of political thought that he should base his Plan of Perpetual Peace upon grounds of general utility, and should press its acceptance on the ground that it was in accord with the common sense of men regardful of their common interest.

Of Kant it has been said that in the department of Politics he did away with the narrowness that threatened it, and entered with his deep priestlike thought into the great spirit of history and the progress of the liberty of peoples.^[42]

Kant's contribution to the cause of Perpetual Peace is measured not merely by his essay bearing that title but by essential parts of other works written by him on the Philosophy of Right and Politics. In the essay on Perpetual Peace the conclusions are more conspicuous than the reasoning; the articles are definite with a degree of sharpness that the preliminary conditions to be fulfilled do not warrant. In the case of Kant as in the case of Rousseau, the emphasis has been unduly laid on conclusions by those who cite him in their advocacy of a League of Nations and Perpetual Peace: too little heed has been given to the conditions that must, he said, first be satisfied. How the project is related as an ideal to facts and to the past in the present is best shown by Kant in his Theory of Right.^[43] One of the short sections^[44] of that work and the few concluding sentences express more clearly and in truer proportion than the earlier essay, Perpetual Peace, the judgement of Kant on the lasting establishment of Peace. If we take these together and combine them with his teaching in other essays on principles of Politics and the relation of theory to practice in Politics, we shall be able to see the character of Kant's contribution to the study of this subject, the place which he holds in its history, and, in particular, his strikingly close connexion with Rousseau.

The essay 'Perpetual Peace'—Zum ewigen Frieden—was published in 1795—the year of the Treaty of Basel. By that treaty Prussia finished her first war of the French Revolution. Only a visionary could have seen in the Treaty of Basel the star of hope in the sky. The treaty was a link in a chain that discredited Prussia in the eyes of Europe; and to the historian of international relations the treaty is noteworthy, inasmuch as it involved a surrender by Frederick William III of the system of the Empire and the system of Europe.

The highest of all practical problems for the human race, Kant declared, is the establishment of a Civil Society universally administering right according to law.^[45] How can we institute and establish a Society in which liberty, under external laws, is combined in the greatest possible measure with irresistible power? It is the most difficult of problems: its perfect solution is not to be looked for, so crooked is the wood out of which men are carved. It will be the latest to find a practical solution, for the pre-requisites are of an exacting character—correct appreciation of the nature of a possible constitution; vast experience drawn from the practice of the ages, and especially a good will favourably disposed towards the reception of the solution.^[46] These are conditions that will not be easily satisfied in combination, and if they are satisfied at all it will be late in the course of time and after many attempts have been made in vain to solve the problem—that of establishing a true Civil Society. We have to reckon with the 'unsocial sociability' of men. Their disposition to enter into society is combined with a tendency to remain individuals, to resist the obligations of civil society, and thus to threaten its dissolution. Society must be made a moral and rational whole.

When an action is in agreement with juridical laws, we say that it has legality: when an action is in agreement with ethical laws, we say that it has morality. The coercion of law has its justification in the reason underlying the law. A perfect civil constitution cannot be established, unless the external relations between States are regulated according to law, with reason supporting the law. An advance has to be made from the lawless condition of savages: the Federation of Peoples has to be prepared for and entered upon. 'Every State, even the smallest, may thus rely for its safety and its rights not on its own power, nor on its own judgement of right, but only on this Foedus Amphictionum—on the combined power of this League of States, and on the decision of the common will according to laws.' This, said Kant, may seem to be very visionary; and the idea has been ridiculed in the way in which it has been put forward by an Abbé de Saint-Pierre or a Rousseau. But it is the inevitable issue of the necessity in which men are tied to each other. Wars should subserve—should, in their results, be made to subserve—this end. Wars (when we think of the purpose of Nature) are attempts to bring about new relations between peoples; through destruction or dismemberment they institute new political corporations. Out of all the actions and reactions of men is nothing rational to result? Is it to be said, and is it to be incontrovertible, that discord is natural to our species, and that, in spite of the presence of many marks of a civilized society, all is but a preparation for a 'hell of evils' at the end? Cultivated we have become, and to a high degree, in the sciences and arts. We are civilized, even to excess, in all that pertains to forms of politeness and social elegance. But much remains to be done before it can be said that we have been moralized. Schemes of external aggrandizement are evidence of this imperfect condition. It is clear, therefore, that the perfecting of international relationship must be preceded in States by a process, and perhaps a long process, of internal improvement, for, without the appropriate disposition—the morally good disposition—on the part of the several commonwealths and their members, there cannot be a true and lasting League of Nations; there will be mere illusion and glittering misery.

When we are thinking of the end that should be, and is, set before humanity, right must not be conceived in compromises. We must not break right in halves, or place it somewhere between justice and utility. Nor should we permit ourselves to be deflected in our thought, and from our purpose, by the emphasis which the historian puts, almost exclusively, upon results and by the historian's definition—not merely his interpretation—of facts in the life of men in society. The 'result' usually becomes mixed up with principles of right. The result is uncertain: what the historian takes to be the result may not be the conclusive event. But, whereas the result, in the historian's sense, is uncertain, principles of right are always certain in themselves.

Little reflection is needed to see that a lasting universal Peace on the basis of the Balance of Power is a mere chimera. It would be like the house described by Swift, which the architect constructed so perfectly in conformity with the laws of equilibrium that when a sparrow lighted on the house it at once fell. No: the only remedy against so great evils is a system of International Right, founded upon public laws, and secured by power to enforce them, power to which every State must submit just as the several members of a State submit to the order of civil and political right established. 'Every people, for the sake of its own security, may and ought to demand from any other people that it shall join in entering into a constitution, similar to the civil constitution, in which the right of each shall be secured. Thus would arise a League of Nations.'^[47]

What should be the Articles of a Perpetual Peace between States?

I. Preliminary Articles:

(1) No conclusion of Peace shall be valid when it has been made with the secret reservation of the means for a future war.

(z) No State shall be merged by inheritance, exchange, gift or sale in another State.

(3) Standing armies shall, in the course of time, be entirely abolished.

(4) No National Debts shall be contracted in the pursuit of the external interests of the State.

(5) No State shall interfere by force with the system of government of another State.

(6) No State at war with another State shall use such methods of warfare as would render mutual confidence impossible in a future Peace.

 

II. The Definitive Articles:

(1) The Civil Constitution in every State shall be republican.^[48]

(2) International Right shall be founded on a Federation of Free States.

(3) There shall be world-citizenship, in the sense that men, in the cosmo-political system, shall have free access to any State of the world, and a title to reside therein.

The main force of the contribution made by Kant to the study and history of this subject was compressed by him into a few words towards the close of his Rechtslehre, which was published about two years after his essay on Perpetual Peace.

The natural condition of nations as of individuals, he says,^[49] is a condition that it behoves us to pass out of in order to enter into a condition founded on law. Before such transition, all the Right of Nations and all the external property of States that can be acquired or maintained by war are provisory merely; it is only in a Universal Union of States analogous to that by which a nation becomes a State^[50] that they become peremptory. In no other way can a real condition of Peace be established. But there may be a too great extension of such a Union of States. The extension may include such vast and dissimilar territories that any real government of the Union, and any genuine protection of its individual members, will become impossible; we should be brought round again to a condition of war. 'Hence it is that the Perpetual Peace, which is the ultimate end of all the Right of Nations, becomes an impracticable idea.' But we must not therefore withdraw our allegiance and support from the political principles which have this end as their aim. These principles call upon us to aid the formation of such unions among States as may promote a continuous approximation to a Perpetual Peace; and these principles are not to be dismissed as being impracticable, for the problem of approximation is itself a problem that both involves a duty and tests good judgement.

Such a Union of States, with a view to the maintenance of Peace, may be called a General Congress of Nations. It is intended to be permanent. But the Congress is a voluntary combination of States. It would be dissoluble; its duration would depend upon the sovereign wills of the several members of the League. It would not be such a union as is embodied in the constitution of the United States of America; it would not bean indissoluble union.^[51] It is only by means of a Congress of this kind that the idea of a Public Right among Nations can become real; only by such means can their differences be settled by civil process, instead of by the barbarous means of war.

Perpetual Peace may not be realized. But that is no reason why we should not work towards its realization; and towards that end we should work to establish that constitution which seems most fitted to achieve the end. It may even be said that the universal and lasting establishment of Peace constitutes not a part only, but the whole final purpose and end, of the Science of Right as viewed within the limits of Reason. But there is need of caution as to the time and the means of action. We must take care lest by proceeding precipitately and in a revolutionary manner we destroy the existing defective constitution at the incalculable cost of annihilating, for some indefinite time, the whole foundation of law on which Society rests. But if we proceed by gradual reform, and are guided by certain clear and fixed principles, we may lead by continuous approximation to the highest political good: we may be led to Perpetual Peace.^[52]

The teaching of Rousseau and the teaching of Kant, partly inspired by Rousseau, on this subject are in agreement in the essentials. One of the subtlest of intellects and one of the strongest agree that there can be no lasting security for right among nations, and no hope of Perpetual Peace, unless a supra-national disposition can be engendered and fostered that shall prevail over national inherited sentiment. This inherited sentiment is in itself good; without it there cannot be a nation. But this national sense of right and interest must be brought to subserve an international right and to contribute to the interest of all. There must be a League of Nations, and in that Federation the smaller States must be given adequate and, it may be, generous representation. The guardianship of the rights and interests of the smaller States must be a cherished function of such a League; the touchstone of its success will, to no small extent, be found in how it discharges that function. In its very nature such a League is supra-national; especially in the motive of its origin it is supra-national. The nations are in the League less as nations than as members of the League, and for its ends. Further, there is need of a supra-national force, need of a 'sanction' that is supra-national. A supra-national disposition, a supra-national League, and a supra-national force: these are all essential. But the most essential of these is the supra-national disposition. Without this there can be no true League. Without it force will be used neither in the right way nor for the right end. With the supra-national disposition fully and freely working there would be no need of force; the indwelling energy of the spirit of the Federation would make the use of force unnecessary. Yet the necessary means of using force for right would always be in reserve and always available against wrong threatened and a wrong done.

The whole question of the relation between Politics and Ethics is involved in this inquiry; and that has been an interminable theme for writers, and for such especially among them as treat of principles apart from the conditions that must shape policy, and discuss ends without making any due allowance for the imperfection of the instruments. The conclusions of two recent English writers may here be cited.

'Just so far as States are thoroughly formed,' said T. H. Green,^[53] 'the diversion of patriotism into the military element tends to come to an end.' Will, not Force, is the true basis of the State. This diversion of patriotism into the military element is 'a survival from a condition of things in which, as yet, the State, in the full sense, was not; in the sense, namely, that in each territory controlled by a single independent government, the rights of all persons, as founded on their capacities for contributing to a common good, are equally established by one system of law.'^[54] It is this capacity of contributing to a common good that tests the development of the relations between States. According as the organization of these relations becomes more nearly complete, 'the more the motives and occasions of international conflict tend to disappear, while the bonds of unity become stronger'.^[55]

The place of International Law, said Henry Sidgwick, is intermediate between Positive Law and Positive Morality, and parts of it 'have reached a degree of definiteness that makes it resemble the former more than the latter. But this is not the case with the most important rules of international duty'.^[56] International duty is not to be determined on the basis of exclusive regard for 'national interest', and where the two conflict the former must be held paramount. Generally, however, 'though not always', it is the interest of a State 'to observe the recognised rules of international duty, so long as it has a reasonable expectation that they will be observed by other States. It is a more doubtful question whether a State ought to risk war to prevent high-handed aggression by another State against a third.'^[57]

If we examine the lawfulness of war by right reason, said Grotius, and by the nature of human society, which is the second and most nearly perfect rule to judge by, we shall plainly perceive that it is not all manner of force that is thereby forbidden, but that only which is repugnant to human society—that, namely, which invades the right of another.^[58]

It has been the object of International Lawyers to assist in determining the nature and the obligations of this 'human society'. Since its foundation, International Law has assumed the existence of a great community of peoples—'the Family of Nations', 'the Society of Nations', to which rights in common pertain, and on which obligations in common rest. Keep faith, and aim at peace.^[59] These are the two lasting injunctions of him whom we may still call 'Father of the Law of Nations'.^[60] The end of war is peace.^[61] The history of International Law records the progress of a community of rights, interests, and obligations among nations, and the expansion of the Family of Nations. History, in the proportions in which she is presented when she tells of the relations of States, has had more to say of disappointment and failures than of fulfilment and success, although it may be that the historian has given too little attention to the question propounded by Bishop Berkeley in the Querist, whether nations as well as individuals may not sometimes go mad.

All who are in the line of true succession from the founders of International Law have built upon this assumption of a Society of Nations. The assumption has been necessary to them for their definitions and their standards, their whole sense of values. 'The family of nations', we read in a well-known text-book,^[62] 'is an aggregate of States which, as the result of their historical antecedents, have inherited a common civilisation, and are at a similar level of moral and political opinion.'^[63] Outside of the Family no State can be regarded as a 'normal international person'.

If the assumption of a genuine Society of Nations were wholly valid, there would be little need to supplement it by instituting a formal League, which in time, if not in its origin, might be too mechanically governmental. Yet this assumption, almost complete in its range and character, has given to International Lawyers the ground for their hopes. 'It is a bright feature of modern civilisation, wrote one of the most distinguished of them in recent years, 'that the Governments of Europe allow in their intercourse with one another considerable weight to a rule of Right as controlling the dictates of ambition or of interest, and that their respect for such Right commends itself to the conscience of the Nations which they represent. No human society has ever long subsisted, or ever can long subsist, without being bound together by good laws, much less the Society of Nations. It has been the signal merit of the Statesmen of Europe, who have had charge of the international interests of their respective States during the last half century, that they have agreed to modify the customary Law of Nations from time to time so as to adapt it to the enlightened demands of an advancing civilisation. The consequence has been, that, however indeterminate in a certain sense are the rules of that Law, it is a Law of the Living, and not of the Dead, and whilst there will always be much question about the details of its application its flexibility as customary law will always preserve it from becoming obsolete. Meanwhile, those who by genius and study are capable of mastering its principles, and of applying them with discernment to the maintenance of a sound public opinion, where questions of Right and Wrong are at issue between Independent States, are in substance although not in form the true law-givers of Nations in this respect. They can however claim no supreme authority for themselves, but must rest satisfied with commending their views of international obligation to the reason of Statesmen, and to the conscience of mankind at large.'^[64]

About three hundred years before these words were written, thirty-one years before the great work of Grotius was published, and in a year intermediate between the first and the more important of the books on War written by Gentilis, Grotius’s precursor, the essential foundations of a true Law of Nations were made clear by one of the greatest and most representative of Englishmen–Richard Hooker. There is a law, he said, which concerns men as individuals. There is, secondly, a law which belongs to them as they are men linked with others in some form of political society; nor should they forget that 'as any mans deed past is good as long as him selfe continueth: so the act of a publique societie of men done five hundreth yeares sithence standeth as theirs, who presently are of the same societies, because corporations are immortall: we were then alive in our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still'.^[65] There is a third kind of law—that which touches all the several bodies politic, 'so far forth as one of them hath publique commerce with another. And this third is the Lawe of nations. Betweene men and beastes there is no possibilitie of sociable communion, because the welspring of that communion is a naturall delight which man hath to transfuse from him selfe into others, and to receyve from others into himselfe especially those thinges wherein the excellencie of his kind doth most consist. The chiefest instrument of humaine communion therefore is speech, because thereby we impart mutuallie one to another the conceiptes of our reasonable understanding.^[66] And for that cause seing beastes are not hereof capable, for as much as with them we can use no such conference, they being in degree, although above other creatures on earth to whome nature hath denied sense, yet lower then to be sociable companions of man to whome nature hath given reason; it is of Adam said that amongst the beastes He found not for him selfe any meete companion.^[67] Civill society doth more content the nature of man then any private kind of solitarie living, because in societie this good of mutuall participation is so much larger then otherwise. Herewith notwithstanding we are not satisfied, but we covet (if it might be) to have a kind of societie & fellowship even with al mãkind. Which thing Socrates intending to signifie professed him self a Citizen, not of this or that cõmon-welth, but of the world.^[68] And an effect of that very natural desire in us, (a manifest token that we wish after a sort an universall fellowship with all men) appeareth by the wounderful delight men have, some to visit forrein countries, some to discover natiõs not heard of in former ages, we all to know the affaires & dealings of other people, yea to be in league of amitie with them; & this not onely for trafiques sake, or to the end that when many are cõfederated each may make other the more strong, but for such cause also is^[69] moved the Queene of Saba to visit Salomon;^[70] & in a word because nature doth presume that how many mẽ there are in the world, so many Gods as it were ther are, or at least wise such they should be towards men. Touching lawes which are to serve men in this behalfe, even as those lawes of reason which (man retayning his original integritie) had bene sufficient to direct each particular person in all his affaires & duties, are not sufficient but require the accesse of other lawes, now that man and his offspring are growne thus corrupt and sinfull; againe as those lawes of politie & regiment, which would have served men living in publique societie together with that harmlesse disposition which then they should have had, are not able now to serve when mens iniquitie is so hardly restrained within any tolerable bounds: in like manner the nationall lawes of mutuall commerce betweene societies of that former and better qualitie might have bene other then now, when nations are so prone to offer violence iniurie and wrong. Hereupon hath growne in everie of these three kindes that distinction between Primarie & Secundarie lawes; the one groũded upon sincere, the other built upon depraved nature. Primarie lawes of nations are such as concerne embassage, such as belong to the courteous entertaynment of forreiners and strangers, such as serve for commodious trafique & the like. Secundarie lawes in the same kinde are such as this present unquiet world is most familiarly acquainted with, I meane lawes of armes, which yet are much better known then kept. But what matter the lawe of nations doth containe I omit to search. The strength and vertue of that law is such that no particular nation can lawfulle preiudice the same by any their several laws & ordinances, more then a man by his private resolutions the law of the whole common welth or state wherin he liveth. For as civill law being the act of a whole body politique doth therfore overrule each severall part of the same bodie: so there is no reason that any one common welth of it self should to the preiudice of another annihilate that whereupon the whole world hath agreed.'^[71]

1. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, To Himself, Book vi, 44.
2. It has been sympathetically and finely appreciated by Robertson, Regnum Dei (1901), with St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei as the central theme.
3. Especially in his De Monarchia. Writing of the Commedia, Dean Church said: 'Lucretius had drawn forth the poetry of nature and its laws; Virgil and Livy had unfolded the poetry of the Roman Empire; St. Augustine, the still grander poetry of the history of the City of God; but none had yet ventured to weave into one the three wonderful threads.'—Dante (1878), with a translation of De Monarchia by F. J. Church. On the scheme of De Monarchia see pp. 88–90 and 93–7. See also Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, and Robertson, Regnum Dei.

   The following extracts will show Dante's general standpoint. 'There is a certain proper operation of the whole body of human kind, for which this whole body of men in all its multitudes is ordered and constituted, but to which no one man, nor single family, nor single neighbourhood (vicinia), nor single city (civitas), nor particular kingdom (regnum particulare) can attain' (bk. i. iii). 'It is plain that the whole human race is ordered to gain some end. … There must, therefore, be one to guide and govern, and the proper title for this office is Monarch or Emperor. And so it is plain that Monarchy or the Empire is necessary for the welfare of the world' (bk. i. v.). 'And as the part is to the whole, so is the order of parts to the order of the whole (sic ordo partialis ad totalem). The part is to the whole, as to an end and highest good which is aimed at; and, therefore, the order in the parts is to the order in the whole, as it is to the end and highest good aimed at' (Pars ad totum se habet, sicut ad finem et optimum. Ergo et ordo in parte, ad ordinem in toto, sicut ad finem et optimum) (i. vi.). 'Further, the whole human race is a whole with reference to certain parts, and, with reference to another whole, it is a part. For it is a whole with reference to particular kingdoms and nations …, and it is a part with reference to the whole universe. … It is only under the rule of one prince that the parts of humanity are well adapted to their whole …; therefore, it is only by being under one Princedom, or the rule of a single Prince, that humanity as a whole is well adapted to the Universe, or its Prince, who is the One God' (i. vii.).

4. Gierke (Professor of Law in the University of Berlin), Political Theories of the Middle Age, translated with an Introduction (pp. vii–xlv) by Maitland, 1900, pp. 3–4. Both the text and the introduction show rare scholarship, and there are almost a hundred pages (101-197) of notes full of learning on mediaeval thought. See especially the chapters, 'Macrocosm and Microcosm'; 'Unity in Church and State'; 'The Idea of Organization'; 'The Idea of Personality'; 'The Relation of the State to the Law'.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
6. 'Dante, I, c. 3 and 4, endeavours to define the common purpose of Mankind. He finds it in the continuous activity of the whole potency of Reason, primarily in the speculative, secondarily in the practical. This is the 'operatio propria universitatis humanae'; the individual man, the household, the civitas and the regnum particulare are insufficient for it. For the achievement of it only a World-Realm will serve, and the propinquissimum medium is the establishment of an Universal Peace. Comp. III, c. 16.'⁠ Ibid., note, p. 103.
7. Gierke, op. cit., p. 10, and note, pp. 103–4, on mediaeval thought in relation to the Universal Church and the Commonwealth of Mankind. See, further, pp. 17–18, 22 (Society as organism), 75-6 (the Law of God, of Nature, and of Nations—Ius Commune Gentium, such law as all nations agreed in recognizing), 90–1 (the Final Cause of the State), and notes on pp. 188–9.
8. Nys, Les Origines du Droit International (1894), p. 388. The high mission of the Emperor was to maintain peace. 'Imperator-pacificus, tel était le plus ancien, le plus beau de ses titres.'⁠ Ibid., p. 390. 'Karolus gratia Dei Rex … a Deo coronatus magnus Pacificus Imperator.'
9. Nys, ch. xiv, 'Les Irénistes,' gives mediaeval anticipations and analogies. See also the chapter, 'La Paix et les Traités de Paix', pp. 264–77.
10. 'Projet de Traité pour rendre la paix perpétuelle entre les souverains chrétiens, pour maintenir toujours le commerce entre les nations et pour affermir beaucoup davantage les maisons souveraines sur le trône, proposé autrefois par Henri le Grand Roi de France, agréé par la Reine Elisabeth, par Jaques I, et par la plupart des autres potentats de l'Europe.'—2 vols., 1712 (about 700 pages); a third in 1717.
11. 3 vols.
12. History of the Law of Nations, pp. 263–4.
13. Les Origines du Droit International, pp. 398–9.
14. Article 4.⁠ See Extrait du Projet de Paix perpétuelle in Rousseau's Œuvres (1839), iv. 267; Vaughan, The Political Workings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, 2 vols., 1915, i, p. 375.
15. Du Contrat Social, liv. i, c. vi.
16. Du Contrat Social, i. vii.
17. Ibid., ii. v.
18. 'Après avoir posé les vrais principes du droit politique, et tâché de fonder l'état sur sa base, il resteroit à l'appuyer par ses relations externes: ce qui comprendroit le droit des gens, le commerce, le droit de la guerre et les conquêtes, le droit public, les ligues, les négociations, les traités, etc. Mais tout cela forme un nouvel objet trop vaste pour ma courte vue; j'aurois dû la fixer toujours plus près de moi'.—iv. ix.
19. Published in 1761; written in 1756.
20. Published in 1782; written in 1756.
21. 1762.
22. Jugement sur la Paix perpétuelle, Œuvres (1839), t. iv, pp. 280–1; Vaughan (with slight variations, e.g. 'République' for 'république', 'résulteraient' for 'résulteroient', and a colon instead of a comma after 'éternellement'), i, p. 388.
23. Œuvres, iv, p. 283; Vaughan, i, pp. 390–1.
24. iv, p. 284; i, p. 392.
25. Du Contrat Social, l. ii, c. vi; Œuvres, iv, p. 341; Vaughan, ii, pp. 50–1.
26. 'Sera-ce d'un commun accord, par une inspiration subite?'—Du Contrat Social, l. ii, c. vi.
27. Jugement sur la Paix perpétuelle—concluding words, Œuvres, iv, p. 288; Vaughan, i, p. 396.
28. This was written before the publication of the Extrait de la Paix perpétuelle in 1761.
29. Œuvres, iii, pp. 571–2; Vaughan, ii, pp. 157–8.
30. More, Utopia, pp. 118, 120, of ed. in English by Burnet, 1762.
31. '… une forme de gouvernement confédérative, qui, unissant les peuples par des liens semblables à ceux qui unissent les individus, soumette également les uns et les autres à l'autorité des lois.'
32. 'Les derniers soupirs de la Grèce devinrent encore illustres dans la igue achéenne.'
33. 'Une sorte de système.'
34. Œuvres, iv, pp. 256–80, especially 257–66; Vaughan, i, pp. 365–87, especially 365–74.
35. Essay iv of his 'Principles of International Law', written between 1786 and 1789, Works (1843), ii, pp. 535–60.
36. Essay i, 'Objects of International Law', Works, ii, p. 537.
37. Essay iii, 'Of War, considered in respect of its causes and consequences', Works, ii, p. 544.
38. Essay ii, Works, ii, pp. 544–5.
39. See Propositions iii–v and xi–xii, Works, ii, p. 550.
40. 'I lay down two propositions: 1. That in no negociation, and at no period of any negociation, ought the negociations of the cabinet in this country to be kept secret from the public at large; much less from parliament and after inquiry made in parliament. 2. That whatever may be the case with preliminary negociations, such secrecy ought never to be maintained with regard to treaties actually concluded.' Works, ii, p. 554.
41. 'Anarchical Fallacies', towards the end. In this work Bentham examined the Declarations of Rights issued during the French Revolution.
42. Rosenkranz, one of the editors of Kant's Works.
43. Rechtslehre, 1796–7/
44. § 61 of Part ii, treating of Public Right.
45. 'The Natural Principle of the Political Order', Fifth Proposition.
46. This third pre-requisite—the right moment and the right mind—is emphasized as strongly by Rousseau as by Kant, who gives clear evidence of being influenced here and at other vital points of his Politics by Rousseau.
47. 'Perpetual Peace', second definitive article.
48. By a 'republican' constitution Kant means one that observes the three following principles: the liberty of the members of a Society as men; the dependence of all its members on legislation common to all as subjects; and the legal equality of its members as citizens. No. xlviii of The Federalist has some acute remarks on 'a representative republic' and its distinction from 'a democracy'.
49. Rechtslehre, ii, § 61.
50. Men and nations, owing to their mutual influence on each other, require a juridical constitution uniting them under one will, so that they may participate in what is right. This relation of the members of a nation to each other constitutes the civil union in the social state; and when viewed as a whole as affecting its constituent members it forms the State. When we are thinking of 'the supposed hereditary unity' of the people we speak of 'nation' rather than State; when we are thinking of the common interest pertaining to all to live in a juridical union, we speak of 'State' or 'Commonwealth'.⁠ Ibid., ii, § 43.
51. This appreciation by Kant of the nature of the constitution of the United States is noteworthy owing to the time at which it was written. 'If, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America,' said Madison in No. xlv of The Federalist, 'is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States?' In the course of a well-informed and able estimate of the influence of Chief-Justice Marshall on constitutional development in the United States, it has been said that a single phrase in one of his latest decisions struck the key-note of all, when he spoke of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as 'indispensable to the preservation of the Union, and consequently of the independence and liberty of these States'.—Constitutional History of the United States as seen in the Development of American Law, by Judge T. M. Cooley and others (1889), p. 111.
52. § 61 and the conclusion of Rechtslehre.
53. Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (1895), pp. xxiv + 252, reprinted from his Philosophical Works, vol. ii. See the whole of the chapter entitled 'The Right of the State over the Individual in War'. The lectures were delivered during 1879–80.
54. Ibid., pp. 175–6. See p. 177 for the influences which combined to turn Europe into an armed camp.
55. pp. 177–8.
56. Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics, 1891, 2nd ed., 1897, pp. xxxiii + 665; ch. xvii on 'International Law and Morality', § 4. See also ch. xv, 'Principles of International Duty'; ch. xvi, 'The Regulation of War'.
57. Ibid., ch. xviii, 'Principles of External Policy'.
58. De Iure Belli ac Pacis, bk. i, ch. ii, § 1.
59. De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Preface and bk. iii, ch. xxv, §§ 1–3, 7.
60. In the introduction to the first volume (p. 12) of the Grotius Society (founded 1915), Professor Goudy says of the De Iure Belli ac Pacis, 'That great work must ever be regarded as the matrix of our science, and must be resorted to for the statement of fundamental truths.' 'International Law, if it is to have any enduring authority, must be based on the fundamental principles of human rights and must give effect to the common welfare of nations. All assertions of right arising from patriotism or "my country before everything" (über alles) must be swept aside as noxious hindrances to progress. The ideal of perpetual peace among civilized nations is indeed still a long way off—much further than pacificists too hastily suppose—but it is none the less the ideal of International Law. It is

    The vision whereunto
    •⁠•⁠•⁠•Toils the indomitable world.'

    The following Papers published in the volumes of the Grotius Society have value for the historical student: vol. ii (1917), 'The Principles underlying the Doctrine of Contraband and Blockade', by J. E. G. Montmorency; 'International Leagues', by W. R. Bischopp; vol. iii (1918), 'Treaties of Peace' (not 'as a means of terminating war', but 'as instruments of peace'), by Commander Sir Graham Bower; vol. iv (1919), 'The League of Nations', by Lord Parmoor; 'The Treaty-making Power of the Crown', by Judge Atherley Jones; 'Some European Leagues of Peace', by W. Evans Darby; 'Divergences between British and other Views of International Law', by Georges Kaechenbeeck; 'The Freedom of the Scheldt', by Albert Maeterlinck and by W. R. Bischopp, and discussion.

61. Grotius, op. cit., § 2, cites Aristotle, Sallust, St. Augustine.
62. T. E. Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, first ed., 1880.
63. Ibid., p. 347 of the 7th ed., 1895. The book has a concise and helpful chapter (xviil) on International Law.
64. Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations … in Time of Peace, new ed., 1884, pp. xlii-xliii.
65. Compare Burke: 'Society … is a partnership. … As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place.'—Reflections on the Revolution in France, Works (1823), v, p. 183.
66. Arist. Pol. i, c. 2.
67. Gen. ii. 20.
68. Cic. Tusc. 5 [cap. 37], and i, de legib. [cap. 12].
69. A misprint, in the first edition, for 'as'.
70. 1 Kings x. 1; 2 Chron. ix. 1; Matt. xiii. 42; Luke xi. 31.
71. Of the Lawes of Ecclestasticall Politie, bk. i. 10, pp. 74 and 76–7 of the first edition, which has been followed in the extract given.